IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO.: CRC1400216CFAES

CURTIS JUDSON REEVES,

Defendant.

PROCEEDINGS:

MOTIONS [Excerpt]

DATE:

January 19, 2022

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE SUSAN BARTHLE

Circuit Judge

Sixth Judicial Circuit
Dade City, Florida

PLACE:

Robert D. Sumner Judicial Center

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APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA:

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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Thereupon, proceedings were reported but not 3 requested as part of this transcript.) 4 5 (OPEN COURT.) 6 (Defendant not present.) 7 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Martin, we're back on the record. And what do you want to take up 8 9 next? 10 MR. MARTIN: Judge, along with the motion that we just did --11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 12 MR. MARTIN: -- there's four other motions 13 that deal with relevancy. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARTIN: The case law is exactly the same. 16 17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. MARTIN: There's no reason to read it 18 again and go through it again. The only thing I'll 19 20 do with each one, I'll put on the record that I'll rely on the case law that I previously provided to 21 the Court. 22 23 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARTIN: So I think we can streamline 24 25 these next four to get right down to the facts.

You know the case law and so that's what we'd like 2 to do if that's okay with you. 3 THE COURT: Fantastic. I'm all ears. The next one is the State's 4 MR. MARTIN: 5 motion in limine to exclude the testimony that in December of 2014 the defendant fell and broke his 6 7 hip. THE COURT: All right. 8 9 MR. MARTIN: Do you have that one up there? 10 THE COURT: I just clicked off of JAWS. MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I can provide it to 11 12 you. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. MR. MARTIN: Did you give her the exhibit? 14 15 MR. ESCOBAR: No. But if you want to give her the exhibit. 16 17 MR. MARTIN: Yeah. If she doesn't have it. THE COURT: Yeah. I've got it. I can pull it 18 19 up right here. And now I've got defendant's 20 response. And I had it up, but I just clicked on the wrong thing. And it's not up anymore, but it 21 will only take me a second. 22 23 This file even in JAWS takes a long time to 24 load up. I guess because it's --25 I have a copy of the exhibit for MR. MARTIN:

I mean, I would need it back. 1 the Court. The exhibit being the transcript? 2 Yes. This argument is not going 3 MR. MARTIN: to take that long. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. MARTIN: May I --6 7 THE COURT: Do you need it to argue? MR. MARTIN: It won't take long to argue. 8 No. 9 THE COURT: Okay. I'll take it. 10 MR. MARTIN: May I go ahead and proceed, Your 11 Honor? THE COURT: Uh-huh. 12 Judge, in this particular motion 13 in limine, you might recall during the immunity 14 15 hearing Jennifer Shaw was asked if she was aware that her father had fallen, and, at that point, the 16 State objected. 17 I've provided you the transcript from that 18 hearing where we argued whether or not something 19 had occurred in December of 2014 when the offense 20 was in January of 2014, to what extent that was 21 22 relevant. And if the Court would just take a moment to 23 refresh the Court's memory as to how you ruled, but 24 25 the bottom line is, after argument from Counsel,

you indicated that, I think your words were, you got it; I don't need to hear stuff that took place afterwards; and you sustained my objection. I'm asking you do the same here.

THE COURT: That's right. It was after -after this, as I recall. After the shooting, the
January 13th that he broke his hip; is that
correct?

MR. ESCOBAR: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. I still feel the same way.

You know, I get it. The testimony of

Dr. Bedard about self efficacy. And I know that's

where you think the relevancy is, but --

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, if I just may make some argument because we have some cases that are on point.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. ESCOBAR: That the Court, I think, you know, should consider.

You know, this case is somewhat unique because of the fact that the jury has to, number one, stand in the shoes of Mr. Reeves. In other words, it's not Rick Escobar determining for Rick Escobar whether it was reasonable to pull that gun and fire

that gun.

If I was a juror, I've got to stand in the shoes of Mr. Reeves. I've got to stand in the shoes of a 71 year old. So I've have to figure that into my equation. I've got to stand in the shoes of Mr. Reeves as a 27-year decorated veteran that started the first SWAT team for the Tampa Police Department and all of the courses that he took on use of force.

I've got to stand in the shoes of Mr. Reeves being 71 years old and having the degenerative changes to his skeletal systems that Dr. Foley testified that -- remember, Dr. Foley didn't say these happened just now. They were longstanding degenerative changes to his skeletal systems.

I've got to stand in the shoes of Mr. Reeves as the head of security for Busch Gardens dealing with similar places. Busch Gardens is a place where individuals come and entertain themselves in that facility. This is not much different than someone going to a theater because you have masses going to a theater entertaining themselves and what can happen at these places of entertainment.

And so because of that, it is very, very relevant and very probative to be able to prove

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that Mr. Reeves' perception of vulnerability, that his perception of vulnerability was accurate.

And if you look at the cases that we've cited, we get a pretty robust response on this particular issue because it is so important, frankly, to the Court.

And in this case, if you look at the legal analysis that we spoke to, first of all, I think Mr. Michaels was correct and when he arqued in his motion that the issue of relevancy is really a very low threshold. In other words, we don't have to meet a high threshold in order to be able to introduce evidence in a criminal case, especially a defense case because, as the Court knows, the Supreme Court of the United States has bent over backwards to say, hey, listen, if someone is charged with a crime, you've got to do whatever you can to allow that defendant to actually prove his defense in that allegation.

