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STATE OF FLORIDA

VS.

CURTIS JUDSON REEVES

Defendant.

\_\_\_\_\_

TAKEN BY: State Attorney's Office

DATE: November 19, 2021

TIME: 9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

PLACE: Criminal Justice Center

14250 - 49th Street North

Clearwater, Florida

REPORTED BY: Sharon K. Allbritton

Shorthand Reporter

Notary Public

State of Florida at Large

\_\_\_\_\_

UNSWORN TELEPHONIC STATEMENT OF ROY BEDARD

\_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 1-162

APPEARANCE: GLENN MARTIN, ESQ.

Assistant State Attorney 14250 - 49th Street North Clearwater, FL 33762

TELEPHONIC: DINO MICHAELS, ESQ.

Escobar & Associates

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Suite 100

Tampa, FL 33609

Counsel for the Defendant

## 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 WHEREUPON, 3 4 ROY BEDARD 5 the witness herein, was examined and testified 6 telephonically as follows: 7 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MARTIN: 8 9 Mr. Bedard, would you state your name for the Q 10 record, please? 11 Yes. Roy Bedard. Mr. Bedard, this is a telephonic statement 12 13 that we're taking today. It's the continuation of 14 your deposition on October 12, 2021. 15 Do you agree to take this telephonic 16 statement in lieu of a deposition? 17 Yes. Α MR. MARTIN: Mr. Michaels, do you also agree? 18 19 MR. MICHAELS: I do. 20 (By Mr. Martin). All right. Pursuant to 2.1 Rule 3.220(h)(8) you will not be placed under oath. 22 And the Rule also specifies that the telephonic statement be recorded, which it is by the court 23 24 reporter. 25 So, Mr. Bedard, do you understand and agree

that this recorded statement may be used for impeachment at trial as a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code?

A I do.

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MR. MARTIN: And Mr. Michaels, do you also agree and understand?

MR. MICHAELS: I do.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you, gentlemen.

Q (By Mr. Martin). Mr. Bedard, I've attempted to structure this deposition so that we can go through specific topics. It will be similar to the structure that we used during your deposition. And what I'd like to do is begin with the areas that we kind of saved for the second deposition that was mentioned in your deposition in October. I sent you a letter I believe outlining those particular areas. You've complied with some of the request, but you are familiar with the letter and are you familiar with the topics that we saved for later based on that communication?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What I would like to do is, one of the things that I requested that you complied with, is providing me with a list of authoritative sources that you plan to use to support any conclusions or opinions

that you may have in this matter. So I'd like to go over those quickly with you, alright, sir?

A Yes.

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Q What I'm going to do is I'm just gonna list, or recite it to the record, the title of the article, and then I have some brief questions about it, alright, sir?

A Yes.

Q The first one is Event-related potentials and the decision to shoot: The role of threat perception and cognitive control. You provided me with that as one of your authoritative sources.

And what area do you believe that the information in that article supports any type of conclusions or opinions in this case?

A Let me preface, I think probably the next several questions you have for me by saying, that this is really somewhat of a continuation of my deposition where I did talk to you about some features of what I would testify to if I were asked questions about it.

Q That is correct.

A And I mentioned to you some very specific areas, and one of them I think was this Event-related potentials area that suggests that decisions are often times made long before we're consciously aware of it,

and that we had an opportunity of a very very short period of time, less than two hundred milliseconds, to actually cancel that order. So if a decision is made and it gets into the nervous system and the motor action begins, we only have about two hundred milliseconds to change our mind, and even if we do change our mind after that two hundred milliseconds, the motor action will often times still be carried out. For example, if you are deciding to shoot or don't shoot. If your first thought is to shoot because you believe that you are in great danger and then suddenly something happens within that two hundred milliseconds and you realize this is not a shoot situation. For example, most of the studies that I've dealt with have been law enforcement related. You see somebody pull something out of their pocket after you've ordered them to show their hands, and for a moment you're not sure what it is but it's black and it resembled perhaps a weapon, so with your finger on the trigger you decide that you're going to Suddenly you realize it's a cellphone, and it happens within two hundred milliseconds, you can withdraw the decision to shoot and the weapon won't fire. However, if it takes more than two hundred milliseconds to distinguish the difference between

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that black object as being a cellphone or a firearm, even if you realize that this is a cellphone, but it has taken more than two hundred milliseconds to discover that, you will then continue to fire.

2.1

And I think I described it to you in terms of a car door last time, that, you know, we all suffer from this problem of being able to veto decisions that are made regarding motor actions.

So this is an article that really talks about that. And I provided that more as a backdrop I guess to a conversation we previously had, like most of the articles that I put in here.

That's the reason that I sent that to you.

Q In reviewing that article did you do any other inquiry into that article as it relates to the methodology that was used by the authors of that article and evaluating the data and coming to the conclusions? Do you know how they did that?

A I do. I don't recall off the top of my head. I mean, these are mostly articles that I actually used for my dissertation. I was quite familiar with them several years ago. I understand the constructs of the articles, and they come to mind when I'm formulating opinions.

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I will admit that I had not gone back and

looked at the researched design and the, scrutinized perhaps even their findings. But what I spoke to earlier, the findings of this particular research, it appears this comes from a peer review article out of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. So it's gone through the riggers of peer review and so I find it reliable.

2.1

Q When we talk about peer review regarding the journal, is that individuals that are employed by the journal that review it to determine whether or not it's appropriate for the journal, or is it individuals independent of the journal that make the review, and how is that information related to the journal that it's appropriate?

A So I don't know every one of these journals and how they select their review boards. I have been on boards before where I've been selected. Mostly what happens is they find individuals who are in this particular field and this particular area of study that are not employed by the journal, most of the time, and they coordinate with those individuals. They either have a call list or they have somebody that perhaps even refers someone who's an expert in this particular area, and they will coordinate with them as a journal reviewer. And usually there's a

panel of them. There can be, you know, often times like five.

2.1

And then those reviewers will take the article in its raw form and they will review it. They will make suggestions and recommendations for improvement. If they find error in the research they'll certainly note that. Then they send it back to the original authors who will once again go through the article and make changes as requested by the reviewers before they publish their final versions. So that's usually the way it is done.

It's very rear that, for example, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology would have a board of people that review that. Reviewers are essentially I guess hired, for lack of a better word, or consulted by these journals who are peers in the field, not employed by the journal itself.

Q That's your understanding how it should be done maybe or normally it's done. Do you know how it was done at the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology?

A If I did know that I don't know it now.

Again, I didn't find it that important to go back and scrutinize who these reviewers were. Like so many articles I've read, I don't know, hundreds of them,

perhaps more than a thousand throughout my studies, it would be just a tiny pursuit. That I'd have to at some point rely on if it is a peer reviewed article that, um -- and if I find something wrong with the data or find something wrong with the conclusions based on the data, I wouldn't generally drill down deeper to answer the questions that you're asking me.

- Q All right. In reviewing the article

  Event-related potentials and the decision to shoot,

  did you find any articles, peer review articles, that

  criticized the finding of the authors of that journal

  article?
  - A No, I don't recall finding anything --
- O Did you look?

2.1

- A -- or look for criticism. I mean, the nature of science is that people do reexamine and retest, and perhaps there's something out there. But I don't recall this being a finding that was hotly contested or greatly debated within my field.
- Q Okay. And refresh the reader's memory. What is your field? We're talking about your dissertation. That's where you used this article, right?
- A Right. So my educational background again is
  I have both a masters and a PhD in Educational
  Psychology. And to refresh you again on educational

psychology, unlike a clinical psychologist, and this is I think the most safe way of saying it; unlike a clinical psychologist who generally deals with people who are not well, that have some type of disorder, a educational psychologist covers the other side of the scale as well, which are people who are not only well but often times very very well. For example, my major was sports psychology. I think I told you that during the deposition. And the sports psychologist deals often times with athletes who are in performance sports who deal with anxiety issues that need to be resolved through, you know, the help of an external counselor. So that is typically how a sports psychologist perform.

2.1

I don't really focus on the sports side of it. So my major encompasses three areas: Sport, exercise and performance. I focus mostly on performance because my studies were all dealing with mostly law enforcement officers. As a matter of fact, my dissertation was directed specifically to law enforcement officers.

And as I described to you last time, the reason that's-- how that ties back to educational psychology, and perhaps more importantly sports psychology, is because in sports psychology that's

where we find the data of stress where we actually have the ability in a controlled environment to empirically test stress and how it affects human performance and human psychology.

2.1

So taking what we know about stressful events that occur in high stress competition, we apply that to law enforcement to see if there are any findings on that world that can bleed over into the law enforcement world.

And I think -- I don't know if we spoke about this. I speak about it all the time. But it's very difficult to empirically test law enforcement officers in the field because, first of all, we never know when a stress related event is going to occur. Secondly, if they're in a stress related event it's often too dangerous for a researcher to be out there with law enforcement. So we find ourselves just simply doing a lot of self reporting from law enforcement, unlike in the sports world where we can actually set up an empirical test and manipulate variables to see how individuals perform, and those variables are manipulated.

So that's kind of the bridge from the sporting world to the performance world in which we have, you know, real life performance oriented issues

that call back to the research that we discovered in the sporting world.

2.1

Q Alright, sir. Regarding the same article, did the authors of that article in their final conclusion offer any caveats to their study or indicate that further study was necessary in order to verify any of their results?

A Most likely. I mean, that's the nature of science. You usually have, after your findings, you'll have a paragraph of all future directions. And I think most scientists realize that we are all building on each others' findings over long periods of time.

So there's gonna be a literature review of data that has come before the publication of this article. Then there's gonna be a description and the research method that were used in this particular article. And then generally at the end of a lot of these articles -- and I can't think of this one. And I'm sorry, I didn't bring the articles with me. I can probably pull them up. But I don't recall whether or not there is a area of future directions that would encourage somebody to not only reexamine past findings of these authors but maybe point out some areas where there is some question as to the ability to manipulate

or control variables. Sometimes there's limitations. There's also an area usually in these articles called limitations. There's just certain things that you can't control and manipulate that have also been pointed out.

So without knowing specifically about the Event-related potentials and the decision to shoot article, without looking at it, having it in front of me, I can't tell you absolutely if those things are there. But I can tell you that they most of the time are when you're looking at peer review articles.

Q All right. Part of the question that you did not address was whether or not the authors of that article placed any caveats on the use of their findings by individuals who are reading the article.

Was there anything that they said, you know, we're not quite sure about this. There may be a correlation but we haven't proved the causation so don't take it to mean A, B or C.

Was there anything like that in their article?

A I think it's mostly understood. First of all, I very rarely, if anything, causative. Almost everything is correlation. And I think it's understood that when you're reading the data that they

don't need to put a biline in like you just framed.

That when you take a look at the numbers, the actual data, you're looking at correlations. They can be strong correlations. They can be no correlations.

But you're looking at correlations. Causation is a very very difficult thing to prove in any respect.

2.1

So I don't believe there's a caveat like that in this article. I think that on the surface reading through the article it would be up to the reader to sort of glean that idea that of course this is not an absolute finding but rather there are some -- the variables need to be strongly correlated with respect to the research.

Q In order to save some time, okay, regarding all of the articles that we're gonna go through, if I ask you exactly the same questions that I did with this first article, would your response be basically the same?

A It would. And I think because article writing is generally similar across domain, it's done essentially the same way. I mean, there's courses about how to read articles because they are formatted in a certain way. But I think that there would be very little deviation in any of these articles.

There are some, like for example, the next

one, FLETC. I'm not sure if that was a peer review article or not.

2.1

- Q No. It's a training manual from the U.S.

  Department of Homeland Security. We're going to get into that one a little bit more.
- A Yeah. So there may be some on here that are slightly different. But if they're peer review articles, they're generally formatted approximately the same. And so I think my answer to those, again, not having these articles laid out in front of me, would be approximately the same.
- Q And for each of the articles, the very last thing we spoke about as far as caveats and warnings by the authors of the articles, the reader who is attempting to use the findings in the article understands that what they found was not an absolute finding, they are simply a correlation and to what degree it correlated was within the article.

A Right. And you should also recall, I mean, during the research methods you have to-- you know, the ultimate goal of all of these articles is to generalize. But sometimes you can't do that. For example, if you don't have a random study. And a lot of the articles I read are not random studies. We select law enforcement officers. I mean, it's random

within the field of law enforcement but they don't generalize to everyone, right.

2.1

is partly based on the research design. And I believe for most of these, like for example, the Johnson & Raab article Take the First, this is a generalizable study. It wasn't selecting a particular occupation of individuals, but basically looking at how human beings think under pressure. How they make decisions under pressure.

Klein, a lot of his studies tend to be a little less generalized but because he very specifically looks at, for example, firefighters and law enforcement officers. So I recognize that in all of these articles.

The Lazarus article that you'll ask me about is really about human beings. It does generalize.

It's how we appraise and develop coping mechanisms for dealing with stress and so on and so on.

So, you know, there's several answers I think to your question, one is in the research design, the other will be in the limitations that may be stated at the end of the article. All of those would point out to the reader the caveats that you eluded to. And of course if you're reading the whole article those are

the things that you would pick up on.

Q Here's what I'd like to do with the rest of the articles. There's three areas that we're going to discuss in a little bit: Self-efficacy, the various artifacts that we discussed at the last deposition, and threat assessment. Using those as very broad topics. The, Take the First: Option generation and resulting choices, which one of those three topics would that fall under?

A That would be broadly under decision making. And, I'm sorry, Mr. Martin, I did not write down the three categories you gave me.

Q Sure. Let me do it again for you. We're gonna talk about self-efficacy.

A Yup.

2.1

Q The various artifacts that you talked about: Fragment memory, tunnel vision, auditory dissociation. You know, all those things that we talked about. Broadly you refer to all of those as artifacts.

A Yup.

Q Okay. And then threat assessment. Those are the three topics we discussed at your previous deposition. If we use those as the broad topics, the question is the article Take the First, what topic would that fall under?

- A Let me just add the last one if it's okay.
- Q Sure.

2.1

- A I think threat assessment deserves a second description, which would be decision making. Because threat assessment leads to the decision that you'll make.
  - Q Okay.
- A So to be clear on that. It's not a different topic but it would be threat assessment/decision making, okay. So we can talk about how you would evaluate an environmental stimulus and you decide what you're going to do. And I would say in this case, Take the First would fit under that category.
- Q All right. Sources of Power: How People make Decisions by Mr. Klein.
- A As well it would fit under threat assessment and decision making.
  - Q Stress, Appraisal and Coping.
- A This would have a little bit to do with self-efficacy. It kind of bleeds over into self-efficacy. And then also threat assessment and decision making because Lazarus & Folkman recognize that everyone's different. Everyone has their limitations and everyone views the world in a different way. So that would be the self-efficacy

component. But the threat assessment is a continuum that they would argue is consistent from person to person. In other words, when you hit the threshold of a challenge and it moves past your coping mechanisms it becomes a threat. So it kind of bleeds over into that.

2.1

- Q All right. Information Processing in Motor Skills.
- A Decision making. You're talking about Martuniak, right?
- Q Yes. Shoot or Don't Shoot? Why Police
  Officers Are More Inclined to Shoot When They Are
  Anxious.
- A You know, I don't remember if Nieuwenhuys-he does talk about self-efficacy issues, but I think
  this article is specifically about threat assessment.
  - Q Sitting Duck or Scaredy-cat?
- A Likewise, this is gonna be threat assessment and decision making.
  - Q The Tactical Edge.
  - A The Tactical Edge I'm sure you're familiar with having been in law enforcement yourself, was mostly a book on police tactics and how law enforcement officers manage threats in the environment. So this would be threat assessment as

well.

2.1

There are some areas of self-efficacy. They talk about coping mechanisms but not using that language. They talk about, you know, being prepared with proper weaponry and things like that. So I think it's a bleed over into self-efficacy as well with some of what I read in the Tactical Edge. And, by the way, this is not a peer review journal. This is literally a text book I guess that law enforcement officers have used since the mid 80s with respect to officer safety skills.

Q Performing under Pressure: Gaze control, decision making and shooting performance.

A This is going to be mostly -- there is a discussion within here in particular, and also John Vickers does talk about the artifacts that we often times see when stress is introduced. Gaze control would be an example of that. Attenuating stimulus in the environment that are not critical at that moment and attending to those things that are critical. This article talks a little bit about that. But more importantly it compares the elite police officer to the rookie officer showing that a elite officer can actually improve on the skills of attendance by attending to the important things.

And I thought this was important in this particular case based on Mr. Reeves' background, that he would be-- I don't know that he'd consider himself an elite police officer at the time of the shooting, but he certainly has the background and experience and education to qualify as an elite officer.

2.1

Q So his ability to overcome the artifacts would be at a heightened level and you would expect him to be able, at least to some level, to overcome those artifacts; is that what you're telling me?

A Yeah, I think he would, you know, over a, for example, an untrained person. It's not really -- the artifacts remember are things that are left over in the hindsight. So when we talk about artifacts we are really talking about stress related performance. And then from the stress related performance you leave artifacts.

And when I mentioned this to you in deposition, I said a lot of times when I interview individuals that's what I'm looking for. I'm trying to find out if somebody is just giving me a line about how afraid they were or if they were really afraid. Because fear generates these stress related performance problems and it leaves artifacts, right. So, for example, if somebody says, man, I never saw

that. I was standing right there. I never saw it.

That might be an indication of tunnel vision. Or a person says, you know, gosh, the guy was shooting at me and I only heard the first shot and I started shooting. I didn't hear my gun shoot back. And they're telling me that. That's an artifact of stress, meaning that they were probably motivated by fear at that time. That's when it happens.