And so when you look at this Tennard Case, which is a U.S. Supreme Court case, and I'd ask the Court to read that case because it is a very robust case dealing with this low bar and what happens in these particular cases and what we should be looking at.

But most importantly, on Page 5 of my memorandum, you will see that certainly there is a section at the very bottom of Page 5 talking about subsequent events. Because, for some reason, you know, there's this general perception out there that if an event happened after the accusation that you then can't use that event because it's not relevant. And these cases, the cases that I've cited, okay, one being Ruiz, which is located at 39 F.Supp.3d 1264, as well as Mack versus -- United States versus Mack, which is at 643 F.3d 119, all stand for the proposition that, no. Just because it happened after doesn't necessarily mean that it is not relevant to an issue before the Court.

And so you can see that in the Ruiz case, there were subsequent violations of the liquor laws. And the government sought to introduce those particular subsequent violations in order to show the intent of the individual that was being accused. And the Court said, absolutely, because it is relevant to that particular issue. Despite the fact that it happened after, it is still relevant to that particular issue considering, obviously, that low bar.

Likewise, Your Honor, in United States versus

Mack, which is at the very bottom of that, again, the government was prosecuting someone for drug sales. And in the fact that these sales occurred after the fact was relevant and admissible to show the state of mind, that being the intent of the defendant in the prior sale. And so just because this particular injury occurred after the fact does not make this excludable.

And let's talk about why. Certainly we all know that as we get older, as part of the aging process, we've got individuals that become more vulnerable. There's a reason why in the State of Florida, if I was to punch Dino right now in the arm, because he's under 65, that's just a battery. But the minute that Dino becomes 65, if I do that same act, that's a felony.

Because the law in Florida has recognized that individuals that are older are more vulnerable.

And so remember throughout this entire defense, we're trying to determine and trying to prove, we, myself and Mr. Michaels, as part of the Defense, that it was Mr. Reeves' reasonable belief. We've got to be able to prove that. We've got to be able to prove that, hey, look, yeah, it was reasonable for him to perceive his vulnerability. And how do

we do that? We do that because of two things.

We're going to introduce Dr. Foley. Who Dr. Foley
will testify to the fact that, yes, the fact that
he got his broken hip is probative, okay, of the
fact that he had these degenerative changes going
on in his body.

Number two, we're going to show the jury exactly how he fell. He fell, not by playing football, not by playing basketball, not by doing anything out of the ordinary, just merely walking in his back patio, falling and breaking his hip.

I think the Court would recognize if someone in their 50's if they fall on a patio are probably not going to break their hip. But the minute that you became Mr. Reeves' age with those types of changes to their skeletal system, then it becomes more likely.

And the word "likely" is what we're trying to prove. Yes. It has a tendency to prove that, in fact, Mr. Reeves' perception of his vulnerability was accurate. And that's what the jury has to do.

If we're not allowed to do that, then we're stripping Mr. Reeves of this very vital defense.

And that is -- that's the jury instruction. It even tells you in the jury instruction, Your Honor,

THE COURT: Thank you.

and I don't have it here with me, but it tells you in the jury instruction that the jury should consider the physical capabilities of both the defendant and the victim. That is the jury instruction.

And so if the jury instruction is telling you that, and this deals with an individual that his physical capabilities were much more vulnerable because of his age and his deteriorating condition, how can it not be relevant? How can it not be probative?

You know, I'm sure Mr. Martin doesn't want that because it is so powerful for us. But to take it away from us, based upon case law that's directly on point, these cases are directly on point in that these were subsequent acts. And in every motion that we responded here, that was our goal is to give this Court cases that have done what we're asking this Court to do so that this Court can be on solid ground to say, okay, if that court has found that that is, in fact, relevant and it was a subsequent act, and it has a tendency to prove the fact that Mr. Reeves was right that he was vulnerable, it's crucial to our defense.

Mr. Martin?

MR. MARTIN: Judge, I refer the Court back to the standard jury instruction 3.6(f). When we're talking about self defense, when an individual puts forth a claim of self defense, what is relevant is what that individual knew at that time. That is what is judged.

Now, we're going to have some arguments and issues later on with Dr. Foley, because you remember Dr. Foley's testimony was, I didn't -- I didn't examine Mr. Reeves. He also indicated people have different thresholds of pain. He doesn't even know if Mr. Reeves was aware of the changes in the bone density of what's going on because it just happens under the skin and you don't know about it.

So when we're talking about a self defense claim, it's what the defendant knew at the time.

That's what he brings to the table.

Not -- having changes going inside your body that you don't know about can't be brought to the table. And so it's not relevant to the decision-making process if you are cognitively aware of the fact, if you're not aware that your bones are ostracizing or whatever that word is,

getting the bone is changing in the density, if you're not aware of it then how can it affect your decision making process.

Now, Mr. Escobar says, well, we've got these cases they're very robust. These things happened afterwards, therefore, they're relevant. Well, what cases did he cite? He cited Williams Rule cases where we talk about state of mind and intent for bad acts after whatever the crime charged was to prove the individual's state of mind at the time of the crime charged.

Well, that's -- that's apples and oranges.

There's nothing robust about that at all when we're talking about Williams Rule type of evidence and that criteria of relevancy as opposed to a self defense claim where the relevancy is what he knew at the time.

So that's the -- that's where the Court needs to separate the Defense argument from the State argument. And what occurs ten months later, he doesn't know it's going to occur.

There was no testimony, you might recall from the Defense, the defendant at the time of the hearing about he knew all the little things that Dr. Foley was talking about. I mean, he did his

physical. I can't do this. I can't move this. Is this consistent with. But it didn't cover it all.

And so that's why the State brings this to the Court's attention. It's what he knew at the time.

That's what's relevant. The State's -- I mean the Defense cases are not on point for this issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, a couple of things that are incorrect factually that Mr. Reeves did not know the state of his condition and the state of his degenerative bones is absolutely incorrect and we will be presenting testimony of Mr. Reeves concerning his perception.

The Court remembers, even when he was questioned by law enforcement, he talked to law enforcement about his arthritis, his back was a wreck. So that's not true. He has a great deal of knowledge about his skeletal system at that time.

It's incorrect -- and I'd ask the Court to read those cases. These are not Williams Rule cases. That is incorrect. As the Court knows what Williams rule is. You'd have to have some very unique set of facts in order to introduce Williams Rule. These are not Williams Rule evidence. These were specifically as relevant evidence to show the

state of mind of that individual at a time prior.

So let's think about that. A subsequent event that's being introduced by the Government in order to prove the state of mind of the accused at a previous time.

Somehow Mr. Martin thinks that what's good for the goose is not good for the gander. Meaning that, oh, well, if this was in a prosecution, the prosecution can do it. No. No. What's good for the goose is good for the gander. Whatever the prosecution can introduce to prove that state of mind so can the Defense prove that state of mind through the evidence.

And so, Your Honor, I would -- I would ask the Court if the Court is -- has not read thoroughly these particular cases -- I know the Court had made a decision previously. These particular cases were not presented to the Court at that time. This is really a very crucial issue for the Defense. And, frankly, I think that if, for some reason, and I say this with all respect, if the Court were to get it wrong it's clearly reversible.

The problem is is that if the Court gets it wrong and it's reversible and Mr. Reeves goes to prison, the chances that he'll be able to come out

after the Second District makes a decision, it's not good. He lost 40 pounds when he was in jail and we had to go to the Second District to get him a bond.

And so the only thing I'd ask for the Court -we have given you a very thorough memorandum -- but
I'd ask the Court to read the cases that we've
cited because I frankly think that they are on
point and there's no distinction whatsoever.

And the unique issue that this jury's going to have to decide is was Mr. Reeves perception of vulnerability at that time, taking everything that Mr. Reeves is all about, including his skeletal system and his degenerative changes, I've got to be able to prove that. And one way to prove that is to say, you know what, he was right. He was walking on his patio, fell down and broke his hip. I think that's -- that's very, very relevant. And, remember, the threshold of relevancy especially in a Defense case is very low.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And I also have to remember a 403 analysis of if there is relevance to it, does its probative value outweigh its prejudice.

You know, as I often do when I have the

analytical decision to make or question put to me,

I just, you know, flip the facts. What if

Mr. Reeves did not break -- fall and break his hip,

does that mean everything that you've been saying

wasn't true?

That's not, you know -- that's not how it works. And I'm well aware that there are -- that subsequent acts isn't an automatic bar to admission. You know, so let's get that out of the way.

But in this case, there's no way that

Mr. Reeves would have thought that he's going to

break a hip. You know, all of his aging and all of

the testimony about his frailties, he's 71 years

old, of course he can testify to his, you know -
he's certainly able to testify about how he felt

about himself, that he knew he wasn't the guy that

he was in his 30's.

No problem. Of course. You know? But there's no way that he could have predicted that he was going to fall and break his hip. And there's no way that that could have been playing in his mind at the time of the incident.

In general, his frailties, certainly. I don't have a problem. But the problem I have is, you

know, that's almost bolstering if you will. See, 1 he was right. No. That's not really how it works. 2 MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, you know that 3 Dr. Cohen is going to testify. You remember 4 Dr. Cohen. 5 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 6 7 MR. ESCOBAR: She's going to testify that that is at the forefront elderly people's minds, meaning 8 9 falling and breaking their hip. THE COURT: Okay. 10 11 MR. ESCOBAR: The reason being is because it is so prevalent out there. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. ESCOBAR: How many times -- and not only 14 15 breaking their hips. When elderly people break their hips their incidents of death is enormous. 16 17 So -- so, no, I think that, you know, Mr. Reeves' 18 vulnerability and realizing that, hey, you know, if 19 I get hit by this guy --THE COURT: I could break a hip. Not a 2.0 21 problem. Not a problem. But not the fact that he 22 did break his hip. MR. ESCOBAR: But that's how I prove that it's 23 24 reasonable. You don't -- no. 25 THE COURT: No. You can't

prove that it's real. It has to be -- the jury has to find that it's reasonable. And would it be reasonable for a 71 year old man to feel that he was frail. You don't have a subsequent act that happened as proof. See, I told you he was frail.

No. You know, that's just not --

I take distinction from all the cases offered and your arguments. I'm going to draw the line on this one. No. The probative value, it calls for sympathy from the jury and I don't find that it has any probative value other than bolstering.