2.1

So just to be clear with artifacts, I should probably add to that category as well and include stress related performance.

And I would say that to your question, yes, stress related performance can be improved on through training and through— well, first of all, understanding what happens to us when we get stressed, but secondly, practicing under conditions and circumstances that someone inoculate us to the stress related performance issues.

And I would think that, uh -- and I do, even after hearing the first interview from Reeves, that he was able to, to not enter into stress related performance problems in the way that perhaps somebody without his training would have.

Q Then we have -- I don't know if this -- I think this is a book. Self-Efficacy by B-a-n-d-u-r-a.

A It is a book. And there's a lot here, Mr.

Martin. And the reason that I included this is

because I think I specifically mentioned it during --

You did.

A -- our conversation during the last deposition. Bandura is, I don't know, he's probably credited as being, I think the father of is probably too great of a title. But really one of the -- one of the original researchers that dealt specifically with self-efficacy issues. So this book would fall mostly under self-efficacy and how individuals would define

their beliefs about their capabilities to exercise,

of their life, and this could be low stress or high

you know, control over themselves during various parts

stress. He's not specific to law enforcement. Or, for that matter, he's not even specific to high stress related events. He's just specific to individuals and how we view ourselves in terms of what we're capable of doing. And that is something that is referred to as self-efficacy.

Q I'm going to ask you if you agree or disagree with this statement, okay?

A Yup.

2.1

Q "Perceived self-efficacy was introduced by Bandura (1977) as an integrated theoretical framework

to explain and predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment."

A Yes, I agree with that.

2.1

Q Since 1997, and of course we have this book in 1994, are you aware of any articles or research that have criticized the conceptual and the methodological way in which he performed his tests and gathered his data?

A Not specifically. I know that the field of self-efficacy has evolved quite a bit, and often times when that happens it's because people are critical of what you have originally wrote. So I can't point to an article specifically that broke down his research methods and were critical to the point where they said, okay, this is not true. This whole construct of self-efficacy is not holding up.

But yes, in the 70s the construct of self-efficacy has evolved significantly. And many many other people-- I think, for example, if you were to type in, and I'm sure you've probably already done this with Bandura, you'll see a whole lot of other authors that are weighing in on the construct of self-efficacy and what affects it.

So I would say to your question, yes, there has been a lot of criticism which is the nature of

science. It's constantly evolving. There has been a lot of criticism since Bandura first introduced self-efficacy and the various modes of treatment that improves self-efficacy.

- Q Are you familiar with an article by Eastman and Marzillier, M-a-r-z-i-l-l-i-e-r, title Theoretical and Methodological Difficulties in Bandura's Self-Efficacy Theory?
  - A I can't say that I know that article, no.
- Q I'm gonna read you a statement out of that article, and I'm gonna ask you if agree or disagree with the statement, okay?
  - A Okay.

2.1

"We conclude that self-efficacy theory is conceptually problematic, and in particular, that the central concept of efficacy expectations is not unambiguously differentiated from outcome expectations despite Bandura's claim to the contrary. Similarly we suggest that what is actually being assessed in the empirical studies is unclear. We conclude that the empirical findings are less impressive when the circumscribed nature of the behavioral task is recognized. Finally, we suggest that resolutions are both the conceptual and methodological difficulties are necessary before Bandura's claim that

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self-efficacy is a unifying construct can be properly
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      evaluated."
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               Have you come across that type of criticism
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      in your studies of self-efficacy?
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          Α
               Yes.
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          0
               Okay.
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                I can't say I agree with the article. I'm
      not conceding to that. I'd like you to send it to me.
 8
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      I'd like to read it. But yes, I have--
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               Well I wish I could but I'm not paying thirty
          Q
      five dollars for the article.
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12
                If you send me the title I still have a
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      professorship at two different colleges. I can get on
      the university's library and pull it down. As a
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15
      matter of fact, I'd be happy to do that and send it to
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      you for free.
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               Well I'll tell you what, I have a note here
      to send it to you, okay?
18
19
          Α
               Okay.
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               All right. Explain to me what they were
2.1
      saying?
22
                I'm sorry?
          Α
23
               Explain to me what was the criticism of
          0
24
      Bandura -- how do you pronounce his name?
25
          Α
               Bandura.
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Q What was the criticism of Bandura's studies, what were they referring to?

A You know, from what you read me it's very hard to say because you sort of read me a conclusory statement.

O I did.

2.1

A Yeah, I don't really know what their study was that allowed for that kind of criticism. But what I gathered from what you told me in that paragraph, is that it doesn't seem to be generalizable and it doesn't seem to be so significantly different from an outcome oriented theory. And that may, in fact, be true. I mean, this is sort of a term that's coined by Bandura.

But in a more practical sense I think all of us recognize that that's sort of the more common sense level even, that we all have limitations. And so self-efficacy theory deals with the idea of what are your limitations. By the way, sometime they're real; sometimes they're imagined. And from a psychology perspective it's the imagined ones that we try to deal with. It's not that we can't deal with real ones as well. For example, I mean, if you're born with a particular handicap, there are modes of— um, modes of psychological correction that can lend itself to you

performing better. This is a human performance issue. And what I think Bandura has done is to grab a lot of previous research regarding limitations on it. I hate to use the word self-efficacy. I just don't have a better word for it. But limitations on self-efficacy. Why does it exist and what to do about it, and has coined it under his own sort of description, and not only in a book but in several books on the topic.

2.1

And I think some researchers, you know, don't like that. I think they think perhaps he's done some, I don't know, mission creed of some type as a researcher and had drawn in some ideas and ideology that are still not disproven but really have been almost like globed on by Bandura.

It sounds to me like that's what that conclusion of your paragraph is. But I don't know that they're saying that self-efficacy doesn't exist, but perhaps Bandura's description of the modes of intervention probably deserve more scientific attention than they feel that Bandura has given them.

Q Do you feel that, and of course, again, you and I are talking about a conclusionary statement, okay? Would it be -- well let me ask you it this way.

Do you agree or disagree that their criticism was whether or not his studies relating to

self-efficacy can actually explain and, quote,
"predict" psychological changes? And it's the predict
that I'm really interested in your opinion on.

2.1

A Yes, I think that is what they said. And, remember, they're talking about treatment. So you're talking about, first of all, self-efficacy as the thing exists. I think they would have to concede to that, the idea that we all feel about yourselves in a certain way. But the treatment is what they're questioning. What Bandura has recommended is various forms of treatment to improve self-efficacy.

Q Do you agree or disagree that it is common knowledge among adults, if you will, who have certain life experience, that in making a decision that they will weigh their individual limitations in making the decision on how to complete a specific task? That's pretty common knowledge to everyone, isn't it?

A Yeah, I think so. I mean, you packaged a lot in that statement. But yes, I mean, sometimes avoidance is what adults practice and that's not generally considered a good method for dealing with life problems. But it is certainly one method that many adults choose. For example, when you get back up to the Lazarus theory to their coping mechanism.

Because the challenge has exceeded their ability to

- manage it so they just simply depart. And it covers a full array of possibilities from under reacting to over reacting. How's that.
- Q Okay. One of the topics and issues that was discussed at your previous deposition was the reaction time principle. You mentioned an author Shultz. I believe it's S-h-u-l-t-z. What is the first name of Shultz?
  - A Let me see if I can pull that up for you.
  - Q Is it Wolfram? A German guy.
- A Well it's definitely a German guy with the name Shultz. But I don't recall what the first name is. Did I give you the name of that article?
- Q You did not. You just mentioned an article by him. And it's on page 38 of your deposition. You refer to it as decision making, ability to change mind in the midst of an event. And you just said there's an article by Shultz and some type of scientific study that he did.
- A Yeah. Let me --

2.1

- Q And I wasn't able to find that.
- 22 A I'll find it and I'll actually send that to you as well.
  - Q All right. Well, if you're gonna do that then we'll just move on, okay?

A Yup.

2.1

Q I'll just put a note here, will send.

Because there's no use talking about it if we don't have it. And I can read it and then we'll just go from there.

A All right. Just to frame it out for you real quickly so you know where the context is with that article. That's also about this veto. As a matter of fact, that was the primary article I was talking about with this ability to veto when you're talking about these event related potentials. So that one would be coupled with the first one that we spoke about which is the Corell and Urland article that I sent you.

O Yeah.

A That would be within that world. And it's a later article. I think it's around 2018, something like that.

Q All right. And the same questions that I asked you about the Corell article, all those questions, peer review and method and how they did it, your answers would be generally the same as you indicated from when we spoke more specifically?

A Yeah. As we sit here today, again, I don't have a fresh memory of all the details of how the article is written. But I certainly would not play

high ball with you on that. I'll send you the article and you can see for yourself what the criticisms are.

Q We're now going to go down the list of the specific things that we said we're going to discuss in the second deposition. And I'm doing them in the order that I have in that letter that I sent to you.

A Okay.

2.1

Q So here we go. What is the number of times, and if you know the case name, in which you were accepted as an expert in any type of video interpretation, videology, photo interpretation?

A So it's only happened one time. And I don't know if you have a list of my cases. It's the case -- it was in federal court and it's a case in Connecticut. I think it's the only one I've done.

Q Where you were actually accepted as an expert in video interpretation?

A Yes. Correct, and the use of force. I was called there as a use of force expert. It was in the process of giving testimony. There was a question about the video. Essentially the opposing counsel was declaring that the frame rate of, something like this, the frame rate of 15 frames per minute meant that there were seconds that were being lost. And this was just simply a misunderstanding about the way the frame

rates are compressed.

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And so I offered testimony after being qualified as an expert in video with my background working with television productions and doing video editing of my own, the Court thought that I had enough experience to speak openly about it. And so I offered some testimony about the way that video sequences are built, how they're just a series of frames, and that compression rates can change between them but we don't end up losing time. For example, you know, in realtime with NTFT video, realtime is about 29.97 seconds per-- I'm sorry, frame per second. frames per second. Or let's just say 30 frames per second. If you have that compared to with how (phonetic) that has a lower frame rate, it doesn't mean that you're getting rid of things that happened, it just simply means that there's a different compression standard and the frames themselves are essentially longer to go up that seconds. information is there.

And in this particular case it was a case of where the correctional officers, they said that the inmates were throwing a stick at them, and no where on video does it show that. And they said, oh, well that's because this has been highly compressed. And

so that incident that probably took several seconds, was just simply compressed out, that's why you don't see it. So that's what I spoke about.

2.1

Q So now I reviewed your CV. Nothing stuck out that would qualify you as an expert as you just described, in particular, video interpretation as to what you see. Is there something in your video, in your educational background or something that I missed because I didn't see that?

A No, you didn't miss it. It has to do mostly with my experience. And it's not generally an area that I even care to testify about. It just so happened that in this particular case that became the issue as it related to use of force, and why there would be force, or at least a description of force that was missing.

But it's not something I ever plan to get on the stand. I don't hold myself out generally speaking as an expert. I don't advertise that I have been qualified as an expert. You know, it's not-- I don't look for cases that are video related. There's people out there that certainly do that. I don't.

So my emphasis when I'm hired is to be hired as a use of force and defensive tactics expert. So, you know, I haven't put anything in my resume about

that particular case or about any of my experience working with -- actually there is something in there. I think there are some notes about me working with a couple of companies in Los Angeles but they're not very descript that I actually did participate in some editing and things like that because it's just not important to me.

2.1

Q If you were asked and the Court allows you to testify, is there anything in the Reeves case in reviewing the video that you would be pointing out relating to frames missing, compressed frames, whether or not content is missing from the video; anything like that, that you're going to rely on your, quote, "expertise" as a videographer?

A No. There's very clearly stuff missing. I don't think it requires an expert to tell you that.

And obviously I would address that issue. We spoke about the missing 10 seconds, if you will, between, I don't know, frame number 26, source second number 26 and second number, I don't know, 35. I don't remember the numbers exactly. There's clearly frames missing.

We can't see what happens during that time period.

And I would comment on that because I think that is important. But, again, that's not an expert's opinion. That's just a statement of fact. If you

look at the video there is no frames before that 34 frame except the one that said 26. So we know that there is seconds missing between those. I think we calculated it to be around 10 seconds. And that is important, by the way.

2.1

But I don't think that a jury needs me to explain to them why that happened or how that happened or -- but rather why it's important that we, you know, that we aren't able to see certain things when we're trying to draw conclusions about what actually happened on that day.

- Q Do you know why frames are missing?
- A I really don't, no. I just know that they are.
  - Q Do you know anything about the surveillance equipment that was in the theater at the time?
  - A I saw pictures of it. I did see where it is on the walls. I did not go back and -- it wouldn't be important for me to do this, to research any of the specs on those cameras or how video is recorded or, you know, what the lighting requirements are. No, I have not done that.
  - Q The next question, the same line. The number of times and the cases, if you can remember, where you were accepted as an expert in crime scene

investigation?

2.1

A Never. I don't hold myself out as a crime scene investigator.

Q Same question. Interview or interrogation techniques?

A I don't believe that I've ever been accepted.

I have talked about it in use before but not as an expert but rather as a descriptive to leading up to use of force and respecting stand your ground cases, you know, where law enforcement officers have drawn certain conclusions that sometimes might be inconsistent with what I discovered in reviewing the case. I would talk about those kind of things, but not from the perspective of an expert here's what should have been done.

Q Okay. Page 93 of your deposition is where I'm picking up on our next discussion. Discuss what impact, if any, the previous testimony of witnesses who heard Mr. Reeves say the words to the effect, "Throw popcorn on me," has on any aspect of your potential testimony, including, but not limited to human factors, self-efficacy, objective reasonableness, or any opinion or conclusion?

And you recall in the letter I provided you the names of the individuals and their sworn testimony

where they swore to those facts.

Did you have a chance to review the immunity testimony of those individuals or their deposition?

A I did.

2.1

- Q Okay. Are you prepared to discuss that topic then with me?
  - A Yeah, I think so.
- Q Well, let's go ahead and start with those words being uttered by Mr. Reeves contemporaneous with the firing of his firearm.

What is the significance, if at all, in any opinion regarding the reasonableness of Mr. Reeves shooting Mr. Oulson?

- A Assuming that he said that?
- Q Well, we have three people under oath that said he did. So are you contesting whether or not those words were in fact said?
- A You know, what I read was that they heard him say that and then he fired a shot.
  - O Yes.

A If you look at the video I think a reasonable person will see that the timing of the shot in relationship to the popcorn throwing occurs so quickly that that sentence probably could not have come out before the shot is fired. That's what strikes me

first of all. And I think that should be pointed out to a jury. We can't see or-- I'm sorry, there's no audio on the video. But I think the jury would agree that that entire sentence probably could not fit in the timeframe between when the popcorn is thrown and the followup shot, it happened so quickly.

2.1

That said, something very interesting happened when I did interview Mr. Reeves -- and I know you want to talk about that. Reeves said to me he heard that also. And I thought that was very interesting because I hadn't considered the idea that someone perhaps in the theater, someone else may have said that. And I tried to think about why somebody might have said that. And it occurred to me that, you know, somebody who is watching this on the outside, a highly stressful event, may have engaged in a moment of levity. By the way, I'm completely speculating as to why that would happen.

But I think we're also speculating about who said it. Because even though people said they heard it said, remember, it's a dark movie theater. I'm not sure that anybody -- and they may go up there and say, no, that's absolutely him. But I don't know that it was because Reeves tells me he heard somebody else say something like that.

So I thought that was quite interesting, when I thought that it sort of changed my perspective a little bit about why that would have been said when I found out that perhaps somebody else said it.

2.1

Q So let's assume that the words were said by Mr. Reeves contemporaneous with the firing, either immediately before; immediately after, but contemporaneous with the firing of the firearm. What significance do you put on that statement as it relates to the reasonableness of shooting Mr. Oulson?

A I think it's for a jury to decide. I think it's inconsistent with his later statements where he tells us he didn't even know the popcorn was grabbed. He said he didn't know if it was knocked out of his hands or he dropped it. So he seems to be a little bit in the dark of even how the popcorn gets spilled. So it would be really weird for him to have said, "throw popcorn at me, will you," knowing full well the popcorn is being throw at him and then later to come back and say he didn't know that was the case.

And he said it I believe in his first interview. So I don't know that he necessarily would have calculated that he should say he didn't know anything about the popcorn. It just seemed like a very honest answer when they asked him about it.

So I don't know that it has any effect at all on my overall opinion that he was under attack. It was a continuous attack by a fairly large person. And based on the self-efficacy issues that I have read to you I think -- did we read those on the record last time? I don't remember if you let me do that or not. That he had a reasonable belief that he was, at the time that the popcorn was thrown, not because the popcorn was thrown, but at the time the popcorn was thrown he had reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of being significantly injured or killed.

So that's sort of my opinion still even having gone back and looked at that statement.

Q All right. We're going to continue this discussion, but I want to direct your attention so you know the source. I want to direct your attention back to the basic recruit manuals that were published by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, specifically Chapter 4 dealing with defense tactics which you previously indicated that you in the past have had some input as to the material in that chapter.

A Right.

2.1

Q Do you recall in the section dealing with

objective reasonableness that the recruits are -- it is explained to the recruits that ability, opportunity and jeopardy/intent are factors that are determined -- or can be used to determine reasonableness of their actions.

Do you recall that in the material?

A Yes.

2.1

- O Do you believe that to be true?
- A Yes.

Q All right. Do you also believe that if any one of those negate reasonableness then a conclusion can be made that the actions were not reasonable.

Would you agree with that?

A So again, we're talking about two different types of reasonableness. When you're formulating opinions of course they're subjective. When you evaluate the opinion after the fact it's objective.