Bolstering the -- you know, what he's already going to testify to that he felt frail. Okay.

Seventy-one years old. Have at it.

You know, I read the transcript of his description. I believe what he said was something about being wrecked. He's wrecked. You know, his body, his hands and couldn't even pull the trigger. You know, that's all fair game.

But a broken hip after the fact simply can't, under any case law or stretch of the imagination, have been playing on his mind other than what you indicated, Mr. Escobar, about all aged people probably worry about breaking a hip or knocking themselves in the head or any number of things. In

general, you know, that's -- sure. 1 2 something that he might have worried about. But to point to an actual event, no. 3 not -- I'm not going to allow that. So I'm going 4 5 to grant the State's a motion as to testimony about 6 his hip being actually broken. I'll provide the Court an order 7 MR. MARTIN: I apologize. It must be on my desk 8 tomorrow. 9 someplace. 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MARTIN: I'll provide it tomorrow. 11 And, Bailiff? 12 THE BAILIFF: Yes. 13 MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, if I could get my 14 15 exhibit back from you too so I can make my file complete. If you're finished with it. 16 17 THE COURT: Yep. 18 MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Bailiff. THE BAILIFF: You're welcome. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Next. 20 Judge, I'd like to take up one of 21 MR. MARTIN: 22 the motions I filed earlier, I think Friday or this 23 week, dealing with the fact that Mr. Reeves was with the police department had a bought with 24 25 cancer.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MARTIN: The argument is the same that I made with the broken hip. He did have a bought with cancer. Apparently, he successfully battled that. But to go through, you know, my life history, I had -- I had cancer, again, we're -- it's the State's position that it's not relevant as far as the decision-making process at the time of the incident. Getting hit isn't going to cause me to have cancer again. You know what I mean? It just doesn't factor into why he responded the way he did. It has no relevance to that.

It can't factor in because there's nothing that Mr. Oulson can do to cause him to have cancer again. Nothing. So that just can't factor into it and it only goes to the sympathy.

So under 402 and 403, the State would ask that the -- that you grant the State's motion in limine to exclude the testimony by the defendant that he was diagnosed with cancer.

THE COURT: What about that, Mr. Escobar?

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, what happens with people that have cancer is, in fact, they become more vulnerable in many areas. So somehow Mr. Michaels thinks -- excuse me -- Mr. Martin thinks that

people that have cancer that it somehow it's not going to affect them other than during the period that they had cancer. That somehow, you know, their muscular system, somehow, their body organs, somehow, you know, they all just become normal again because now you don't have cancer anymore in your body and that's just not the case.

I think that all of his ailments that he's had throughout the years are relevant. And it plays — if you listen to Dr. Cohen's testimony, those things play on your mind because the minute that you do have cancer, you realize as an individual that you're that much more vulnerable and that you can't do the things that you used to do prior to having cancer depending upon how that cancer has affected you, you know, within your abilities to move around and with your abilities to have the energy that you used to have, with your abilities to function as a normal human being.

So if we're going to -- if we're going to color Mr. Reeves something that he's not, I think that's a big mistake. I think the fact that he's had all of these conditions play to the fact that he, in his mind, got up that morning, that he went to the theater like he does every morning, and

finds himself that much more vulnerable every day that he has another ailment. And that's part of the aging process and it's a very real issue in this case.

You know, one of things that I want the Court to consider, let's assume that Mr. Reeves was not 71. Let's assume Mr. Reeves was four years old. And let's assume that because Mr. Reeves was four years old, Chad Oulson was going to (indicating) pop that four year old in the head. How would we feel about that? Would we feel that that four year old, because of the four year old's age is vulnerable? Of course we would. Of course we would.

It's no different when people get old. It's just like when people are very young they can't sustain the type of abuse that individuals can sustain when they're a robust 30 year old going to the gym lifting weights, pumping weights. Yeah, you may be able to take a punch.

I will remind the Court, okay, that even their witnesses talked about one punch homicides.

And so you don't have a very high threshold on this issue of great bodily harm. I think the Court knows that, you know, a broken nose is great bodily

harm.

And so for us to say that conditions that

Mr. Reeves has had, and serious conditions, cancer
is a serious condition, that that did not affect
his perception, his perception of vulnerability I
think is wrong. I think we all -- it's the
arthritis, the degenerative changes to your
skeletal system, it's the broken bones. All those
things in cumulation of one of the other make us

And so I would make the same argument that him having cancer, as well as him having all of the ailments that he has, and we're going to, you know, elicit all of the ailments that he's had throughout, you know, his life, especially as he got older --

feel reasonably vulnerable. Reasonably vulnerable.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- are relevant.

And Dr. Cohen is going to talk about that as an expert in this area.

THE COURT: Okay. What -- you know, and I'm more than likely going to deny this. But what sort of cancer are we talking? Did he --

MR. ESCOBAR: He had prostate cancer, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Good enough. 1 2 know, if it was a little mole on his nose --MR. ESCOBAR: No. It was prostate cancer. 3 THE COURT: -- you know, come on. We're kind 4 5 of pushing the impact. MR. ESCOBAR: I wouldn't do that, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to deny then. know we're -- what you're trying to prove with the 8 9 vulnerability and that this having cancer would --10 but he knew he had cancer. MR. ESCOBAR: Yes, ma'am. 11 THE COURT: The difference there. 12 So that 13 could certainly weigh on his mind. I'm going to deny as to that one. 14 15 MR. MARTIN: You might recall, Judge, during 16 the immunity hearing there was no other testimony 17 regarding that. 18 THE COURT: There was no other what? 19 MR. MARTIN: Testimony regarding that the 20 cancer, just said that he had cancer. Dr. Cohen didn't testify about cancer. 21 22 MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, I will tell Mr. Martin 23 there's a lot of things that we didn't bring up the 24 immunity hearing that will be brought out in this 25 trial. A lot of stuff.