So what I mean to say by that is that if
Reeves believed that in this case Mr. Oulson had the
ability to do him great harm, he had the opportunity
to do him great harm, and he was -- his motivation or
intent was to do him great harm, that is a sufficient
use of force. It would be up to a jury of course to
decide objectively whether or not the ability,
opportunity and the intent existed, or jeopardy

existed. And of course we don't know that yet.

Q All right. And --

2.1

- A So usually in the hindsight-- I'm sorry.
- Q No, go ahead, Mr. Bedard.

Making is done in the hindsight of an event. When law enforcement basic recruit officers are instructed in objective reasonableness, they're told this is the yard stick by which you will be measured. It's not intended to be all inclusive and to make decisions for them before they leave the academy. That's not the point of objective reasonable trait. It is simply to describe to the police officers the yard stick by which they will be measured. And I think that it is most certainly in deadly force cases something that I always look at to also objectively decide or evaluate and opine as to whether or not something was objectively reasonable.

But it is not a standard that you can apply when you are the subject of force, which in this case Mr. Reeves was. But he has made it clear to me that he believed that Mr. Oulson had the ability, had the opportunity, and he was in great jeopardy. And I have no reason to dispute that.

Q In looking at the factor jeopardy/intent,

would you not agree that if Mr. Reeves did in fact say the words "Throw popcorn in my face," that that would indicate in his mind that the threat was not a threat necessitating deadly force, and that his intent as the victim was not to use deadly force or commit great bodily harm against Mr. Reeves?

Would you agree with that?

2.1

A I think so. But let me state that you can't shoot somebody for throwing popcorn at you.

Q Well we can all agree on that, Mr. Bedard. So let me make a big note of that.

A Yeah, I think that that's correct. If you get popcorn thrown at you that's not a grounds for deadly force. And you know you have popcorn being thrown at you. That's not grounds for deadly force.

I'm not sure that that's the bridge that we're able to cross with Mr. Reeves. I don't know what he said. Like I said, he claims to have heard it himself, that there was another voice in the theater that said that.

But I think that's what this case has devolved to. I think, you know, partly through the media that this is a case of a man shooting somebody over having popcorn thrown at him. I don't see it that way when I go back and look at the actual

evidence of the case. But it seems to me that that's the part we're trying here.

Q We'll cover that more in your final conclusions. So I'm gonna move on to the next topic.

In your depo page 98 through 99, what facts, if any, from defense expert Cohen's potential testimony will you use in any way, including in your explanation of subjective facts?

I think there was discussion about well maybe she has some scientific basis that correlate with self-efficacy.

Do you recall that conversation we had?

rely on Cohen's testimony. I don't think it's necessary. I think, once again, going back to self-efficacy just from a reasonable man perspective, I don't think there's so many people that will think that Mr. Reeves, who is elderly, who is there with his wife at a movie theater who claims to be, and probably can provide records, I don't know, of having arthritis, a bad back, he's clearly overweight, he is definitely much older than Mr. Oulson, you know, that he can't defend himself properly in a fist to cuffs with Mr. Oulson. I think a reasonable person will agree with that.

So I don't know that we need to get into the science of how your body deteriorates as you age.

Most of us know that too. Certainly if you are an older person you know there are things today that you couldn't do years ago, in most cases.

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So I think I'll leave it at that. I think the description of, you know, what Mr. Reeves is, what he claims to be and who he believes he is, and what his potential abilities are, and I think it's very sensible to me. Again, I find no reason to think that Mr. Reeves is making these medical claims up.

Again, he immediately starts saying, man, I couldn't do anything. You know, if I was 20 years younger, he says. He says, I'm so full of arthritis I didn't even know if I could shoot the gun. He says, you know, basically I can't take anybody anymore. He makes the suggestion that he should have I guess got out of the chair and went fist to cuffs with the much younger six foot four assailant.

So I don't think that I have -- there's not a lot of work there for me to I think to convince a jury that he did not have a sense of self that was adequate to do a -- to try to hold off Oulson's attack with the use of bare hands. And I'll leave it at that.

Q So you believe the members of the jury, based

on their life experience, that they will know that themselves and recognize in themselves. Dr. Cohen doesn't need to tell them that. That's pretty much common knowledge for them?

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A I think they'll know when you age -- I don't know what Dr. Cohen is going to tell them. But, you know, when you age your body does break down. And I know the Court demands those levels of scientific analysis, and there's nothing wrong with that. There's nothing wrong with telling somebody that rather than making assumptions.

But my flight is the primary to talk about the use of force. So if Ms. Cohen goes in and offers that testimony and explains why your body breaks down as you age, to me that's sufficient. I think the jury is ready to hear now about a use of force transaction with somebody doing -- when we have officer subject factors, as we call them, in the academy. In this case we have a subject -- subject factor. It's the same basic theory. You've got one individual who has a particular capability and competency. You got another individual who has a particular capability and competency. And one of those capabilities is gonna have everything to do with your age and your physical fitness level.

And I can start there. I don't need to explain why Oulson is more equipped for a fist fight than Mr. Reeves. I don't think I have to do that.

2.1

But I wouldn't sit here and tell you that Cohen's testimony is not necessary, it's just not necessary for me.

Q And would you not agree that the members of the jury, the adults based on their life experience and having made decisions based on their own limitations, would know that people make decisions to complete a particular task based on their known limitations; they know that, right?

A You know, I don't know. I don't know what people know about that. But to me it seems common sense that if we're specifically talking about age related debilitation of people, if you are old, and I don't even know who's gonna be sitting on the jury, would know that. I do know, you know, if you're younger you may have a different perspective. And if you're sitting on the jury you perhaps need to hear what happens when you get older.

But if you're old, I think yes, your life experience will tell you that depending, you know, when we get past, for example, 30, I mean, there are physiological changes that Cohen can talk about. For

example, with men there's a drop in testosterone, which is gonna lead to, you know, lower bone density.

2.1

And again, I'm not testifying here. That's not an area that I need to testify about. But she could certainly do that. And she can talk about perhaps even reaction time and why that would slow down.

So if you're a young person perhaps you need to hear that. Your opinion is just as valid as the old person sitting next to you when you go into the jury room.

So I think that Cohen's testimony, once again, may be important to lay a foundation. But for me talking about use of force transaction, which is essentially what I've been hired to do, I'm gonna go in there assuming that the jury knows that Mr. Reeves is elderly and is in many ways debilitated by his own admission, and perhaps, like I said, by medical records as well. I don't know. And take it from there.

Q And based on the jury's life experience, would you not agree that they're well aware that limitations dictate how you decide to complete a particular task; they know that, right?

A Yeah. I wouldn't know what the jury knows.

I mean--

2.1

Q You would expect them to know that because they've gone through life making decisions like that, right?

A Well I'm sure that you've heard of the Darwin Awards. This is sort of a humorous way of looking at removing people from the gene pool who don't know their limitations. And so there are some people I guess who just don't know that. I can't say what the jury experience is.

Q Would you expect that when the jury hears, and I'm gonna use an example, information that a man missing a leg using crutches made the decision to use the elevator as apposed to the stairs, it would be reasonable for them to conclude that that decision was based on his limitations and they don't need anyone to tell them that, right?

A I'm not sure that's true, Mr. Martin. I think, you know, there are many many people who -- for example, one of the things that I learned at the academy when we were talking about cultural diversity is to be very careful on how you treat people that have obvious limitations. For example, if you have somebody who, I don't know, perhaps has one arm, to run in front of them and pull the door open, they

would be very insulted because it suggests to them that you're not capable so I better do it for you.

2.1

So I think a lot of people using your example may, in fact, want to try to challenge themselves to go up a flight of stairs to prove to themselves that they are capable of doing things that perhaps other people think they aren't capable of doing.

And I think that's the whole notion of Special Olympics, is that --

Q Alright, Mr. Bedard, I'm gonna stop you because you went away from my question. So let me rephrase it just a little bit for you so you can help me understand where you're coming from, okay?

And I apologize for interrupting but you just weren't answering my question. So let me rephrase it.

You have that same scenario. And the issue is, was it reasonable for the man without a leg using crutches to use the elevator?

Would the jury be able to conclude without any assistance whatsoever that of course it was reasonable for a man with one leg using crutches to use the elevator? They don't need anyone to tell them it's reasonable or not reasonable.

A Well I can tell you I don't have crutches and I use the elevator all the time. And I don't think

that's unreasonable either. So I don't know. I don't know how to answer your question. And I think I was answering your question before. I think you didn't like how I answered it.

But the facts are people are motivated by different things. And this is a whole area. It's a whole field of study on motivation. And for me to decide what a jury, which is a very abstract/ construct anyway.

Q Okay.

2.1

A Now if it was about motivation and what causes people to get on elevators with one leg, I just can't do that. I don't think you can either. Because it's not unreasonable, agree, for a person with one leg and crutches to get on an elevator. But it's also not unreasonable for me who is fit and has two legs to get on an elevator.

So I guess I don't know how to answer that.

- Q And you don't need anyone to tell you that either, do you, because you know that?
  - A To tell me what?
- Q Whether or not it's reasonable/unreasonable. You can make that decision for yourself, can you not, like you just did?
  - A I think it's reasonable for a person with one

leg or two legs, or in some strange case maybe even three legs get on an elevator.

Q So you can make that decision yourself without any assistance from anyone, right?

A I don't know that I'd be presented with that question. But yeah, I don't think I would find it unreasonable for a person with one leg to get on an elevator, if that's the contrarian answer to what you're asking me.

Q All right. We're going to move on to another topic. Thank you for being patient with me.

There was some information that was provided to you after the first deposition, some of it we knew was going to be provided and then Mr. Michaels sent me a list of additional material. So I want to go through that real guick.

 $$\operatorname{\textsc{Did}}$$  you review the additional material that  $$\operatorname{\textsc{Mr.}}$$  Michaels sent you?

A I did.

Q All right. He sent you Mr. Knox' deposition and photos. And I asked you in your deposition on page 100, what measurements, if any, taken by defense expert Knox will you use in any way to support any opinion or conclusion.

So after reviewing his deposition and photos,

are you going to use anything from Mr. Knox' potential testimony?

2.1

A I don't think so. Again, I think a large part of the deposition you took with him had a lot to do with use of force issues, and I questioned that, why that was the case. I'm certainly not gonna rely on him. To be honest with you, I think he wasn't correct in a lot of what he answered about, for example, reaction time and things like that.

But even the measurements are sort of unknown. I mean, even after he did a workup on the theater itself. I mean, I know that there's a foot and a half between the back of one seat and the front of another. I mean, I may rely on that. I don't know. I don't know how helpful that will be.

But because there's so much of Mr. Oulson you cannot see as he exits the scene after throwing the popcorn and is finally fatally shot, there's a lot of guesswork here even for the crime scene analyst.

So it wasn't terribly helpful to me because we're speculating about distances. It wouldn't be Knox' deposition except that he mentions, you know, the stippling, for example, in Mr. Oulson's hand. I mean, that would be kind of important because it shows that he is still close enough to, to Mr. Reeves to,

we'll say, reach out and touch him.

2.1

But I didn't find anything that was terribly helpful for my use of force analysis that Knox gave. The pictures are probably the best thing about it for me because it really sort of -- they took so many pictures of the inside of the theater. And I know it doesn't look like that anymore. But that was a little bit helpful to help me kind of put myself in that place at that time.

Q How is it helpful in that respect?

the grainy video that I had been looking at. I mean, I can see the theater. It was black and white. You know, it was shadowy. It was grainy. Obviously it was broken. But the Knox photo gave me an opportunity to just stare at the video in it's full color. I thought they were very well done by the way. I thought that the lighting was brought up well enough so that you could make out the details and the relative distances from seat to seat, and how wide the theater was, and where the cameras were and things like that.

Again, I don't plan to offer any testimony, which I think is your question, about anything in there. But I will tell you after having looked at

those photos, those were helpful for me to just get a better picture of the scene.

2.1

Q Well the question was, are you going to use any of his testimony as far as measurements to support any of your conclusions, not whether or not you're going to testify like he did, but whether or not you're gonna use any of that data; data A supports my opinion B?

A The only thing that I may possibly cite would be the foot and a half distance between seats. That's the only thing I gleaned out of there that I didn't actually know because I didn't take measurements.

Q And how is that significant to you?

A Just because it shows proximity. And I think when you're talking about use of force and you're talking about allegations of where Mr. Oulson was and why Mr. Reeves would perceive him as a threat, um, 18 inches, if he is leaning over the seat, and it looks to me in the video like he is, is awful close. It's certainly within an arm's length. And it's certainly within the quarter second timing that we try to avoid using both relative position and reactionary gap.

So Mr. Reeves is kind of trapped in an area where he can't go any further. He's got a wall to his back. He's got a person that's within that striking

distance that can very quickly throw a very serious blow at him. And now we have the measurement of it being approximately 18 inches between the front of his seat and the back of Mr. Oulson's. It's pretty close in a fighting perspective. Of course, we would never teach someone to stand that close to an individual unless they were in control of the situation. For example, if they were handcuffing or something like that or were clearly dominating the situation.

2.1

But from a defensive perspective we would be trying to create distance. That's an awful close area. So I may cite that on the stand if I'm asked a question about it. And I image perhaps you will ask me a question about that because distances do matter in use of force transactions.

And so that's the only real measurement information that I gathered from the Knox deposition that I think may somehow perhaps support my opinions.

Q I want to go ahead and touch on one statement that you made during this discussion. You indicate, when we were talking about the close distance, you made a statement, looks like he's leaning over the seat to me.

Do you remember making that statement?

A Yes.

1 And what are you referencing when you made 2 that statement? What material are you using to make 3 that statement? 4 Just the video. 5 All right. And do you know specifically where in the video that, quote, "It looks like he's 6 7 leaning over the seat to me"? Well, in anticipation of these kind of 8 9 questions I've actually got this on my screen. So let 10 me wheel back a little bit. And it looks like the 11 first frame that I have is -- do you have your pen 12 out? 13 0 Yes. 14 Α Is 132636.366. 15 Q Okay. Α 16 Okay? 17 Yes. Q 18 And that goes on for a little while, by the 19 way. He doesn't recoil from leaning over the seat until about, I don't know .733. Now there's a caveat 20 21 to that. 22 Well you're gonna have to do the whole frame 23 number for me. 24 So it will be 132636.733, where I can still

kind of see his face.

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- Q And those are the frames where we see the grabbing and tossing of the popcorn, right?
  - A Yes.
- Q Okay.

2.1

- A Now, the caveat to that is that this first frame that I gave you, this .366 frame, is the first that you can even see Mr. Oulson. So I have to assume that he's there before this frame because when it opens he's there. So I don't know if he's there for 10 seconds, because there's a blank spot there. I don't know if he's there for four seconds. I just know he's there before this frame opens. So I don't want to leave the impression that he's there for a millisecond, or a few milliseconds because I don't know. I can only see his face in that .366 frame.
  - Q Okay.
- A And that's the frame that I'm able to stop with my crude equipment. I'm able to stop this and actually look on a freeze frame. That's the first earliest frame that I can see.
- Q I'm familiar with that part of the video.

  Any other parts of the video where it looks like, to you, he's leaning over the seat other than the information you already gave me?
  - A I think -- let me go back to the second 26.

Hold on one second. Because I think there's a moment there where he's also leaning over the seat. I'm not sure that he's in a standing position but I think you can certainly see that there's a person that is coming over the back seat, you know, perhaps twisted in the chair or something like that. So give me just a second. Yeah, so --

Q Give me the frame number.

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Yeah. It's 132626. And I'm at .189. Α just before that, and tinkering around again with my crude Apple laptop, I can't quite catch that millisecond frame, but there's definitely somebody that's leaning over the seat towards Mr. Reeves. And it almost looks as if there's an argument. And the reason I say that is because Reeves actually leans forward towards him. And now remember this is about 10 seconds earlier than the last frame that I told So it looks like this is kind of where the verbal exchange is starting between the two of them. Perhaps Mr. Reeves is turned around -- I'm sorry, Mr. Oulson is turned around in his chair. Perhaps he slung an arm over the back seat. So that would be coming over the chair as well, at least part of his body would.

But I see that as not the moment where the

cellphone is alleged to have been thrown and his glasses are knocked off. And I tell you why I say that, because at the conclusion of this when Reeves recoiled back into the seat, I noticed that he makes no adjustment to his glasses. And he tells me when he gets hit in the face by this or cellphone or whatever it might have been, that the first thing he does is kind of bring his hand up to put his glasses back on after the shot. So he's kind of working blind.

But that 10 seconds later, it doesn't happen here. So I don't think that this is where the actual or initial exchange of the cellphone striking him.

And we do know the cellphone is at his feet. So somehow it ends up over the back. But I don't think we can see that. I think that's the part that's in the blackend frames.

- Q What blackend frames, the eight seconds?
- A Yeah, eight or however many seconds. In between 26, and what did I say the other frame was, 36?
- Q You believe that's when the cellphone was thrown?
- A Yes.

2.1

Q In the eight second gap before the toss of the popcorn?

A Yup. And, by the way, I did see the luminescence that everyone is talking about as well. I don't know what it is. I don't think anyone knows what it was. If I were picking a side, I would pick the side of saying that's probably the shoe. That's what I would say from my observation. It looks to me like it's over in a different section. It doesn't look like it's where the phone is found over in Reeves' section. So, and it's only there for a flash.

2.1

But I don't think this is the moment of changing hands, this 26 and 27 second moment. I don't think that's where the fight starts. That's what my conclusion is in looking at this. I think this fight starts in the darkness before second 36, I think is the frame I gave you, that we can't see, where he's now standing there. So I think he gets hit by the phone and within a second or two reaches over, that follows up with the popcorn in the face. And we can't see that. We can only see the popcorn to the face.