I taught you well. 1 MR. MARTIN: I know. 2 THE COURT: All right. Yeah. MR. ESCOBAR: You're going to do the same 3 4 thing. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 (Staff conversation.) 7 Judge, the next one I'd like to MR. MARTIN: discuss along with the relevancy is the State's 8 9 motion in limine to exclude testimony the defendant handled a delicate situation in Vice and Narcotics. 10 11 Again, we're talking about the -- he didn't go into what it was, to what extent that is relevant 12 13 in a claim of self-defense as to his decision-making at the time of the altercation. 14 15 has no relevancy whatsoever. So I've outlined my argument in the motion. 16 It's all the cases I cited to the Court. We've had 17 a lot of discussion about what is relevant and not 18 19 relevant, what's relevant in a self defense case. 20 I suggest to the Court that that life experience has no relevancy in this case. 21 THE COURT: I'm sure you're going to tell me 22 23 why it's relevant. 24 MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, this is the issue. I'm not going to show my cards to Mr. Martin as to 25

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what Mr. Reeves is going to testify about concerning his life experience as a law enforcement officer.

But that life experience as a law enforcement officer, even Bedard in the hearing that we had testified how unique, you know, that was for a case like this, to have Mr. Reeves have the background that he had with use of force. And I want to start there because I think it's very important for us to talk about that.

Mr. Reeves was selected by the captain back many years ago in order to form the first SWAT team ever for the Tampa Police Department. That was an incredible feat that he was asked to do because he had the responsibility of not only educating himself, meaning going throughout the country taking these particular courses dealing with use of force, but, more importantly, educating the men that were going to be working under him. He was the captain of the SWAT team at the time.

And so as the Court knows and I believe

Mr. Reeves testified about this, he had extensive

experience out on the street both as a patrolman

and as a detective on how things and how quickly

things can change in the life an of an individual

out there in the community.

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And we've argued the cues that law enforcement has to adhere to in order to prevent something tragic happening to themselves while they're out in the line of duty.

It's important to look at the self-defense instruction because the self-defense instruction is a preventative instruction. In other words, it contemplates you not waiting for that first blow. You can use deadly force to prevent that particular forceable felony and that particular act, that felonious act of striking, that can cause great bodily harm or death. You don't have to wait to say, okay, give me the first punch and then I can pull my gun out and kill someone. Because after that first punch, you may not be able to pull out your gun. You may be dead.

And so his life experiences out there as a law enforcement officer in narcotic cases, in domestic violence cases, in homicide cases, in SWAT cases are all going to be factors that this jury is going to have to hear and consider. Because, again, it is not Joe Blow jury that is a surgeon at Tampa General that puts herself in those shoes alone. She's got to put herself in Mr. Reeves' shoes.

And so anything that would enlighten the jury concerning those particular risk factors and how something can be totally benign or look totally benign and all of a sudden turn and be drastically violent is something that he's going to be able to testify about.

You know, one of the things in this case that is monumental in the evaluation of this threat assessment is the theater. I go to theaters all the time with my wife. It's my Sunday routine. We go to the theater. We go to the CineBistro, my wife and I, late in the afternoon because then, you know, I go to bed and ready for Monday, right.

And I can tell you in my -- I'm 64 -- in my 64 years as I stand here today, I have never had anybody stand up in a theater yelling, screaming, cursing, threatening anybody. And so as a law enforcement officer, when something so outrageous is taking place in that setting, it is a cause -- it is a cue that that particular individual is totally out of control. And that individual is more dangerous with or without a weapon than anyone can imagine.

Those are the experiences that Mr. Reeves uniquely brings to this case. Most individuals

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that pull a gun and shoot someone in self defense don't have this background. Mr. Reeves has this background and the jury has to consider that background and all of his life experiences while he was out on the road, when he was doing homicide detective work, when he was doing SWAT work. In order to determine, that jury's got to say, okay, Mr. Reeves has told me about all these instances, these one-punch homicide, which I've defended one. One-punch homicide. I've got to take that, I've got to listen to it, and if Mr. Reeves is believable about that, then I've got to use that in my evaluation as to whether or not it was reasonable for Mr. Reeves to perceive his vulnerability at that point in time.

And so that's what this particular issue is about. I know Mr. Martin doesn't know the particulars of it. He took extensive, you know, depositions of Mr. Bedard. I don't believe that he touched upon this issue with Mr. Bedard. But there's going to be testimony of this issue and many other instances that Mr. Reeves was out there serving our community as a law enforcement officer, protecting our community, that gave him the knowledge and the experience to be able to deal

with a situation in the right way, in a reasonable way.

THE COURT: Mr. Martin, do we know what we're talking about here?

MR. MARTIN: I have no idea.

THE COURT: Delicate situation?

MR. MARTIN: I have no idea. I have no idea how Mr. Escobar the last ten minutes even addressed this issue. I'm sorry. I just -- it didn't address it.

The bottom line is, we have a situation where he testified he handled a delicate narcotics situation as part of his three hours of who I am, which I will deal with later but not today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARTIN: So I have -- how can that apply to his decision-making process as far as use of force in handling a delicate situation in Vice and Narcotics?

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MARTIN: And it just leads to speculation and guesswork on part of the jury's what are we talking about or anything. So, again, I'm back to 402 and 403. You just throw it out there and hopefully it sticks and I'm asking the Court to

find that it doesn't stick. This has nothing to do 1 with this case. 2 THE COURT: Certainly if the delicate 3 4 situation involved an individual who was pretty 5 tall and lanky and hollering and screaming who maybe then went on to fire a firearm, I could see 6 7 that that would be pretty relevant that he might 8 have that on his mind. But, you know, other than 9 that, I don't know. I'm inclined to just leave this and we'll have 10 to do a proffer, I guess. It shouldn't be long I 11 12 wouldn't think, and I'll determine if it's relevant or not. 13 I can't -- I understand your argument about 14 15 life experiences, but I don't know, you know -- 403 16 analysis here, I don't know. I don't know about 17 the probative value versus the prejudicial impact. So I will reserve for contemporaneous proffer. 18 19 MR. MARTIN: All right. I'll draft an order 20 to that effect. THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 21 22 MR. MARTIN: May I have just a moment to make 23 some notes here, Judge? 24 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 25 I'll have that typed up and have MR. MARTIN:

it for you tomorrow.

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THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARTIN: Judge, the next one, along the same lines, is a motion in limine regarding Vivian Reeves and her physical infirmities.

There was, you might recall -- I'm sure you do recall, Judge. There was testimony, I believe, from not only Mrs. Reeves but even possibly from Jennifer Shaw, but don't hold me to that, dealing with, you know, what her physical state was.

I'm suggesting to the Court that her physical state is not relevant to the extent that it's not known to the defendant.

If the defendant takes the stand and says, my wife has A, B, C, then that's fine. But we can't infer that -- what he knows of her ailments. can testify to whatever was in his head. would be fine. But for her to make a laundry list of everything that's wrong with me and then imply or infer that that is the knowledge of the defendant, well, that would just be cause for speculation on part of the jury as to what he actually knew and to what extent he even considered it.

> So that's why I ran the motion. I did the

same thing. I objected at the time of the immunity hearing.

Does the Court have my exhibit? I attached the discussion that Mr. Michaels and I had with the Court. I argued that it was -- may I have just a moment, Your Honor?

MR. MARTIN: She talked about her knee replacement, the treatment that she's had over the

THE COURT: Is it part of your motion?

years. And this was Jennifer Shaw talking about her mom.

And the way it came about is Ms. Shaw indicating what her mother told her, I objected as far as being hearsay, and you sustained the objection.

So that's why I ran the motion depending on what Jennifer Shaw testifies to about her mom and what Vivian Reeves testifies to. It's not relevant to infer exactly to what extent Mr. Reeves had knowledge and to what extent it factored in.

Like you've already pointed out, it's fair game. Mr. Reeves can take the stand and say whatever he wants and I'll object when I feel it's appropriate. But have the other witnesses come in to infer it is not appropriate especially based on

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hearsay. So I'd ask the Court to grant the State's motion.

THE COURT: Response.

Judge, the plan is is this: MR. MICHAELS: Vivian Reeves is going to take the stand. going to talk about these infirmities. She's going to say that her husband knows about them because he took her to the hospital when she woke up and had bandages all over her knees. He was there in the hospital and held her hand. He took her to physical therapy when she was learning to walk again. He was right there. He made her breakfast at home.

You know, she's going to be able to testify They've been that certainly he has knowledge. married, I forget how many years now. It's been so long since the hearing. I didn't do the math, but however many years.

You know, the same with the breathing. took me to the doctor. I had trouble breathing. And so certainly it's relevant because in this case it was self defense. It's not only defense of self but defense of others. So I certainly think that it's clearly relevant and I don't think there's any evidentiary problem with getting that information

out. Certainly Mr. Reeves doesn't even have to testify. He has the right not to testify. But certainly Vivian, Mrs. Reeves I should say, can testify about those infirmities.

In terms of, you know, Jennifer Shaw, the daughter, saying it, you know, I don't see where that's even going to happen. You know, we're going to have Mrs. Reeves up there talking about it.

And, certainly, she was in very close proximity, sitting right next to her husband. Certainly we all know Mr. Oulson was in front of her, so all of that makes this relevant and I think appropriate in this sort of case.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MARTIN: Judge, just -- and, you know, at some point, you know, it comes to, well, that's more appropriate for cross or whether or not you leave it out. But you might recall Mr. Reeves left his wife alone after the conversation, after the confrontation and altercation that wasn't pleasant. It was so unpleasant and disturbing that he went and complained to the manager and left her there.

So, you know, to say that what is in his head and how to what extent he did what he did, it kind of begs the question can you infer what he knew

about her and how that played in his decision making.

And then so it goes back to speculation on part of the jury about what he knew, especially given the fact that he left her there alone with Mr. Oulson sitting right in front of her.