Because as I mentioned to you, and I know you'll ask me about this, then you see Reeves drop back into the seat, bring his hand up to his face.

And he tells me this is where he adjusts his glasses.

He also tells me at this point he feels the sting that he's been hit in his left eye. And I mentioned to you

during deposition, you can actually see his elbow come up and kind of move up and down. He's kind of rubbing that area. And of course there are other witnesses that I sent you that saw that as well.

So my conclusion in looking at this is that this fight is occurring at probably second 33, 34, something like that, that we can't see, that's not on video. That would be most consistent with what story Reeves has been telling.

Q Okay.

2.1

A I'm trying to stitch together 26 and 36. I'm just not seeing this as being the active fight sequence.

Q Okay. One of the things we talked about in your deposition on page 72 and 73 was the autopsy report. I sent you the autopsy report. You mentioned that you had a question about trajectory.

A Yeah.

Q Did you have a chance to review the autopsy report?

A I did.

Q And what, if anything, in the autopsy report supports any opinions or conclusions that you have in this case?

A Just that the location of impact and the

trajectory suggest that—— I think what we can actually see in the video is that it's being fired upwards, meaning that Mr. Reeves is at a lower position than Mr. Oulson when the shot is fired. And also most importantly, Oulson is virtually facing him. So he is turned and facing him. He's not shot in the back or even in the side. He's shot right in the chest. And this would be consistent with a threat, right, that squares to a target. So I think that's relevant.

Q All right. On page 72 of your depo I discussed whether or not you saw any crime scene photos, including photos of Mr. Reeves. We've discussed the crime scene photos. The photos of Mr. Reeves, and specifically I guess I'm referring to the photos taken in the theater where he's sitting there and there's the redness of his eyelid.

A Yup.

2.1

Q All right. Any of that information are you gonna use to support any opinion or conclusion in this case?

A I mean, only that it's forensic and it seems to support his version of events that something hit him in the face. Again, you know, when you do these analysis you look for reasons to doubt. It's sort of a scientific method. You're trying to falsify what

people are telling you. This is very much in support of his version of events. I mean, it's helpful to see something has happened to his eye. I don't know what. But it certainly is not inconsistent with his statements about what happened to him moments before.

2.1

Q You made a statement, and I just want to followup on it because I guess I may have to talk about this later. I don't know.

You mention scientifically must try to falsify what a person told you. What does that mean?

A So scientific method -- you know, and I think it helps having had gone to graduate school because it helps me understand this a little bit better. But I think the same rules apply, as a matter of fact I know they apply, when you're doing any type of forensic evaluation, or for that matter even an investigation.

And what you're constantly trying to do is decide that something is, in the words of the law, beyond a reasonable doubt. And that is exactly the same standard that science uses, it tries to conclude things beyond a reasonable doubt. And when you conclude things beyond a reasonable doubt it is because you have been able to eliminate other possibilities.

And the only way you can eliminate other

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possibilities is you do that through falsification.

You take a look at what's being offered and then you try to figure out if your hypothesis has another explanation. And so you come up with a variety of different conflictions perhaps that have caused this effect, and then you one by one you eliminate them.

You falsify them. So that the only possible reason that this is happening when we show correlation, and this is how, you know, SPFS and other types of statistical programs work, the only possible conclusion from the study is that the dependant variable is being affected by this identified independent theory. And so in science of course that's the whole process.

2.1

But in social studies, for example, things like by police investigations, we should be applying that same standard, which means that if somebody tells you something it may not be true and you should not assign credibility of how you feel about it or what you think about that person, but rather what you are able to determine through falsification. And if you can't falsify the statement then it's assumed to be true. If you can't falsify the evidence it's assumed to be related. Things like that.

So that's kind of what I mean when I talk

about falsification. Or when you look at a case like this you're not able to, or we are not able to falsify. There's nothing to suggest that Mr. Reeves isn't telling the truth. And I would look for that. If he claimed something and all of a sudden we found out, well okay, well the evidence shows that couldn't be the forensic evidence. That could be for one of two reasons. One, because of, what I know you spoke with Knox about. And we didn't spend a whole lot of time talking about it. Could be perceptional distortion. Somebody made us feel something that isn't quite accurate because of stress related issues. Or generally it could be a lie, absolute. So I think that has to be taken into consideration.

But in this particular case I find nothing that Reeves has said to be demonstrably untrue, with the exception of perhaps being suspect of him giving self serving statements, I find nothing to be demonstrably untrue.

And I think to the original point, if I can circle around now and kind of conclude what I'm saying. When you talk about redness to the eye, that suggested he's telling us the truth, that there's something that made contact with his eye.

Q Okay.

A Like he says.

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- 2 Q And where are you getting this method that -3 what's this method called? Is it a method or
  4 something you made up or what?
  - A No, no. Scientific method, I mean, is very well known.
  - O What is it?
- A It's in the literature. I just explained it to you.
  - Q Okay. What's the name of it?
- 11 A The Scientific method.
- 12 Q Yeah. What's the name of it?
- 13 A That's what it's called.
- 14 | O Scientific method?
  - A Yeah. Yes. Who's on first. That's what it's called. And if you want to be more specific to really sort of get in the, I guess the crevice of the Scientific method, it would be the process of falsification. That's what that's known as. But mostly what I spoke to. I mean, there are other methods when you're doing science. But it is the Scientific method.
    - Q Is it also known as the null hypothesis?
  - A Yes, the null hypothesis.
- Q Why can't we just say that? You make me pull

it out of you. Come on now.

2.1

A Well the null hypothesis is part of the Scientific method.

- Q All right. And is that, in fact, what you're using here, what you just described, is the null hypothesis?
- A I mean, in a general way. Again, this was not a scientific study. I mean, this is just basically using the same logical sequencing that you would if you were doing scientific study. If you could actually have some controls and, you know, manipulate variables you would use the same process. That's kind of how my brain works. So it's natural for me that when I get something I'm skeptical. I'm automatically skeptical. I think that's the nature of any scientist is skepticism.

So my first question is how do I eliminate what's being told to me. How do I show that that's false. And if I can't show that it's false then I deem it to be true.

- Q And that's the Scientific method known as the null hypothesis, correct?
- A Well the null hypothesis would be the area of falsification. So yes, the assumption that a hypothesis is not true, that's the null hypothesis, is

where we begin. And then we go about conducting our experiment to disprove the null hypothesis. And that's essentially what we're doing, is everybody doing things in reverse. This is exactly the opposite of what's called confirmation bias. And confirmation bias is the idea that we're basically looking for facts included to support an opinion that we already hold. We're not, in the language of bias, we're not following the clues to a conclusion. We have the conclusion, now we're just collective to support it.

2.1

And I deal with that all the time in cases where people -- especially law enforcement officers.

I have a case right now that that's one of the things that I've written into my report, that there seems to be a lot of confirmation by associated with the investigation. So we know it happens a lot.

There's a lot of literature on that warning law enforcement officers, because we all have biases. Many times we don't even know we have them. I think implicit biases is the catch phrase that everyone is using today to sort of reflect on the idea that our brains work in a certain way that we may not be consciously aware of. And that we are supposed to be paying attention to these biases.

And so the best way to prevent confirmation

bias is by using a null hypothesis, to assume that what you're being told or what you're seeing or what you're observing, in the words of science, is not true. And now let's go about figuring out if we can falsify the belief that it's not true. Because if we can falsify the belief that it's not true then it turns out it is true.

Q Okay. See if you agree with this example, okay?

A Okay.

2.1

Was the Earth was flat. In order to convince people of that time that the World was not flat, there was an alternative theory that the Earth was in fact round. Using the null hypothesis, your accepted fact back then would be that the World is flat. The alternative hypothesis would be that the Earth is round. Someone then set sail and circumvented the World and came back and was able to present objective data, I circumvented the World, I didn't fall off, therefore, proving the accepted fact was false. Therefore, you accept the alternative hypothesis. Now people, because of that, believe the World is round.

Is that the proper use of the null hypothesis?

A Yes.

2.1

Q Okay. And is that what you're doing here when you're conducting your analysis to determine whether or not specific events actually occurred?

You're postulating an accepted fact, stating alternative, and then looking for data that proves your accepted fact is, in fact, false so that your alternative data will be accepted.

Is that what you're doing here?

A That's generally a description of the Scientific method. Again--

Q Is that what you're doing here in the Reeves case?

A That's what I always do. I try to have some sort of evidence to show that whatever -- the story is on both sides, by the way, because there's always two different sides to these stories. Um, whatever I'm being told is not true and I have to then falsify that. And if I can't do it then I have to accept it as true.

Q I want to further discuss this method and then we're gonna move on. And in this method that you're using to test and accept as fact, because that's the way you constructed the null hypothesis, there's an accepted fact and there's an alternative

explanation. In fact, in science the null hypothesis, you don't even have to believe that the accepted fact is true, you're just trying to figure out whether or not the alternative is more logical, right?

A Yes.

2.1

Q Okay. So in --

A That's why, to your point earlier, that is why mostly everything is based on probability. We talked about that previously.

Q Right. We're talking about probability, likelihood, and whether or not there is such a significant correlation that one would accept one alternative hypothesis over another, correct?

A Yes.

Q All right. Now getting back to my example about the World is flat and the World is round. We had the individual who circumvented the World in a boat, whatever, proving that it was round.

I want to talk about the, and not specifically, just generically, what in the Reeves case when you used the null hypothesis to try to determine reality, if you will, what facts in the Reeves case are you using to make that determination, whether or not you can nullify or invalidate your hypothesis that is the accepted fact?

Just generically what is the data that you're using: Police reports, witness statements. You know, just generically tell me what you're using.

- A Yes, using all of that.
- O Tell me what all of that is?

A Well, I told you. So particularly in the Reeves case -- first of all, let me just get clear on one thing. I mean, you mentioned an experimental analysis. You have somebody board a ship and go around the World. That was an experiment to see where they ended up.

O Yes.

2.1

A Understand the Reeves case is a single trial. You can't repeat it, right. So we have to deal with what's called observational studies. Observational studies are a little bit different than empirical testing, which is kind of how you summed up the Scientific method. And you're not wrong, it's just not complete.

So in any kind of case like this for-- and certainly it's captured on video, and I like it when it's captured on video. Other times I'm basically just dealing with eye witness statements, which you know are terribly unreliable. And, um, you know, conclusions perhaps that the police department has

made and things like that. It's just more challenging. But when you have the video it's very very helpful so that you at least know generally what has happened.

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So when I look at the Reeves case I'm not able to experiment to see whether or not it's true or not, but I am able to apply observational studies. So Reeves said he's attacked by Mr. Oulson. So let's assume that's not true, that Reeves is lying to us. Well, I would go about looking at the video and I would see a person that's standing in front of Reeves. I would read the witness statements, who all -- and I say all and I don't mean every person in the theater, but I sent you a list of them, who see him standing up and facing the opposite direction. I hear the report from Reeves that this is over a point of conflict, over the cellphone being lit up and him going to the manager. All of that corroborates.

This is a guy who's upset, comes out of his seat, he turns around and he's now facing Reeves. All that corroborates Reeves' statement. I can't falsify that Reeves is not under attack. I'm not able to do that. On the contrary, if we don't have the video there it's a little bit harder because maybe Reeves is telling us a lie.

okay, this guy is shot in the chest. Alright, how can that happen. Well it can only happen if they're facing each other. And all the witnesses say that Reeves never gets up. So then I would draw the conclusion that he's facing Reeves, even though I can't see it on the video, which I can't. So that corroborates that evidence as well.

So here's what we know. Reeves is being a attacked by Oulson. This is a self-defense case. That's how I concluded this. This is a self-defense case. I just don't think any reasonable person won't think it's self-defense. But there's a second part to this, and that's wether or not the response was reasonable. And of course that's an ultimate opinion that I don't plan to offer. That's up for the jury to decide whether or not shooting somebody who is attacking you is appropriate.

I mean, as that was the Rittenhouse case, and not to bring that in, but we're seeing people think strange things about this. One of the prosecutors there is saying basically you're supposed to take a beating. He has said that. It's unbelievable to me.

That said, I now have to determine whether or not the use of force is accepted, whether or not it's

appropriate or reasonable, objective reasonable as I understand the term, not in a courtroom setting but in a police training setting as you presented it to me from FDLE's own book.

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So I turned to the models. I turned to the force continuum. I turned to threat analysis, what we talked about last time that you and I, I guess got hung up on the construct of situational awareness. And I take a look at whether or not those things in a given environment, inserting all of the facts that we know about Reeves about his self-efficacy. He's an old man. He's eaten up with arthritis. He is severely overweight. He is sitting in a movie theater with his back against the wall. It's very poor lighting. He has his wife who is sitting next to him, which I'm sure he feels he needs to protect her as well. Who is being confronted by, who he perceives is a much younger man. I think he said 35 to 40. Who is six foot four, who is standing in front of a lit screen silhouetted. He can't make a lot of detail out. He tells me this when I talk to him, by the way. He can't make a lot of detail out. Somebody gets hit in the face and knocks his glasses sideways. self-efficacy is now even further deteriorated because now he doesn't have clarity of vision. Not only is he

an old man who has difficulty getting out the chair, because he said he tries to do that but he can't even push himself out of the chair that quickly. Not only is he an old man with arthritis, with a bad back who can't push himself out of the chair who is severely overweight, now he can't see. He gets hit in the face with something and immediately he sees the individual coming back towards him.

2.1

Now, you have to question motivation. You and I talked about ability, opportunity and jeopardy. What a reasonable person thinks, that someone who stood up in a movie theater to confront an old man physically was motivated to do great harm. And I think a reasonable person would think that probably the best way to predict the future, which is what this is all about, anticipating what comes next, is to look at the past. And the past is completely unreasonable. It's unreasonable for any person to do that. No person would think that it's okay to settle a score in a movie theater, certainly when you are the cause of the problem with your cellphone on.

So I think a reasonable person would then believe bad things are going to continue to happen because they are happening. He fires a shot, according to what he says, and I have no reason to

dispute it, I wish the video captured it, the second time that Mr. Oulson reaches for him.

2.1

The first time he gets hit in the face he thinks he's punched or hit with a cellphone but he doesn't know what. Now that arm comes back out. The video picks it up. And that's where we're invited to see what happened on video.

The second time that arm comes back he grabs the popcorn. All Reeves can see is he's still coming after me. He decides, I'm in great danger, reaches for his firearm. He's got about two hundred milliseconds to cancel that. He gets hit in the face with the popcorn. He tells me he doesn't know it's even popcorn, he just knows he's under attack and he fires the shot. Does he believe that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, I think from a reasonable perspective if I were judging a police officer in this case with the same facts and circumstances, I would conclude internally, if I were an internal affairs investigator, this was a reasonable shot.

It's not a police officer on duty but I use the same standards. If you look at the subject factors between the two of them, the circumstances, the motivation that we are aware of, things that I

can't falsify, things that I'm not able to say Oulson did not do those things that Reeves said that he did, then maybe my opinions change.

2.1

But I think the very best witness to this is
Reeves, and there's no reason to not believe him.
There's been no evidence to not believe Reeves. The
only reason we're not believing Reeves is because we
think that he's self serving in his statements, and of
course he is, especially if he did it right. If he
did it right it would be self serving for him to tell
the truth.

So that kind of is where my opinion leis is that as I apply the Scientific method, as I refer to it, I'm not able to say what Reeves said didn't happen. And I have worked many cases where individuals have said things that have happened and there is no corroboration, and there often times is even contrary evidence. This is not one of those cases.

- Q And that's based on your interpretation of the evidence that you just described on the record, correct?
  - A Well all of my opinions are based on that.
- Q All your opinions are based on what, your interpretation of the evidence?

A Well my conclusions looking at the evidence. Call it interpretation if you will. I think at some level they are my conclusions based on looking at the evidence, based on what I actually know.

Q Okay.

A I know that Reeves said he was hit in the face by something. I know that. I can't say that he wasn't hit in the face by something. And, by the way, there's a great corroboration. There's a cellphone laying at his feet. He claims to have seen a flash of the screen. Who doesn't really get better corroboration than that when it's laying at his feet.

Q Well Mr. Oulson was holding the phone when he was shot. When he got shot he released the phone and it fell at his feet. That's an alternative explanation, isn't it?

A But why would Reeves says that in the back of a patrol car. He doesn't know that.

Q But is that an alternate explanation?

A I don't think it's a reasonably alternate explanation because of the timing that Reeves describes.

Q Mr. Oulson is holding his phone. He's shot in the chest. He drops his phone at the feet. When you get shot in the chest, would you not agree, that

it would be reasonable for you to drop whatever you had in your hand?

2.1

- A I don't know. I've never been shot in the chest. I really wouldn't know that.
- Q Oh, come on now, Mr. Bedard. You've laid out your conclusions for the last five minutes regarding how you believe Mr. Reeves. Why can't you answer that question for me?

Working on now in Los Angeles on Tony McBride who shoots a guy holding a knife in his hand six times, he dies with the knife in his hand. He doesn't drop it.

I mean, I don't really know how to predict what somebody will do when they're shot. And he takes a couple in the chest I might add. They were pretty similar in that respect. He dies with the knife clutched in his hand. It was not for certain.

And again, I think you're drawing conclusions based on no evidence at all. But I do have evidence that there's a phone laying at Mr. Reeves' feet that is consistent with his story of being hit in the face by the cellphone.

- Q Is it also consistent with it being dropped by someone who is shot?
  - A Well nobody says that.