So --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MARTIN: -- you know, that's where we are at.

THE COURT: I get that. And I understand what you're getting at. As far as anything that he didn't know about, Mr. Michaels is correct. I mean, I'm sure he knew -- I mean, was there something that happened afterwards major that came out or is it just like her knees and her breathing and --

MR. MICHAELS: Her knees, her breathing, her arthritis.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MICHAELS: The things that he knows about from living with her and taking her to the doctor and all of that, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. And I think my prior ruling was basically a sustaining of a hearsay

objection primarily.

MR. MARTIN: On Jennifer Shaw it was.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MICHAELS: And I think there was a hearsay objection with Mrs. Reeves, knowing what her medical condition was that caused me to go down the line and say, well, did you have pain in your knee? Did you go see a doctor? Did you wake up one day after surgery? You know, that sort of thing. But, yes, Judge, you did.

THE COURT: Yeah. No. I'm going to -- I'm going to deny that one.

And just to clarify, as I recall, Jennifer
Shaw was asked, what did your mom tell you about
her injuries? Isn't that how it went, something
along those lines? And I sustained on a hearsay
objection about that.

MR. MARTIN: You sustained on a hearsay objection.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's -- yeah.

I'll deny on that one. I think that's fine.

And, real quick, Mr. Martin, I've been -something has been making me chuckle every time I
look at this docket. I think -- I don't know when
you said you'd have something typed up, either you

1 or somebody in your office, your auto correct or something must automatically make everything that 2 supposed to say proffer into poofer. 3 Have you noticed that? 4 5 MR. MARTIN: Judge, I wish I could tell you. THE COURT: I've seen that 100 times on the 6 7 I'm like, what? What is that? What is a poofer? Did I miss part of that? You know, 8 9 it's -- I thought that was comical. MR. MARTIN: Mr. Michaels gives me grief about 10 11 my grammar and --THE COURT: It's just a funny-looking word. A 12 poofer. Poofer. What does that mean? 13 14 MR. MICHAELS: The grammar's good. It's just 15 the typos. MR. MARTIN: The typing is awful because my 16 17 B's are P's and my A's are whatever you get and it's awful. So, hey, chalk it up to a learning 18 19 disability. 20 THE COURT: Oh, well. 21 MR. MARTIN: I passed the Bar. 22 THE COURT: That's it. 23 MR. ESCOBAR: That was important. 24 MR. MARTIN: That was important. You can 25 harass me all you want about the other stuff.

take it in stride, but it is embarrassing.

THE COURT: I'm still lamenting the loss of
Word Perfect that I used to use in private practice
and now everything is Word that I -- I feel like
it's Communist or something. It makes you do what
it wants you to do. You can't have a choice.

MR. ESCOBAR: It tells you. If you put in a word and it tells you, no, you don't want this word, put this one in. I'm, like, no, I want the word.

THE COURT: Yes. Yes. I've begged -- I've begged for years, can't we all go to Word Perfect?

MR. MARTIN: As long as you understand what I was trying to write.

THE COURT: I do. I do.

MR. MARTIN: I appreciate that you do that.

THE COURT: All right. What next? We're getting close to wrapping it up probably.

MR. MARTIN: The rest are kind of long.

THE COURT: Kind of long?

MR. MARTIN: Because we're done with the quick. We did five quick after one long one. So what we have left is three dealing with defendant's character. Mr. Escobar's going to argue one of them doesn't involve that. But we have those three

left. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. And the State's motion to redact 3 MR. MARTIN: the statements. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Right. MR. MARTIN: That's all that's left as far as 6 7 the State. Defense has the motion for a material witness 8 9 I think they want to do probably before we leave. 10 And maybe now's a good time to stop because I've got some stuff to give to Mr. Escobar tonight so 11 12 I'm going to be working. 13 MR. ESCOBAR: If we can hopefully finish tomorrow? Do you think the Court -- I'm willing to 14 stay a little bit late if need be, but I'd love to 15 be able to stop tomorrow. 16 17 MR. MARTIN: I think we can finish tomorrow. THE COURT: 18 Okay. I think we can. 19 MR. MARTIN: I mean, yeah. 20 THE COURT: I'm good. We'll get done as much as we can now. 21 One thing, didn't I see -- did we still have 22 23 stuff outstanding on Mr. Knox? MR. ESCOBAR: We do, Your Honor. 24 25 And this is what I'm going to propose:

brought Mr. Knox in on a scheduled motion date and then we had this issue with the court reporter and so that day was canceled. Every time we bring in one of my experts, I just got a bill for payment for \$17,000 for one appearance here.

Mr. Reeves is not that kind of wealthy, you know, individual. And so what I would propose with Mr. Knox is maybe -- I haven't spoken to Mr. Martin about this, but that we have that argument before he -- you know, before he testifies so that we can avoid that additional -- that additional charge. I think Mr. Martin and I agree the motions have been well briefed on both sides.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. ESCOBAR: And I believe we've also included in our brief his actual testimony --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- that he had in Court.

And I don't think -- I think that the issues that Mr. Martin is objecting to is maybe two or three issues.

Is that correct?

MR. MARTIN: I have one.

MR. ESCOBAR: Yeah. So I would ask the Court to consider doing that. But if the Court says no,

we're going to do it next week, you know, I'll find 1 2 out what day he's available and I will bring him in and we'll do whatever we need to do. I'm just 3 trying to --4 THE COURT: Well, let's get through what we 5 can without bringing him. 6 7 MR. ESCOBAR: Okay. THE COURT: And then -- like, I saw motions in 8 9 limine directed at him. And then, as best I can 10 tell, we've got a Daubert motion still outstanding 11 on him. MR. MARTIN: Right. 12 So obviously, the Daubert we need 13 THE COURT: to get done and that typically involves testimony. 14 15 MR. ESCOBAR: And all of the motions, Your Honor, even the non-Daubert motions are probably 16 going to require him to testify to substantiate our 17 18 position. And so I think, frankly, if we pick, you know, 19 one late afternoon to argue his motion before he 20 21 testifies, I think we'd be able to do that. THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's try and do that 22 23 this week then, like Friday. MR. ESCOBAR: I haven't checked with him this 24 25 week.

THE COURT: Oh. You want to have him here. 1 MR. ESCOBAR: I would have to bring him back 2 and I'm going to avoid that cost if I can. 3 MR. MARTIN: You want to do it in the middle 4 5 of trial? MR. ESCOBAR: I want to do it, yes, at some 6 point. He's going to testify. It's just a matter 7 as to whether he's going to testify to everything 8 or whether he's going to testify to --9 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ESCOBAR: Don't you think, Dino? 11 THE COURT: Well, you know, we'll -- I think, 12 we can talk about that during trial then. I think 13 that would be okay. Certainly I don't want to 14 15 waste jury time, but, undoubtedly, we're going to have some, you know, lags perhaps here and there. 16 17 And we can certainly schedule it to where 18 everybody's on the same page and it will have the least impact on the jury. 19 MR. ESCOBAR: We appreciate that. 20 21 Mr. Reeves would financially appreciate it. THE COURT: That makes sense. 22 All right. So for tomorrow we're going to do 23 the transcript -- oh, Mr. Reeves' testimony. 24 25 MR. MARTIN: To redact the law enforcement.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MR. MARTIN: And then the defendant's character by Jennifer Shaw, the defendant's character put on by Vivian Reeves, and then what I call the awards.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MARTIN: Three hours of awards.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, we did file one other motion. We were speaking to Fred Meyers. If you remember, Fred Meyers was the manager of the Cobb Theatres.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: He was on board to come. We had -- Matt had had numerous conversations with him. We were getting his airline tickets, the whole shebang. And then he started this week, actually I think it was Monday, to get a little squirrely, saying, well, I haven't been subpoenaed so -- he's in Georgia. I haven't been subpoenaed, so I'm not going to -- you know, I don't know if I have to; why don't you use my former testimony.

And so we were in the process already because I don't trust witnesses just telling me that they're going to come. Once we found him, we were in the process of drafting this motion and getting

it over to Georgia so that Georgia could issue a certificate for the subpoena and then we'd have an investigator of ours over there in Georgia serve him.

And this is our request -- I believe it was filed 1/19. And I can give you a copy of it so you can see it.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. ESCOBAR: I don't think that

Mr. Michaels -- I mean, Mr. Martin is going to have
an objection to this process.

And while you're reading, Your Honor, the reason for -- his materiality is listed in the motion, but just to remind the Court, Mr. Reeves left the theater, went to him, was very calm. He testified he was very calm. There was nothing unusual about Mr. Reeves. Mr. Reeves was very patient there at the counter waiting for him to finish speaking to another patron.

MR. MARTIN: That is a Fred Meyers?

MR. ESCOBAR: That's Fred Meyers.

MR. MARTIN: No. Fred Meyers is the vice-president who came down and gave the flash drive.

MR. ESCOBAR: No. Fred Meyers is that

individual. 1 THE COURT: The one at the counter? 2 MR. ESCOBAR: The one at the counter. 3 THE COURT: Do you have any objection? 4 5 MR. ESCOBAR: You're talking about the guy 6 that came from Alabama is someone completely 7 different. Another Meyers. 8 MR. MARTIN: 9 MR. ESCOBAR: No. It wasn't a Meyers. I'm trying to think his name now. But the guy that 10 11 came to pick up the hard drives or to control the 12 hard drives being removed? 13 Yeah. That was someone else. I'm pretty 14 sure. 15 If Your Honor wants to, why don't you table this until tomorrow. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. Check it out. 17 18 All right. So I've got this certificate that 19 I can sign ASAP. 20 MR. ESCOBAR: Tomorrow. THE COURT: Tomorrow we'll talk about it. 21 22 MR. ESCOBAR: That way he can have a chance to 23 look at the transcript. THE COURT: Uh-huh. All right. Well, done 24 We'll stand in recess until 2:00 tomorrow. 25

1	Thank you, everybody.
2	MR. ESCOBAR: Thank you.
3	(Proceedings concluded.)
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1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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3	STATE OF FLORIDA )
4	) COUNTY OF PASCO )
5	,
6	,
7	I, Victoria L. Campbell, Registered Professional
8	Reporter, certify that I was authorized to and did
9	stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and that
10	the transcript is a true record.
11	DATED this 28th day of January, 2022.
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15	/s/Victoria L. Campbell
16	Victoria L. Campbell, RPR
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