- 1 I'm just asking is that also consistent. Ι 2 didn't say anyone said that. 3 Okay. Yeah. Could it have happened, the Α probability is much lower. 4 5 Alright, and why do you say the probability 6 is much lower? 7 Because it's inconsistent with the story that Reeves tells. 8 9 Okay. Okay. One of the things that we Q 10 talked about -- you did send me the list of the 11 individuals, and I appreciate that, thank you, that 12 testified in some fashion that you're relying on that 13 Mr. Oulson was leaning or standing over Mr. Reeves. 14 have those. I have those cites. I have read them. 15 We've already had the discussion about the 16 significance so we don't need to do that. 17 We've already discussed a little bit about 18 Mr. Reeves' arm coming up and rubbing his face after he shot. You sent me those frames. Thank you. 19 20 Α Did you review that? 2.1 I did review those frames, yes. 0 22 Α Okay, you don't want to answer the question.
  - A Understood.

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It's not my depo.

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Q So here's where we're at. We've been going

for two hours. We have completed a good chunk of, because we've gone off on tangents. And I'm not being critical. It's just it's come up so we covered it.

So I would like, if it's alright, to take a 10 minute break for the court reporter to relax for a few minutes. And when we come back I want to go through the defendant's statements and how you have picked out through the various statements those artifacts that we talked about that are left over based on being in a stressful situation, and those statements that indicate to you some type of self awareness or self-efficacy of some sort of limitation that is important to you.

And so what we'll do is we'll go through the law enforcement statement first, we'll then go through his immunity hearing testimony, and then fully you'll relate his statement to you, and then we'll go back and -- well, we'll figure out how we're gonna do that because I don't want to waste your time going back again.

So that's what we're going to do. Is that okay with everyone?

- A It's okay with me.
- Q Okay.

2.1

MR. MARTIN: Now, Mr. Michaels, are you good

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      with that?
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               MR. MICHAELS: Sounds good.
 3
               MR. MARTIN: All right. Would you like to
 4
      hang up at this time and me call you back or do you
5
      want to stay on the line? What's everyone's
 6
      preference?
7
               MR. MICHAELS: I'd like to hang up and have
      you call me back on the office phone.
 8
9
               MR. MARTIN: Okay. Give me the number.
10
               MR. MICHAELS: 813-875-5100
11
               MR. MARTIN: 5100.
12
               MR. MICHAELS: Yep.
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               MR. MARTIN: And Mr. Bedard, call you back at
14
      the same number?
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               MR. BEDARD: Yes, that would be fine.
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               MR. MARTIN: Okay. I have it's 11 o'clock so
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      back at 11:10 or do you want 11:15? What would you
      like?
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               MR. BEDARD: I don't care. Whenever you wrap
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      up with what you're doing call me back and I will be
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      sitting by the phone.
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               MR. MARTIN: All right. We'll let the court
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      reporter decide. So as soon as she's ready to get
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      back I'll give you guys a call, how's that?
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               MR. BEDARD: Perfect.
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1 MR. MARTIN: All right. We're gonna hang up 2 and I'll call you back. Thank you. 3 (Break) Mr. Michaels, are you on? 4 MR. MARTIN: 5 MR. MICHAELS: I am. 6 MR. MARTIN: Mr. Bedard, are you on, sir? 7 MR. BEDARD: I am. MR. MARTIN: Alright, gentlemen, we're on the 8 9 We're in the same room. And it's just me and record. 10 the court reporter and my door is shut. Ready to go? 11 MR. BEDARD: I'm ready. 12 (By Mr. Martin). What I would like to do, 13 Mr. Bedard, I made a request of you to, in dealing 14 with the defendant's statement to law enforcement, to 15 use the police report that was printed on January 25 16 '16 as far as making reference to any pages. Were you 17 able to do that for me? 18 Α About the self-efficacy issues or--19 We're gonna go through the statement to law 20 enforcement, and we're gonna talk about the 2.1 self-efficacy, and we're gonna talk about the 22 artifacts that you felt were residual to Mr. Reeves 23 being involved in a stressful situation. That's what 24 we're gonna go through. 25 Α Right. Okay.

1 Because in your first depo we used a 2 different report. But throughout this case we've been 3 using the report printed 1/25/16 and all previous 4 pleadings and discussions. So I appreciate you doing 5 that. And I did convert the page numbers in your 6 first depo over just in pencil. 7 So that's what I'd like to start with is Mr. Reeves' statement to law enforcement. 8 9 Do you have that in front of you? 10 I'm trying to pull it up right now. Give me 11 a second. 12 0 Alright, sir. Let me know when you're ready, 13 please. 14 So I don't get this confused, I do have a 15 police report pulled up. 16 Look at the very top. It's either gonna be 17 top right or top left. It will say printed. Very first page. 18 19 1/27/2014? Α 20 No, not that one. Q 2.1 Let me keep moving. 1/25/2016? Α 22 Q Yes, sir. That's the one. 23 Α Okay. 24 All right. Mr. Reeves' statement to law Q 25 enforcement begins on page 75 of that report.

- A Let me get to it.
- 2 Q Thank you.

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- A It looks to me like it's on page 76; is that right?
  - Q Well, actually it's --
  - A At least on mine. On page 75 it looks like we're still talking to Angela Hamilton.
  - Q Yeah. Keep scrolling down and you'll see it will start printed out like a transcript.
- 10 A I see. Yes. Okay. So it starts with yup,
  11 right?
- 12 Q Correct, sir.
- 13 A Okay. I'm there.
  - Q Alright, sir. In the depo in October beginning on page 161, right at the end you authored up several areas in Mr. Reeves' statement to law enforcement that suggests to you his self-awareness of his limitations, if you will, the self-efficacy. Whatever we're gonna talk about. What do you want to call that, self-awareness? I don't know.
    - A Self-efficacy.
  - Q Self-efficacy. All right. In order to save some time I've reviewed those. I get it. Is there anything else in his statement involving that issue that you need to add that you didn't cover in the

first depo?

A I don't think so. I'm just going through this latest one here. Let me see if I highlighted anything.

Q We began that discussion in your depo on page 161 through pages 164.

A Right. I mean, trying to just-- I think what I have given you is a pretty good accounting of Reeves' description of his self-efficacy. He talks about his shoulder and how sore it is. And I think I covered that with you. Again, I'd have to almost do a side-by-side comparison.

Q Yeah. On page 164 of your depo, and this is the reason I'm asking the question, you indicate, "That's it. That's what I'd written down from the notes took." So if that is correctly stated, I'm assuming that everything that you had noted you told me. Would that be a correct assumption on my part?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Let me just followup then on that, not what you identified but the significance of the self-efficacy in this particular case.

Are you suggesting by those examples that Mr. Reeves' actions are predictable based on those statements by him that you have indicated show

self-efficacy?

2.1

A Yes. I don't know that I would frame it that way but--

Q How would you frame it?

A That the decision -- the decision making model involves self-efficacy and understanding your limitation and coping mechanisms for a different situation.

I think actually the way you said it is fine.

I think, yes, I think we can boil it down to

predictability. In other words, if you were to take a

different person, not Mr. Reeves, give him the same

ailments and the same level of self-efficacy, I think

you'd get the same result.

So I think predictability is not badly framed.

Q If you were in the courtroom and you had gone through those areas in the statement Mr. Reeves made to law enforcement indicating self-efficacy, and if you were asked and the Court allowed you to testify, what would you tell the jury is the significance of those observations that you made to this case?

A Okay. So typically it's not within the expert's purview to try to get into somebody's head. But every now and then somebody allows us to get in

their head --

2.1

Q Yeah, I know.

A -- when they make statements of the type that Mr. Reeves makes. He talks about himself. He talks about what he was thinking when this event was going on. He talks about what he knows about himself. So it's fairly easy. It's an open door for anyone to look at what was going on in his head at the time that this event took place. So I think I can comment on that because I would simply be using his words. I'm not trying to offer opinions about things which I couldn't know.

So when you're making decisions, decision making begins with data collection, right. So that's problematic obviously for everyone, not just a 71 year old man. But sitting in a dark movie theater you're very very limited in the amount of information you can gather because things are dark.

And as human beings most of the information that we gather is visual. This is what my dissertation was about, by the way. I think we talked about this in my deposition previously.

Visual information tells us about the environment. It tells us what's out there. It tells us what's important. It tells us what is just noise.

And it gives us the construct and situational awareness that you and I spoke about.

2.1

Situational awareness means that you're gathering data and you're discriminating that data. So you're attenuating some information and you're attending to other information. That's the beginning of decision making. And you're doing that based on importance. What's important for the moment.

When you're talking about combat and survival techniques you're looking for the most dangerous aspects of environmental information, and those are the things you're going to attend to.

But you also have to compare it with your coping mechanisms, which I spoke to previously. Your coping mechanisms are going to be, quote, "psychological" as well as "physiological."

So, for example, law enforcement officers who are sent to calls, we don't ever pick them based on their size, we pick them based on their proximity to the crime. And so sometimes very small officers get sent to incidents involving very large offenders, or sometimes very armed offenders. And we know that there's a natural imbalance between law enforcement officers and yet they go. And the reason they go is because they're equipped with training and they're

equipped with various tools to be able to accomplish goals. They're equal based on the fact that we issue them a belt system that has, depending on the agency, pepper spray perhaps, Taser perhaps, baton perhaps. And using those tools they can mitigate the differential between let's say, for example, their small size or perhaps even gender, and the person that may be challenging them. So they're motivated to take control. And so law enforcement officers essentially don't run from fights, not that it's never happened, but they certainly wouldn't be a good law enforcement officer if they did. They would have to deal with the circumstance because we give them the tools and training to deal with it. So their self-efficacy is very high. They would wonder into what we would call harms way with a high motivation because they know that they're equipped to handle it.

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To the contrary, if you were to take the same circumstance and send somebody, for example, very small or perhaps a particular gender, into a situation and not properly equip them with coping mechanisms for what they come up against, they would have a very low motivation to go to that particular area and inject themselves in a situation that could be harmful to them. So we don't ask them to do that.

When you're dealing with citizen fight, coping mechanisms are limited in the fact that, A, citizens don't typically have authority to make arrest. They don't have the authority to take someone into custody. They don't have the authority often times even to exert any type of force, with one exception, and that would be self-defense that's protected by law.

So if we can cross the bridge and say, okay, something is self-defense, and I think we can do that in this case. I think it would be harder to argue it's not a self-defense case. I mean, you have, again, a six foot four male younger than Mr. Reeves jumping out of his chair acting very bizarre. I mean, making a big issue about Mr. Reeves telling the manager about his cellphone being on. Very unpredictable. And so Reeves was forced to defend himself against that self-defense part.

Now when it gets to the second part, did the survivor take bifurcated equation, as we spoke about earlier, which is how that force can be used, now we get into self-efficacy. What does Mr. Reeves think he can do. So a reasonable person who would be trying to use a minimum amount of force or try to create the least harm.

Had the roles been reversed and Mr. Reeves was the younger and the bigger and perhaps the more agile and the better equipped, this may have ended as Mr. Reeves said with a wrestling match in the movie theater. But that's not what happened. In this case Mr. Reeves is a 71 year old, and I'll paraphrase it, broken down old man. He's defined even by law as being somebody that can't be battered. It's an aggravated battery if you hit him.

2.1

But he truly has debilitating physical features. He's full of arthritis. He has a bad back. He's overweight. And he has an imposition in that he's sitting against the wall. He can't go anywhere. He can't even get out of his seat. So his motivation to struggle with Mr. Oulson is very very low because he doesn't have the self-efficacy or the coping mechanisms to deal with what's happening to him at that moment.

Now, under the circumstances Mr. Reeves has brought something with him which the law protects under the concealed carry permit, that once again mitigates the differences between Mr. Oulson who's much younger, probably much stronger, certainly more agile and threatening, in comparison to Mr. Reeves' diminished state because of his ago and because of his

injuries, and his arthritis, his condition, and that something is a firearm.

So it's reasonable if exceeded by the challenge of Mr. Oulson that you would feel threatened. That's how Lazarus and Folkman defined a threat. When your challenges are exceeded, your ability to cope with the challenge is exceeded, you are no longer being challenged, you're being threatened.

And I think that the evidence shows, based on self-efficacy, that a reasonable person would conclude that Mr. Reeves is being threatened.

So how does he mitigate that. Well, at first he doesn't just pull out a gun and shoot him when he's challenged. He tries to lean far away. He tries to stay away from him. He says I'm still trying to figure out what's going on. It's so unusual. It's never happened to me before. I don't have a blueprint on what to do. So I'm pulling myself back in the chair as far as I can. I'm trying to avoid him. And all of a sudden I get hit in the side of the face.

Well, his existing self-efficacy is not to fight Mr.

Oulson already, now he has further diminished capacity because he can't see. And we are visual creatures.

He says my glasses turned sideways on my head. I have

make out detail, which was hard to do in a dark theater. He can of course see Mr. Oulson who is six foot four. He's got the ability, even through blurred lenses, because the focal point had been adjusted, to see Mr. Oulson still coming at him after being hit. Really the only appropriate coping mechanism at this point is to take the only tool that he has on him, and that is his firearm, to protect himself.

2.1

I think reasonable people will believe under the circumstances that Mr. Reeves, who says in his interview, man, if I get hit it takes me two months to heal. Or something like that. Two months for a bruise to heal. That's how he feels about himself. He then says, I don't need another ass whipping. I think that's verbatim what he says. Or, I don't need an ass whipping. And he says a lot of things like that. I didn't think that I could take him. No, I can't take anybody. Stuff like that.

So it would be reasonable if your self-efficacy is that low in that compressed timeframe where you can't sit around and contemplate the possibility, that you would take the very first thing that comes to mind as a solution to a quickly rapidly unfolding, diminishing problem, which is that he might

in the very next millisecond be severely injured or killed, and that is he reaches for his firearm.

2.1

And in the fog of the attack where everything is happening very rapidly, he does get hit again a second time. We know this by popcorn. You can see it. He tells me he doesn't know he's hit by popcorn. He knows he's hit. He can see Mr. Oulson coming at him and he decides to put a stop to it by firing a shot and that's what he does.

So because of his self-efficacy, I think to answer your question, he has a justification to use deadly force because he was left with no other reasonable alternative.

So then we have to go back and decide, okay, is all of this true what I just told you. Is he really 71 years old. The answer is he is. Is he really debilitated, and to what degree. And more importantly, how does he feel about his debilitation. He tells us that. There's no reason to doubt him.

So that's what I would tell a jury, is that the subject factors matter. And part of the subject factors is how you reasonably believe various coping situation that is rapidly unfolding and a threat to your safety.

And again, I don't know that jury necessarily

know that. It's the same -- you know, unfortunately news media, the television shows teach people who make up juries strange things. You know, like for example, every time you shoot somebody in the back it's a bad shooting. You know that's not true. Sometimes that happens in the course of shooting at somebody they twist away in the course of being hit in the chest the first time, they catch one in the back. That doesn't nullify the shooting and make it a bad shooting.

enforcement that the public thinks they know and they're just not true. And so they might think, for example, you shouldn't shoot somebody -- this is I'm referring to the Rittenhouse case right now. You should have taken the beating. You should go fist to cuffs because that's what people do. That's what brave people do. They fight back using their fists, not guns. That's excessive. And that's not always true. It would depend on the self-efficacy of the individual. If he didn't think his fists could work he wouldn't attempt to use them. Who would. It would be unreasonable to do that.

So I think that's probably the answer to your question as to what I would tell a jury about self-efficacy.

Q Okay. Given the factual situation that you just gave me, if the jury were to conclude that Mr.

Reeves was not hit by the cellphone, would you agree that the shooting of Mr. Oulson for tossing popcorn at Mr. Reeves would be disproportional to the threat?

A It would be a hindsight analysis after the jury weighed in on that. I don't know that I've always agreed with juries, by the way.

- Q Well this is a hypothetical--
- A I know.

2.1

- Q -- where the phone is out. He was not hit with the phone. He was tossed popcorn in his face and he shot Mr. Oulson. Is the shooting of Mr. Oulson for tossing popcorn a proportional response?
- A Yeah, let's not mince words. And I'll just be clear and I'll answer it succinctly.
- Q Thank you.
  - A As I think it should be answered. You can't shoot somebody for throwing popcorn in your face.

    How's that.
    - Q Okay.
- A And, by the way, I would think perhaps even a caveat to that is I think about police officers that shoot folks with cellphones. Sometimes that happens because the officer believes that it's something else.

And I don't think that Reeves ever said he doesn't think he's hit by popcorn. To the alternative he doesn't even know he's hit by popcorn until he's being interviewed by law enforcement. He says, I don't know what happened. I just saw it on the floor after it was all over.

2.1

So he doesn't claim to do what -- in the literature it's called a mistake of fact. That's not what he's claiming. But to your question I think it is a hypothetical so it's generalized. It is possible somebody could be throwing popcorn and somebody on the receiving would think it's something else and have justification for thinking that and fire a shot. So I can imagine a scenario where that could happen.

But let me redefine my answer or narrow my answer. If somebody is throwing popcorn in your face and you know it's popcorn, you can't shoot them. I think that's more accurate.

Q And if the jury believes the three witnesses that it was Mr. Reeves that said the words to the effect, "toss popcorn on me, will you," contemporaneous with the shooting, would the shooting be disproportional to the threat?

A Not as I've analyzed it. I mean, the jury's opinion is not gonna change my analysis.

Q This is a hypothetical. We're not talking about what the jury, I'm asking you.

2.1

- A You said if the jury believes. That's how this question started.
- Q I apologize. The hypothetical is that he was not hit with the phone and he did say the words "throw popcorn on me, will you," as he fires the shot. Would the shooting of Mr. Oulson for tossing popcorn be disproportional to the threat?
- A I would say asked and answered. You can't shoot somebody for throwing popcorn if they know it's popcorn.
- Q Okay. In his statement to you law enforcement -- I want to turn to the residual artifacts that we've been talking about that are there because of the way you explain an individual being in a stressful situation. Without going through the statement itself, and let's assume that there are some, go through with me just like you did with the self-efficacy. I think that's the quickest way to get the material in front of me.

What is the significance of any of the artifacts that you found in Mr. Reeves' statement to law enforcement in this case; what is the significance to you?

A So artifacts when I usually look for them-and let me preface my answer by saying I didn't find a
whole lot of artifacts and I guess I wasn't surprised.
And that's partly I think during the deposition why I
wanted to interview him, because obviously we don't
ask certain-- law enforcement doesn't ask certain
questions to draw those artifacts out.

2.1

Here's the problem with Reeves, and I can see. He knows about all these things. I mean, if he wanted to fake it, he's aware of tunnel vision. He's aware of auditory exclusion. He's aware of vasodilation and vasoconstriction and all the things I often talk about when I'm dealing with people who are not, you know, former SWAT team members. I mean, these are ideas that are openly discussed in law enforcement. Very few police officers have learned this at the academy level.

So I was very very cautious when I spoke to him to not even talk about that because I didn't want to prompt him to give me self-serving answers. So I tried to ask roundabout kind of questions. I don't see a lot of this. As a matter of fact, the only thing I do see is some memory issues, and I think that demonstrates that at some level, you know, fragmented memory also occurs when you're under high arousal.

And I think there's no question. I think again it's reasonable to understand if you're sitting in a movie theater and you get attacked in the dark, you're gonna be aroused by that. You're going to have a lot of anxiety about that. I think normal people will believe that that's true.

So the memory issues can happen, you know, to anyone who is facing a situation like that. And that's what I saw in the police reports. But otherwise he's pretty well composed.

I mean, a lot of times when I look at stand your ground cases the individual, providing they give a statement to law enforcement, I can just pull artifacts out of it. They're saying, man, I didn't see this. I didn't hear this. I mean, just all these different artifacts. I don't see a tone of that with Mr. Reeves. So when I went and spoke with him --

Are you going to talk with me separately about my interview with him?

Q Yes, sir.

2.1

A I thought you might. But if you don't mind me bleeding over to that. The only time with the issue of artifact that I actually saw something that perhaps I recognized, is there's two things that I wrote down. And mind you, I didn't write down very

much because he just basically affirmed everything that I had already read. And I spoke to him for over two hours. But it was really just stuff that he had already said to law enforcement. He's unwavering in his description of things. And, by the way, I think that's a good thing, for him anyway.

But he did mention that—— I said to him that there was some rumor that Mrs. Oulson had stood up and tried to hold her husband back. He claims that. And he had very little memory of where exactly she was or how she was standing and all that kind of stuff. He said he remembered when it first happened that she—— before he realized what kind of danger he was in, that she was already starting to try to hold him back. But at the moment that he fired the shot he didn't know where she was. That could suggest some type of tunnel vision. And I would submit to that that probably did happen when you're firing a bullet certainly in a public place of a person.

And then the only second thing is I asked him, I said, was it loud? He said, I don't remember the shot at all. I don't remember hearing it at all. And that would indicate of course the auditory exclusion.

On of the two areas really of the artifacts

that may be relevant -- I can't tell you whether or not they're relevant at all, and I don't know that I need them to describe the fact that he should have been reasonably anxious about what was about to happen because it was somewhat unusual that a person would attack him sitting in a movie theater.

2.1

Usually when I talk about artifacts it's to demonstrate I guess what you would call Mens rea, right, the guilty mind. If somebody is a cold blooded killer and is trying to sell this as self-defense, a lot of times that's revealed in the statement to police because there's no artifacts there. And, you know, typically when you don't have artifacts it's because something is calculated, right. I mean, artifacts happen under anxiety, arousal and fear.

So, for example, Ted Bundy probably didn't show a lot of artifacts because he generally was in charge of the situation and that's why we think it happened. If you know how a situation is going to end your arousal level doesn't get very high because you're in control of the situation. It's when you don't know how something is going to end. You don't know if you're going to be hurt, you don't know if you're going to be killed, that you tend to reach the higher level.

I would submit to you had Mr. Reeves not carried a concealed weapon he would have given a very different interview because I think I would have seen those artifacts because he would not have had the coping mechanisms to know how this ended. And he probably would have hit those high levels of arousal. But I think being a trained law enforcement officer with the coping mechanism in his pocket he was capable of dealing with this with relative poise like you would expect a police officer.

2.1

So I don't see a lot of that, to your question.

Q You talked a little bit about memory fragmentation and memory distortion. Did you, in your opinion, find any of those, quote, "artifacts" in the statement to law enforcement by Mr. Reeves?

A I think a couple of times he says I don't remember, but nothing really significant. I've worked cases where there's entire minutes of an event that are missing. They just simply don't have them in their head. And, by the way, these are usually events like this one that you think no one could ever forget and yet they have no memory of it.

Again, I didn't see a whole lot of what we call critical infantile amnesia occurring with Mr.

Reeves. I think that he did not get to that highest arousal level. I think he was scared but I think that he always knew that he had an ability to mitigate his advantage as a result of having that 380 Kel Tec in his pocket. So I think that he remained somewhat in control, as he should have under the circumstances.

Q What about memory distortion?

2.1

- A I don't recall during the interview if he had a distorted memory that was obvious to me.
- Q We're talking about the interview to law enforcement, not your interview. Just so the record's clear.
- A No. In reading the interview with law enforcement, nothing stood out to me as being a memory distortion. Let me flip through this real quick and see if I have anything highlighted.

He said something about, you know, this one section where he says after getting hit before shooting he fires a shot, and he's surprised he didn't shoot himself in the left hand. I looked at that scene over and over. I don't see his left hand up.

Now I don't know if it was up previous to this and he has a recollection of that or what. But he says his left hand is out in front of him. I can't see it on the video. So if that is a factual statement and he

in his mind's eye can actually see his left hand out in front of him, that would be probably memory distortion, at least within the time sequence in which he offers it.

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Q Are you able to discern -- we're back to Mens rea, okay. Are you able to discern based on that statement whether or not it's memory distortion or just a lie?

No, I can't. I actually can never tell that. Α I mean, once again, that's obviously in your head. think artifacts just help us -- help lead us to the idea that somebody's afraid. Like I said, in this case I think it's because it's on video and because we do know what happened I think a reasonable person would say, okay, yeah, had that been me I would have been afraid too. So it's not that important. distortions are not that important to me. They're usually just when you have, for example, one living witness and that's the guy that's in defense of himself. I've got to sit here and say, okay, were you afraid, afraid enough to use deadly force. Because I don't have any video on it. It's just what he's saying. And that's when those memory distortions and perceptional distortions are most salient. Because then I can say this guy thinks that the really only

people in great fear say. And I don't know that I even give -- I don't even know that I feel comfortable saying that about Reeves because he's schooled in this stuff. I mean, if he was going out here going, man, I had wicked tunnel vision. I didn't hear a thing. I would think he was just going down a list. He doesn't do that, by the way. He never offers that.

2.1

So I was careful in how I approached it because I didn't want to, for example, get him recalling the last training manual he read. And he's read many of them. I think he's even written them. So I didn't dig too deep there. And he doesn't offer this to law enforcement, which of course he could have if he was really trying to pad this to his favor. But I don't see any of that stuff.

Q I believe you covered the topic of threat assessment when you talked about the self-efficacy, am I correct in that assumption? I was listening to you and I believe you started out with that being in the environment, gathering information and then coping and how you cope with the information you gathered.

That pretty much covered threat assessment or is there more to it that than?

A Well threat assessment really deals with the part that I didn't spend a lot of time talking about,

and that's going to be anticipation, right.

Q Okay.

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A So threat assessment leads us up to forever trying to know what happens next, and that's what we call anticipation. So when you're anticipating something you're anticipating it based on things that have already happened, and you're trying to find things that haven't happened yet.

So, like I said, that's a predictor of future behaviors is gonna be past behavior. And the past behavior that Reeves is observing, and we can also observe on video, now, you know, in hindsight, is that Oulson is acting completely unreasonable. He's got his cellphone on. He's got a guy in the move theater who has paid for his ticket who tells him, look, turn your cellphone off. And in response to that he gets up, makes a physical challenge and then physically attacks Mr. Reeves. That's completely unreasonable. And, by the way, had he not been shot he would have been arrested I'm sure for battery. So, I mean, he's committing a crime. He would have probably been arrested for aggravated battery because of Mr. Reeves' ago. So we know he's committing a crime. He's in the process of doing that.

And so Reeves has to anticipate is this crime

going to be terminal to me. Is he going to cause me lifelong injury or death. He doesn't know that because if he did know that it would have already happened.

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So the threat assessment is there. It's at that point of anticipation. What do I think is going to happen next. That he's relying on what's happening now or what just happened in the past. And how this just unfolded in the most bizarre way.

So I would add that to the situational awareness that I described which is where you're taking information and you are trying to discriminate the information out to what you should attend to, what should be attenuated and so on and so on to come up with an understanding of the environment that you're Now you're working towards what do I think is gonna happen next and then you come back to what are my coping mechanisms to deal with that. If your coping mechanisms can manage what you think is going to happen next then you say no shoot. If your coping mechanisms are heated by what's gonna happen next, then it would move into the area of deadly force because you are no longer challenged, you are threatened.

So maybe that's a good summary of what I

think we talked about with the addition of how important anticipation is.

2.1

Q In your opinion, did you find anything in Mr. Reeves' statements to law enforcement that suggested to you that his decision making process was adversely affected by the artifacts of being in a stressful situation?

A No, with the exception of I would -- I think his decision making had more to do with his self-efficacy, and that's why I raised that with you in deposition, more so than trying to say he was afraid. Because I think that's on the table as a reasonable person seeing this video would also be afraid for him. Or not even just seeing the video because the video doesn't capture it all. But if you take the things that are probably happening during those dark frames you would be afraid.

So again, those artifacts, those stress artifacts, I don't think that Mr. Reeves overreacted to this. And a lot of times when we're trying to identify why, you know, why something isn't exactly as the law says it should be is because of the emotional context of it, right.

So, for example, I testify in cases a lot of times where law enforcement officers shoot at motor

vehicles that are coming at them, but then they continue to shoot as they go by. How do I explain that. Well I have to get into the emotional component of it, right. I have to talk about the fact that the fear doesn't just turn off when the vehicle passes. So sometimes they get them inside of the car, sometimes they get them through the back window. And that does happen in the course of the original decision that your life is in danger.

2.1

But that's not this case here. This is a single shot that was calculated from the perspective that a reasonable person, a certainly subjectively reasonable person, according to Mr. Reeves, believed that his -- that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death. And the artifacts that would have otherwise showed up would have been perhaps important had my analysis concluded that he overreacted. But under the circumstances, providing you believe that he got hit in the face and was still under continuous attack, he did not overreact. I mean, that would be a justifiable use of deadly force as I understand it.

A jury is going to have to decide ultimately if that's justifiable. But as I understand it as an expert offering an opinion, that would be considered a

justifiable use of deadly force under the circumstances that I detailed now I guess at nauseam.

2.1

Q Going back to the method that you used, that you described you used in all cases in analyzing use of force, which encompass the use of the null hypothesis to test the reality of certain data that you're reviewing, how did you go about making the determination, the ultimate determination that Mr. Reeves did not overreact and that the shooting was justified?

Tell me your thought process. What did you go through? What did you look at? How did you use the null hypothesis to give credence or support to your conclusions?

A So you start off with Mr. Reeves' statement and then you say, well none of that happened. That's how it begins. You start off with the statement. You look at what he says. You say, well he's just lying about everything. Then you go back and you take a look at the video. Then you go back and take a look at the witness statements. You go back and take a look at the crime scene information. And as you start to do that you start to go, oh, he's not lying about that. That's corroborated.

So when you say testing, I suppose it's a

test but it's really an observational study, like I mentioned earlier. It's not an empirical test because this is a single trial. We can't, you know, suddenly recreate the event, put another person there and see what he would do. That's what you would do if you had a control. You would take a 71 year old person. You take a 30 year old person. You run the same scenario. You see if they acted the same. And then my opinion could be validated or invalidated, that this is how people with low self-efficacy because of their age and because of their injuries behaved. But that's not how this is particularly done in use of force studies because they're all single trial. Obviously the outcome isn't something that's capable of being tested.

2.1

So it lends itself to an observational study. I think a good comparison to this when you talk about the inability to do empirical testing, is I think most people think that smoking causes cancer but there's no actual evidence of that. There seems to be a correlation because people who smoke die of cancer a lot, but we can't actually test it. We can't hand a bunch of people cigarettes and say, here, smoke these. Let's see if you die. So no one's ever done a controlled study on smoking, yet we believe that

smoking causes cancer. I think across the board most people think that's a reasonable conclusion without an empirical examination. This is one of those kind of things.

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So as I do an observational study I have to observe what's given to me, and what's been given to me is the video, which I've looked at many many times. I can see Mr. Oulson standing there. I can see him facing Mr. Reeves. I know that Mr. Reeves perceives that he is being, at least at the moment when the video opens, challenged. He's being challenged by Mr. This is I guess the second 26 if we go back to that previous one that I said I don't think the fight actually started then. It seems to me that he's arguing with Mr. Oulson, which is consistent with the story. I can't falsify that. He says they're arguing. He says the guy says, I'm texting my fucking daughter, or something like that. It seems to me that that's probably true based on what we can see on that second 26.

But then it goes blank and it shows back up and there's Mr. Oulson. He's standing up in front of Reeves and he's -- I think I can even see, I can't say this absolutely, his leg in between the seats. There is some body part that gets retracted at about the arm

level of the chair while Mr. Reeves is pressing his gun forward and firing that shot. It looks like his leg is propped up between the seats to me. That's what Reeves says. I can't falsify that. The video seems to confirm that.

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So I know that there is now a case of him not only challenging Mr. Reeves but he's out of his seat now. Now we go back to everything I told you about self-efficacy. What do I know about Reeves. I looked at all that. Oh, he's 71 years old. He says he's full of arthritis. I have no reason to dispute that. He says that he doesn't think he can take him. He says he can't even get out of the chair. Perhaps he's lying. I mean, you can figure that out. That's something that you can flush out on the stand. But I don't need to think he's lying. I'll take him at his word for it. So there's no way for me to disprove how he felt about himself.

That said, when Oulson is standing there and he has low self-efficacy, he's no longer being challenged, he's being threatened. Now we're in a case of self-defense because he's being threatened. I think reasonable minds will agree that he's being threatened and this is a case of self-defense.

Now we've got to get to the firearm. Without

coming off of self-efficacy, the reasonable belief that Mr. Reeves, as he says he's afraid, and reasonable minds would agree he probably should be under the circumstances, what can he do about it.

Well, with self-efficacy, under thinks this entire conversation. He can't fight him. He doesn't think he can take him. He doesn't need a lesson to know it. I mean, no one would do that. But he does have a firearm in his pocket. That's a fact. We have it. It's, you know, in evidence.

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So he decides to Take the First, which is one of the articles that I sent you. He goes to really a heuristic analysis of the situation in that compressed timeframe and thinks, what can I do now. And the only reasonable response to a threat that in the next moment may result in permanent harm or death to Mr. Reeves, is the firearm. That's why he has a concealed carry permit, if not for this case what case scenario does he carry the concealed weapon for. So he decides to pull the weapon. I mean, that's a -- it matches what he said, and at the timeframe that he says it. He doesn't get up and start shooting Mr. Oulson because Oulson tells him to fuck off, which he says happens earlier in the conversation. He does it when he's under attack.

So if I'm falsifying his statement what's happening is the null hypothesis is slowly being eliminated and I have to start accepting the alternative hypothesis which is that Mr. Reeves is telling the truth.

So that was my thought process as I went through this, to your question.

Q Did you read the transcript of Mr. Reeves' direct testimony in the immunity hearing?

A Yes.

2.1

Q Is there anything in that immunity hearing transcript that is so significantly different than what he told law enforcement that your explanation, like the one that you just gave me, and the self-efficacy and the artifacts, if you will, is gonna be any different?

Do we need to go through the transcript or is it basically the same? I can go through the transcript if you want.

A If you want to go through and ask me questions about it I'll be happy to comment on it.

But I don't think that -- like I said, he's somewhat unwavering. There may be, you know, some variable, but I don't think anyone ever tells a story the same way twice, exactly the same way twice. But if you

were to look at the pillars of the foundation of the story, I don't think that changes at all while he's on the stand. I don't know how many pages I read about his background and what he did. It seemed like a lot of it was about that.

Q Yeah, it's a lot.

A Yeah. But, you know, when he describes the story it is remarkably the same as he tells law enforcement after it happened, which, by the way, is also a bit surprising because when you have artifacts like that you have fragmented memory. These initial reports to law enforcement officers often don't recall the detail that you will later see in court. But I think it was remarkably unwavering from what he originally said, and when I spoke to him as well. He's sure on his story.

 ${\tt Q}$  You mentioned that you had an interview with  ${\tt Mr.}$  Reeves and it lasted for two hours.

- A Right.
- Q Was that interview tape recorded?
- A No.
- 22 | Q Was it video taped?
- 23 A No.

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- 24 Q Did you take notes?
- 25 | A I did.

Q In order to recall specific statements by Mr. Reeves are you going to need to refer to those notes?

2.1

A I don't think so. It really turned into like more of an affirmation interview as I spoke to about earlier. It really just sort of confirmed things I already knew. I tried to say things to him that might compel him to give me some information of the artifacts I knew that you were interested in and I knew you were going to ask me about it. But I didn't want to be blatant and come right out and say, hey, did you experience tunnel vision. Because I think any statement with his background would be self-serving and I think rightly so. He is educated in this area.

So I really just went back through what happened. I matched it to the story as I understood it that was given both in the immunity hearing as well as his statement to law enforcement officers. There are still some things I think that he said that he was unclear about. There were things that he was clear about. You know, he didn't exactly know what hit him in the head still. He said I think it was the phone. He said, I'm not sure if he threw it at me or punched me and dropped it in the course of being punched because I don't know. But I remember seeing the blue of the screen. He goes, but I'm not really sure. But

I just know that when it was over I looked down and there's a cellphone at me feet, and I thought maybe it was even mine. He said, but, you know, I understand now that it makes sense with what I recall at that moment when I was hit.

So he hasn't grasped the hindsight information and said, oh, I was hit by a cellphone. It's at me feet. He didn't do any of that. So he's really just telling me I think, as much as I could tell, how he thought about things at that moment. And so I don't have a whole lot of notes on it because most of it is contained in the statements that I read.

Q Let me break it down just a little bit. We're gonna talk about different segments.

A Okay.

Q And you might want to just go ahead and put your visualization skills to use about the video because that's what I'm doing.

As he walks into the theater with his wife and sits down, at that point did you have a discussion with him about his observations of Mr. And Mrs.

Oulson, what he saw them doing? Did you talk about that?

A I don't believe so. No, not specifically about what Mr. And Mrs. Oulson were doing when he

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      walked in. I think our conversation really started
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      when he attended to what Mr. Oulson was doing, which
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      was of course being on his cellphone and annoying. He
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      said he held the phone in his left hand. He said the
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      light was, you know, basically coming right into his
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      face. And that's I think where our conversation kind
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      of started. I didn't really see the relevancy of
      asking him about --
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               Okay, well I had to start somewhere so let's
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      start there.
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          Α
               Yeah.
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               MR. MARTIN: I'm sorry. Mr. Michaels?
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               Did he drop off?
          Α
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               MR. MARTIN: I don't know.
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               MR. MICHAELS: No, I'm here.
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               MR. MARTIN: Oh. I thought I heard you.
                                                          I'm
17
      sorry.
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               MR. MICHAELS: I didn't say anything. I had
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      my mic muted so you wouldn't hear background noises.
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                (By Mr. Martin). Okay. Did you discuss with
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      Mr. Reeves the first time that he observed something,
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      some activity on Mr. Oulson that he felt was
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      inappropriate in the movie theater; did you discuss
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      that with him?
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          Α
               Yes.
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Q What did he tell you?

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- A What I just told you. He said he was

  watching the previews. And he said the person in

  front of him to his right was on the phone. He said

  it was a bright screen. It was held in his left hand.

  He remembered that. And it called attention to Mr.

  Oulson, as I understand it, for the first time where

  he actually attended to Oulson.
  - Q How did he respond to that activity of Mr. Oulson; what did he say?
  - A He said that he asked him to put his phone away because it was bothering him. He said it was actually shown in his eyes. And he said he was met with an abrupt-- he said he didn't remember exactly what he said because he thought it was along the lines of go fuck yourself, or fuck you or something like that.

 $\label{eq:local_and_state} \mbox{And I guess I'll stop there and let you ask} \\ \mbox{the next question.}$ 

- Q Did you ask Mr. Reeves how many times he made contact with Mr. Oulson regarding his use of the phone before he left the theater to complain to the manager?
- A He didn't volunteer making contact with him more than once. I think he said after he got that curt response he felt it was best to get a manager.

And that was the whole purpose of getting the manager because he felt that there was no point in revisiting his conversation with essentially an unreasonable individual.

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Q Did you have a discussion with Mr. Reeves as to why he went to the manager to complain; what was the purpose?

You know, we did talk about that. And it had a lot to do with his I guess Busch Gardens experience. He brought this up. He said that, you know, I'm well trained in customer service and I'm trained at defusing a problem. And I know that at Busch Gardens, you know, if we have a problem people will typically come to me and ask me to resolve it, if it's a problem. He says, we train our folks to have an up line. And he said, you know, being a chain of command quy that's just kind of how he thinks. And he said that his natural reaction, as a natural now, meaning that he's been doing this a long time as a police officer and now as a customer service person whose job it is at some point to not upset people, he thought the right thing to do was to get up and talk to the manager. And so that's what he did. Or at least that's what he told me he did. And that's why he said he did it, because he felt like that was the proper

thing to do.

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Q Did you have a discussion with Mr. Reeves about his observations when he was returning to his seat from complaining to the manager as he was walking down the isle to his seat?

A Yes.

Q What did he say?

A He said when he came back he noticed that Mr. Oulson had his phone off. And he said to him something to the effect of, I see your cellphone is off. I'm sorry I had to involve the manager. I asked him if he said that in a snarky way, meaning if he did it almost like an agitated sort of way. He said, I don't know how he took it but that's not what I said. I was being a bit apologetic for involving the manager for something that resolved itself at the time I was gone.

Q Did you ask him why he made that statement to Mr. Oulson?

A I did.

Q What did he say?

A That was the whole snarky conversation. He said that he felt that it probably was more of a customer service training that he had. That he wanted to, you know, basically resolve any bad feelings with

the guy in front of him who was sitting there with his phone on. And clearly he went up and told the manager. He said, I wanted to apologize and let him know that everything is fine now. And so that's kind of how he described it to me.

- Q Did you discuss with Mr. Reeves his observations of Mr. Oulson after he returned to his seat, sat down and placed the popcorn on his left thigh? Did you ask him what observations he made of Mr. Oulson at that point in time?
  - A Yes.

2.1

Q What did he say?

A He said this is the point where Oulson turned to him and said something to the effect of, I was texting my fucking daughter. And I said, did you respond to that? And he said to me, I don't really remember if I did or not. He said, but he made it very clear. And then he said almost immediately after that he stood up. He said, when he stood up, and I wrote this down, I thought he was leaving the theater. We thought he was standing up to leave the theater. He said, then he turned around. And he said, and then suddenly without warning he was in my face.

him and the time that he actually stood on his feet and turned around and was suddenly, in the words of Mr. Reeves, in my face.

- Q Did you ask Mr. Reeves what he meant by he was in his face?
- A That he was being challenged. Yeah. That this was now a situation in which he was being challenged by the guy in front of him.
- Q Did Mr. Reeves tell you that Mr. Oulson said to him, get out of my face?
  - A I'm sorry, say that question again.
- Q Did Mr. Reeves tell you that Mr. Oulson said to him, get out of my face?
  - A I don't think he said that. I think I read that. But I don't think he said that to me in my interview.
    - O After --

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A And I think what I read, Mr. Martin, is that somebody said that. And it would strike me as odd that if Mr. Oulson had made the effort to get out of his seat, turn around and challenge Mr. Reeves, that he would be the one saying get out of my face. That just seems counterintuitive to me. Perhaps he said it. I don't know. But I do remember reading somebody hearing that that was said.

- Q Hang on a second.
- A Mr. Martin?
- Q Yes.

2.1

A Let me add something here. I'm looking at the bottom page of my note. I don't know if we circled back around to that. But I wrote down here, doesn't recall what he said but said something. He thinks it might be, get the fuck out of my face. So that's not in the sequence as I wrote my notes. But it looks like he-- I might have come back to that question later on. So I do have a note on that. He said that he hears him say something that he thinks might be, get the fuck out of my face, or something like that.

Q Well that's what he tells law enforcement on page 84 line -- well I don't know what line it is. On page 84.

A Well he told me that again. And I may have asked him about that as I went through-- because I actually had his statement, or I was looking at it and sort of talking to him about it and examining his responses. Like I said, it was remarkably similar. But somehow this ends up at the last -- my last note actually in the notes that I took, and I don't have many of them. So he does say that.

- Q Okay. Did he tell you when Mr. Oulson said that?
  - A I didn't write it down unfortunately. But he does remember saying that. And I think it, like I said, it seemed counterintuitive to me that had this happen when Oulson got out of his chair and stood up and turned around that he would have said that. And that may have been why I questioned him about it.
    - Q And did you question him about it?
    - A I did, because I made a note of it.
  - Q And what did he say?

2.1

- A I read it to you. He said he doesn't recall what he said, but he said something. He thinks it might be, get -- in quotes, "get the fuck out of my face."
- Q And when did Mr. Reeves say that Mr. Oulson made that statement?
- A I believe this is when he was telling him that he was just texting his daughter. That he had kind of like turned around and said -- I wrote that down. He says-- he said, who the fuck do you think you are? In quotes, "I was texting my daughter." And I think it happened during that same time. Get the fuck out of my face. That kind of thing.
  - Q Once Mr. Reeves told you that Mr. Oulson was

standing, did you ask Mr. Reeves what his next observations of the behavior of Mr. Oulson was?

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He said to me he threw the phone at me. Α And I remember this conversation. He elaborated by saying he wasn't sure if the phone was in his hand and he got hit with a fist. He said, suddenly my face turned to the right. My face got knocked kind of to the right. He said, my glasses went cockeyed and I remember seeing a flash of the phone. I don't know exactly what he hit me with, if it was his fist holding the phone or if he actually threw it at me. He said, but I remember it hit me. It hurt me. It turned my face to the right. And then suddenly my vision was obscured because my glasses were cockeyed. And that was the next thing he recalled. Well, I shouldn't say that. He actually said that he was coming over the seat, or coming -- so there's obviously space between the seats. He sees him kind of prop up and he declares that he's coming over the seat. He said he's got a leg in there. He's kind of coming through the side of the seat and over the top of the seat. That's what he says. And then he says he gets hit in the face.

- Q With the cellphone?
- 25 A That's what he said, yes. He said-- I wrote

down, he threw the phone at me. But then he went on to elaborate that he wasn't sure if it was thrown or if it was in his hand when he got punched. He still doesn't know. That's what I'm saying. He's still kind of unclear on what hit him and how it hit him even. I think he knows it's a cellphone that hit him, he just doesn't know how it hit him, if it was launched or if it was actually held in his hand.

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Q Did you ask Mr. Reeves how long after he believes he was hit with the cellphone that the popcorn was tossed in his face?

A Yeah, I did ask him about that. And I said, you know, I've read some things and I've read some depositions of people in this case who think that maybe you got hit in the face because of the mysterious luminous object 10 seconds earlier. Is that the case? He goes, I don't really know. He says, it happened very very quickly. I don't have a full understanding of the timeframe. But he said, I got hit in the face. He says, my glasses went sideways. The next thing I know he's still coming at me. I'm pressed back in the seat. So it sounded like it was very close to when the popcorn was thrown, which is why I concluded based on Reeves' statement, that it probably happened during that timeframe that

we can't see, during those black frames. And concluded that that 10 seconds earlier where we have a very brief picture of Oulson turned in his chair, Reeves kind of leaning forward, that that's probably not where it occurs.

And the reason I said that, and I'll say it again, is because when Reeves sits back from that he does not gravitate, he doesn't try to adjust his glasses, which one would expect if he just got hit in the face with a cellphone.

I'm sorry?

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Q I'm thinking. I thought you were moving on because you were saying it didn't happen here so it happened here. And I was waiting for you to finish your answer.

A I don't think anyone could say actually where it happened, but I think we are more able to say where it probably didn't happen, and that is at second 26.

Because, like I said, there's no -- there's no -- there's nothing that you would expect in Reeves' behavior to show that he's been struck at that moment. He just sits back in the chair. I think he actually grabbed the popcorn and sets it on his thigh. I mean, he doesn't-- he looks like he's exchanging words perhaps. And I do remember that Reeves said to me he

was trying to be quiet to not disturb everyone in the theater. That's probably why he leans forward towards Oulson and says something. I said, what did you say to him. He said, I don't remember. He said, if I said anything at all I don't know. He may have been leaning forward to listen to him. He doesn't recall exactly what happened at that moment.

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But he seems to think that he gets struck in the face, either punched or hit by a cellphone, moments before Oulson then reaches across, grabbed his popcorn and hits him now for a second time. And he says what he remembers is him coming at him. And as I told you previously he's been very clear about this. He said this to law enforcement and he repeated it to He goes, I didn't know he grabbed my popcorn. says, when it was all over and I sat back, I looked down and my popcorn was scattered. And I still don't know-- I still don't have a memory, I'm sorry, of that happening. I originally thought maybe he knocked it out of my hand or perhaps I dropped it. He says, I now know that he grabbed it and threw it. He says, at that time I didn't know that at all.

So what he does recall is the board lumbering of Oulson probably when he's grabbing his popcorn, but he perceived it as a direct attack on him. As the

- distance is closing he does not have a full sight picture but he knows that he is still being assailed.

  That's how he explained it to me.
  - Q Did you ask Mr. Reeves whether or not he made the statement, words to the effect, throw popcorn on me, will you?
  - A Yes, I did. And I told you what he told me. He said, no, I heard that also. Somebody said that, he said, in the theater. I said, why would they say that? He goes, I really don't know. He says, but I heard it. So I'm speculating here. But I could see somebody in a moment of levity after what just happened saying something, I'll teach you to throw popcorn on me. Something like that. I mean, that's my kind of sense of humor. That's the kind of stuff I would say. So if somebody else said it then somebody else said it. If Reeves said it, Reeves said it. I don't know. But he says, I didn't say it but I did hear it. So I know somebody in the theater said that.
  - Q Did you ask Mr. Reeves what it was about the behavior of Mr. Oulson that he felt it was necessary to respond with deadly force?
    - A Yes.

- Q What did he say?
- A He said kind of what I have summarized for

you, which is that he thought that Oulson's behavior was bizarre and unpredictable. He said he'd never faced anything like that before, somebody that had been so, I think he used the word again, in his face. He said he-- he repeated the word I was scared shitless. He said that he believed that, especially when he was trying to make his assessment, when he was trying to analyze what was actually happening, that it happened very rapidly, and that he felt as if he had been already hit once and he was about to be hit again, and didn't know when the beating would stop and he needed to put an end to it.

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So he felt that he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or worse. And he didn't say necessarily that he felt like he was gonna die. And I don't think I asked him that. I don't think that anyone could answer that question with any degree of certainty, even Reeves. But he said that he knew that he was not going to prevail in a fist to cuffs with this guy. And he felt like he was going to be seriously injured or worse, is kind of what he told me. So I took that to mean that perhaps even killed.

Q Did you have a discussion with Mr. Reeves as to when he made the decision to begin the process of drawing his firearm from his pants pocket?

I did. And he said to me that it was a bit -- it was a little bit about his positioning as much as it was about his analysis of what was actually happening to him. He was thinking to himself he had no where to go. He mentioned to me he had the wall behind him. And I think we even had a moment of discussion about, you know how cops do that. know, we sit with our back to the wall. We try to observe, blah, blah, blah. He goes, it put me in an unattainable predicament. I couldn't really go anywhere. I was completely stretched out, I think is the word he used. He said, and if you were to see the pants that I wear, he said, I had my little Kel Tec in my pocket, he said, and it's pretty tight in there. wouldn't have been able to get it when I was sitting down, he said. But because I was stretched out, he said, I actually could get my hand in my pocket and get it out. So that was occurring to him based on the position that he took, he told me, of the consequence of the ongoing attack by Oulson. That he just pushed far away to the left. Kind of a little bit drawn away from his wife and at the same time to not get hit again. And he said, that is the moment where I realized I could get my hand in my pocket. So that's when he started to formulate what his response would

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be. And he said, he told me when he did put his hand in his pocket it went right into the weapon and came right out. So it wasn't a matter of pause or him, I don't know, putting it in his seat. I asked him about that. Did you have it out? Did you have it on your leg? Did you think that you might end up in this situation? No, no, no. I reached in my pocket as I was being attacked, drew the weapon, and then when I had the weapon in my hand I started to sit back up and I fired the shot. That's what he told me.

2.1

Q I got the impression from your statement that Mr. Reeves told you that he made the decision to draw his firearm after the popcorn was tossed, the second attack; is that a correct assumption? Do I have it right?

A No, I don't think that's right. I think that he -- as the popcorn is being tossed --

Q Wait a minute. I appreciate what you're saying and I'll get to that in a minute. I want to know what Mr. Reeves said.

A I did not get the same impression you did from what I just said. I mean, when he told me that I just relayed it to you. You formed the impression.

My impression was formed differently. My impression is when he first got hit, or as he was being hit,

somewhere in that neighborhood, the first attack-we'll call it the first attack, assuming there was two
attacks.

The first attack is when he gets pressed back in the seat. At that point he can still see the figure, can't make out detail, his glasses are sideways, you got -- I think he even mentioned that Oulson was backlit. He does not have a clear picture of what's happening, he just knows that this figure is still coming at him. So this is before the popcorn.

He reaches his hand into his pocket because he knows that he's got to get Oulson off of him, and that's the time this happens. And then the popcorn I think is grabbed, and about exactly the same moment as the weapons comes out and is introduced. And I think the video picks up from there. We can see that. So we can see as the popcorn is tossed in the same timing, in the millisecond that it takes for Mr. Reeves to retract his arm, the weapon follows the arm. It's coming out and then he fires the shot. So it's happening almost simultaneously to the popcorn being thrown.

But it appears to me, and I think this is the only way you can figure it -- do you want me to comment on what I think as an opinion or--

Q No, because I want to followup. Is what you just said what Mr. Reeves told you, or your conclusion is based on what he said?

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Well I suppose it takes a little of both. mean, I'm interpreting what he's telling me. that's what he said to me. He said that when he was splayed out, when he got hit in the face and he pushed back -- no, I'm sorry. Let me go back. As Mr. Oulson was coming over the seat he splayed out. He got hit in the face. That's the time where he's got the ability to get the firearm. And he tells me that's where he sticks his hand in his pocket and is able to get it. And then goes on about, he breaks there and says, you should see his pants. If I was sitting up straight there's no way I could have got the gun out. It was pushed down in a deep cargo pocket, or however he explained it, and I couldn't have got it. But because of the position he had forced me into I was able to get the weapon out. So that's what he tells me.

Q Did Mr. Reeves make any other statements to you or did you discuss any other aspects of the shooting with him that we haven't already covered?

A We talked about post shooting, what he did. He mentioned that after it was over he didn't want

1 anybody in the theater to be afraid that he was a 2 homicidal maniac, so he said that I put the weapon on 3 my thigh. And he said, by the way, when I put it on 4 my thigh it was in full battery. He said, then the 5 Sumpter County deputy walked over and grabbed it, he 6 said. And I'm sure he stove piped it, is what he 7 said. Well, wait a minute. 8 9 That's what he told me. He says-- I wrote Α

- A That's what he told me. He says-- I wrote down, it was in full battery when he set it on his leg.
- Q Okay. You and I are gonna have this discussion. You know that the shot was fired, right?
- 14 A Yup.

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- Q And you know that there was one casing found on the floor, correct?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 | Q And it's a semiautomatic pistol, correct?
- 19 A Yes.
  - Q Okay. And then you know as a firearm instructor, how does a semiautomatic pistol become in a phase 2 malfunction, which is a stovepipe; how does that occur?
- 24 A The casing doesn't properly eject.
- 25 Q Correct. Now, do you really think that

happened, that Corporal Hamilton racked that firearm and stove piped it, do you believe that?

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A I don't believe there was an empty casing there --

Q There was an empty casing on the floor.

No, I'm talking about the conventional stovepipe where you have an empty casing trapped inside the mechanism of the weapon. But it was -- I don't know if it double bent. But I think the battery of it was out of battery. I think I even saw I think a picture of it. So it's not a true stovepipe. it's jammed. He thinks -- he tells me -- here's what he said. I wrote it down. The Sumpter County deputy stove piped the weapon when unloading it. He said it was in full battery when he set it on his leq. what he said. So he felt confident that when he set it down it was still very serviceable. And of course how would he know. He didn't inspect the weapon after the shooting. But he believes that the problem with the weapon that was identified during evidence collection was not of his doing. It was not because of a malfunction of the weapon. It was because the Sumpter County deputy did not properly clear the weapon. That's what he told me.

Q All right.

- A He used the word stovepipe. But you are correct, that stove piping involves an empty casing.

  But double feeding, for example, does not. You may end up with the battery that's pushed back because you got two rounds trying to get into the chamber. That's more likely what happens. But he used the word stovepipe because I wrote it down.
  - Q Anything else that he said that we haven't covered?
    - A Let's see.

- Q I mean, about his statement to you. We're at the post incident.
  - A No, I think that's it.
  - Q Did you ask him about any statements he made to his wife or any statements the wife made to him after the incident?
  - A No. I mean, a lot of that I found in the reporting. I have Ms. Reeves saying what she said; what he said.
  - Q Anything that Mrs. Reeves said about the incident, does that play into any opinions or conclusions that you've made?
- A Yes, one thing, and I think I put it on the list. She is one of the people who said he turned to her and said he hit me in the face. So this is his

very first initial reaction. After the shot is fired he turns to his wife and said he hit me in the face. So I felt that was interesting because of the timing of it. He hadn't been sitting down and conjuring a plan on how to cover his faulty shooting. He very quickly turns to her and says he hit me in the face. And she recounts that. I think that's important.

2.1

- Q And do you know whether or not being hit in the face, was he saying I was hit in the face with a cellphone or I was hit in the face with popcorn?
- A I think she recounts that he tells her I was hit in the face. He doesn't say by any particular thing. I don't think at that time -- in his statement he says I don't know what I was hit in the face by. He says that. But he believes it's a cellphone because he sees sort of this blur of a bright screen for a minute as he's getting struck.
- Q But the statement by Mrs. Reeves in and of itself neither confirms or invalidates whether or not Mr. Reeves was hit with a cellphone, does it?
  - A No. I mean, he said I was hit in the face.
- Q Any other statements post Miranda (sic) or any other discussions you had with Mr. Reeves?
  - A What do you mean post Miranda?
  - Q Did I say post Miranda? I meant to say post

incident. I apologize. Thank you for correcting me on that.

A Okay. I mean, we talked. Most of it turned to more of a casual conversation just learning more about him and even him learning a little bit about me, what I did and that kind of stuff.

But in relationship to this event, I think when I finally got through this and finished taking notes, we kind of stopped at the post shooting what did you do then. And then he went with the Sumpter deputy and blah, blah, blah.

And I did ask him -- I did ask him, I said, why did you give a statement? And he said -- I wrote this in quotes. "I gave them a statement because I confident of self-defense." That's what he said. So somewhere towards the end of this conversation he tells me that he gives a statement to police because he's confident that it's self-defense. And I think even during his interview that I listened to he says, if you guys start scaring the shit out of me I'm gonna have to get an attorney. That's what he says.

So I think, once again, that kind of confirms the fact that he believes that he's telling a cohesive story of what happened and he's telling it because he is confident it's self-defense.

And a guy like him, by the way, I would reasonably anticipate he knows the rules of engagement and would be able to draw that kind of conclusion about what just happened. So that was just sort of my analysis of it. So he was confident that it was self-defense. And he tells that to law enforcement.

Q Based on your interview with Mr. Reeves, do you believe that Mr. Reeves actually believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm necessitating the use to use deadly force?

A Yes.

2.1

Q And do you believe after interviewing Mr.

Reeves regarding the danger as he perceived it, that
he actually believed that the danger was so real that
under the circumstances the only way he could avoid
the danger was through the use of deadly force?

A Well he told me that. And I have no reason to dispute what he told me. I think he does believe that. And I have a whole list of reasons why it would be reasonable to believe that but those are of course my opinions, not what he said.

Q Well I'm asking you, once that you spoke with him do you believe that he actually believes that?

A Right, and that would be an opinion of mine.

And my opinion is he actually believes that.

And based on your interview of Mr. Reeves do 1 2 you believe that Mr. Reeves actually believes it was 3 necessary to use deadly force and/or to prevent what he perceived to be as an imminent threat of death or 4 5 great bodily harm? 6 I think you just asked me that question in a 7 different way. 8 I did. 9 Yeah, I believe that Mr. Reeves believes that the moment he fired the shot he was in imminent danger 10 11 of death or great bodily harm. 12 And based on your analysis of this particular 13 case, do you have an opinion as to whether or not Mr. 14 Reeves was justified in the use of deadly force as you know the facts to be? 15 16 My opinion was that the use of deadly force by Mr. Reeves was justified based on the facts as I 17 understand them. 18 All right. And would you just go ahead and 19 bullet out for me those facts. 20 2.1 In the last four hours I've been doing that 22 but I'll try to summarize.

they are. Not a long narrative. Just short and

Just bullet fashion, A, B, C, D this is what

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sweet.

A Okay. Mr. Oulson, his behavior was unreasonable and not predictable.

Mr. Reeves, when faced with the challenge of Mr. Oulson had a very low self-efficacy about his ability to deal with him if it escalated. He provided reasons why he had low self efficacy. I guess that would be part two.

When Mr. Oulson stood up, part three, it moved from a challenge where he knew he was in conflict with somebody to an actual threat, in particular, when Oulson encroached upon his space where he, according to Reeves, was coming over the seat.

Mr. Reeves, part four, felt as if he was limited in his options. He wasn't able to run away. He had a wall behind him. He wasn't even able to get out of seat at that point. He wasn't equipped with a utility belt to deal with him. He couldn't have pepper sprayed. He didn't have any of that kind of stuff. And he knew that his hands would be ineffective in dealing with this threat. That would be number four.

Number five. He then gets hit in the head with something, and it further diminishes his ability to be able to properly appraise the situation because

he can't see. And most of the information we get is visual. But he is able to tell that Mr. Oulson is still there and still advancing on him. That's number five.

Number six. He feels as if, because he's advancing on him and because he is unpredictable, that he's anticipating he doesn't know where this is going to end but it may very well end in him suffering great bodily harm or death and he wants to avoid that.

Number seven. The coping mechanism that he is equipped with is a 380 Kel Tec that's in his right pocket. Due to his fading away from Mr. Oulson's direct attack he finds himself in the position that he can get that weapon out where he couldn't have done it had he been sitting straight up. And so he reaches his hand into his pocket to take out a weapon that can mitigate the threat that's being posed by a younger, angry, unpredictable man. Was that number seven?

O Yes.

2.1

A After he takes the weapon out, or as he's pulling the weapon out Mr. Oulson again launches a hand towards him. We know by watching the video that he went to grab his popcorn. Reeves doesn't know what he's doing, he just knows that he's being attacked. There's a forward movement of a hand coming at him.

He responds by deciding to use deadly force to stop this attack from continuing.

2.1

The video picks up with him being hit with popcorn. Reeves claims, I don't even know that he's grabbed my popcorn, I just know that he has attacked me again and so I decided to fire a shot. And I fire one shot. And that stopped the problem. He doesn't fire another shot.

And that's the summary of why this would be justifiable. Because I think, and again, this is an ultimate opinion of the jury, that Mr. Reeves had a reason to believe, a demonstrable reason to believe that he wasn't equipped to deal with the threat that was being offered by Mr. Oulson. It was unreasonable. It was unpredictable. It was ongoing. It was physical. And he needed to put a stop to it. And that meant that the only mechanism that he had under his control to do that was the use of a firearm.

Q In this particular case, in your opinion, why is it reasonable for Mr. Reeves to respond to the perceived threat with deadly force, firing a firearm at Mr. Oulson?

A Because he believed that he was gonna get seriously injured if Mr. Oulson continued to do what he was presently doing.

Q Is the fact that you could be seriously injured, the use of deadly force proportional to that threat?

that you could be injured. You have to believe that you could be injured. You have to believe that you could be injured. And under all the circumstances that I just laid out for you, it's reasonable for somebody to think a six foot four guy who's acting unpredictable and unreasonable and so angry, and is currently hitting you, could cause you great bodily harm. That's completely reasonable. You don't have to wait until you're seriously bodily harmed to say, okay, now I have what I need for deadly force. The law does not require that. It requires a reasonable analysis of the facts to determine that you believe your life is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. That's precisely what we have here.

Q If you were asked and allowed to testify to the Court and explain to the jury objective reasonableness, to what extent would you use the concepts of force continuum or force matrix in that explanation to the jury?

A Almost completely. So what makes something objective is that there are rules in place when the event happens, right. So I would rely obviously a

little bit on statute that allows people to defend themselves. And then I would break it down into the force matrix and the force continuum and talk about how threats are a theft and how they are responded to based on a scale that has been approved in court many times by law enforcement and by others to evaluate the appropriateness of response to perceived threat. And that would make it objective. It's devoid of emotion. It's devoid of all the things that happen when you're the subject of an attack. So that would be the objective reasonableness claim.

I would also probably be asked, I assume, about the subjectivity of it. And of course the one that can answer that question would be Reeves. I'm aware of what Reeves said. So taken Reeves as true I would be able to comment on the subjectivity of it and put these behaviors of Mr. Oulson in categories of threat and show the straight line appropriate response. And that would be going back to the objectivity in hindsight.

- Q Give me just a minute, please.
- Mr. Bedard, I don't have any further questions.
- 24 | A Okay.

2.1

25 Q I just turned to the page with the

1 authoritative sources. 2 Α Yes. 3 And some of them are in journals that I don't 4 have access to. 5 If you want you can send me a list of what 6 you'd like to read and I'll pull them down for you so 7 you can take a look at them. 8 I appreciate that. 9 MR. MARTIN: Is that okay with you, Mr. 10 Michaels? 11 MR. MICHAELS: Yes, that's fine. 12 And, Mr. Martin, before you continue on, with 13 respect to those sources, you'll see the last one is 14 Yerkes, Dodson. You see that? 15 (By Mr. Martin). Yeah. 1908. 16 I mean, I don't know that there's a specific 17 citation for that. Q What is that? 18 19 It's the inverted U theory where arousal 20 affects performance. We use this a lot in sports 21 psychology. 22 0 Yes. If you have lower arousal your performance is 23 24 very low. And as you get some arousal, some anxiety 25 before it increases until it reaches a top point which is known as the individual zone of optimal functioning. But the strap exceeds that. You start to have a deterioration of performance. So this is typically what happens when we see in combat cases where individuals may be prepared for a fight and then all of a sudden start losing and their performance breaks off and— there's actually another model that accompanies this since 1908 called catastrophic model. They think that that rounded curve of the inverted U is much more extreme. It goes from optimal performance to just really degraded performance.

2.1

And so this is partly-- this has a lot to do with the whole challenge versus threat construct that I gave you. And what's happening during challenges is that the arousal level is coming up, but when you hit a threat, remember that I indicated to you that your coping mechanisms have been exceeded, or at least you believe they're exceeded. This is where you start seeing these fight/flight responses and you then have artifacts and things like that.

So I referred to the Yerkes, Dodson because I've learned it in text books. I didn't have a paper on it. So I just didn't want you to kind of get lost on what is he talking about.

I think you can get online probably and look

- at Yerkes, Dodson and it's quite-- it's been around a
  long time and it's quite popular in the literature.

  And I'm sure I can find some literature that is
  authoritative that talks about it. But I could not
  find the specific Yerkes, Dodson article from 1908.
  - Q Yeah, you're correct. There's a lot of information about it on the internet both criticizing it and accepting it. And, yeah, no, I don't need that. I know about the upside down U and that theory. I have a grasp of that.
  - A Okay.

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- Q What I will do is I'll send you a list of the articles that I'd like to read that I cannot pull down.
  - A Okay.
  - Q And then if you would electronically provide me with those I would greatly appreciate it.
    - A Happy to do it.
  - Q There was one other thing I was supposed to send you. We talked about a scientific study by Shultz. You were gonna look that up for me.
    - A Yeah.
- Q And then there was something else I was going to send you.
  - A And that article was called The Point of No

1 Return. I remember that now. And that talks about that two hundred millisecond veto ability. Let me see 2 3 if I can find it quickly. I'll try to find it. There's so many Shultz. 4 5 Write that down when you're sending your 6 Just write The Point of No Return so that will 7 remind me, and I'll get it over to you. 8 And there was one other thing. I'll find it. I'll find it in my notes. 9 10 MR. MARTIN: Okay. Mr. Michaels, do you have 11 any questions or followups or clarification that you 12 want to do on the record? 13 MR. MICHAELS: No questions. How's that. 14 Alright, Mr. Bedard, I don't MR. MARTIN: 15 have any further questions. 16 I will of course copy Mr. Michaels with all 17 the emails that I send to you. Do you have any 18 questions of me before we leave? 19 MR. BEDARD: Yeah. I know this is not a 20 formal deposition but you did record it. Is it 2.1 possible to get a transcript of it so I can review 22 what we talked about today in preparation for trial? 23 MR. MARTIN: A transcript is being ordered by 24 the state.

ALLBRITTON REPORTING

MR. MICHAELS: We'll order a copy. You'll

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      get a copy, Roy.
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               MR. MARTIN: Yeah.
                                   It's just like a depo
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      only we call it a telephonic statement because the
 4
      court reporter doesn't place you under oath. And
5
      that's how the rules refer to it.
 6
               But she will transcribe it and file it just
7
      like a depo. So yes, you will get a copy.
 8
               MR. BEDARD: Just like in a deposition I will
9
      say that I read. How's that.
10
               MR. MARTIN: Excuse me, sir. What?
11
               MR. BEDARD: I said just like in a deposition
12
      I'm informing you I will read.
13
               MR. MARTIN: She just put that down that you
14
      will read. Of course you know that by saying that you
      can't change sum and substance, you're just making
15
16
      corrections that maybe words or something that she
17
      didn't pick up correctly.
               MR. BEDARD: For me it will be more of a
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19
      study guide of what we will probably talk about in
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      trial.
2.1
               MR. MARTIN: Okay. If there's nothing else,
      gentlemen, have a safe and productive weekend. And I
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23
      will talk to you soon. Thank you.
24
                ( CONCLUDED AT 1:00 P.M.)
```

1	CERTIFICATE OF OATH					
2						
3	STATE OF FLORIDA )					
4	COUNTY OF PINELLAS )					
5	I, the undersigned authority, certify that ROY					
6						
7						
8	WITNESS my hand and official seal this 22					
9	day of NOVEMBER, 2021.					
10						
11	DOES NOT APPLY					
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I have read the foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 159, inclusive, and herewith subscribe to sa					
as a correct transcription of the answers made by to the questions herein recorded, subject to corrections below.					
corrections below.					
ROY BEDARD					
Date:					
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	**************************************				
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2	COUNTY OF PINELLAS )
3	I, SHARON K. ALLBRITTON certify that I was
4	authorized to and did stenographically report the
5	STATEMENT of ROY BEDARD; and that the transcript is a
6	true record of the testimony given by the deponent.
7	I further certify that I am not a relative,
8	employee, attorney, or counsel of any of the parties,
9	nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties'
LO	attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am
L1	I financially interested in the action.
L2	Dated this22 day of NOVEMBER, 2021.
L3	
L 4	
L5	SHARON K. ALLBRITTON
L6	
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