STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

CURTIS JUDSON REEVES,

Defendant.

PROCEEDINGS:

MOTION TO COMPEL

BEFORE:

HONORABLE PAT SIRACUSA

Circuit Judge

DATE:

May 29, 2015

PLACE TAKEN:

Pasco County Government Center

7530 Little Road

New Port Richey, FL 34654

REPORTED BY:

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Notary Public

State of Florida at Large

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APPEARANCES

APPEARING ON BEHALF OF
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Office of Bernie McCabe, State Attorney
Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County, Clearwater, Fl

APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, CURTIS REEVES: RICHARD ESCOBAR, ESQUIRE DINO M. MICHAELS, ESQUIRE ESCOBAR & ASSOCIATES 2917 W. Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Fl 33609

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

THE COURT: You can be seated.

All right. We're here in the
State of Florida vs. Curtis Reeves. Case Number
2014-216CFAES. Charged with murder in the second
degree, a first-degree felony; and aggravated
battery, a second-degree felony.

State is represented by Mr. Loughery. The defense is represented by Mr. Michaels and Mr. Escobar.

The defendant's presence was waived because it is purely a legal argument motion and he didn't have to be here if he didn't want to.

Of course, you gentlemen told him he could be here if he did want to, right?

MR. ESCOBAR: We did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We're here on a motion to compel disclosure on a number of different items. And, I guess, we should just go through them one at a time.

Defense, you want the left and right shoes
Mr. Reeves wore while he was in the Cobb Grove
Theater, and that's from January 13th of 2014.

It's my understanding that they were taken into evidence obviously, right?

MR. ESCOBAR: They were, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you want to take possession of them within the chain of custody and take them some place other than looking at them at the evidence locker?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, what I told
Mr. Loughery is that I'm going to just have the
right shoe. I don't need the left and the right
shoe. He can keep the left shoe. They're
identical shoes except that one goes on the right
foot; the other one goes on the left foot.

THE COURT: If you're just going to use them right, yes.

MR. LOUGHERY: That's right.

MR. ESCOBAR: So I'm just really seeking the right shoe at this point in time so that hopefully he can feel a bit more comfortable that an identical item is going to be kept in his possession.

THE COURT: Mr. Loughery, do you have any objection to letting him have the right shoe?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, I do Judge.

THE COURT: Keeping in mind you'll still have the left shoe hostage, if you need it?

MR. LOUGHERY: I do. Only because we had a

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discussion a couple days ago in trying to see if we can figure something out about this, and that was a negotiation perhaps at one point.

But when I felt it was useless to get over the hurdle that Mr.~Escobar believes that we should just give all this evidence to them unsupervised, then I'm here today to object to that process. So I really don't want to parse it out.

THE COURT: You don't want to concede to any of it. I understand.

MR. LOUGHERY: Not at this point, I don't, Judge, no.

THE COURT: All right. Hold on a second.

You all need to figure something out here?

Come on, you can come up.

MR. LOUGHERY: Us?

THE COURT: No, no. This young lady has to do something. I'm not sure what she needs to do.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Don't worry about it. If it wasn't already a week to remember, I'd be more concerned about it, but let's just get what you need done.

Are you ready? All right. Do you need to put something else someplace?

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. We need it on. 2 THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. LOUGHERY: While they're doing that, 3 4 Judge, you've seen the motion and the response? 5 Have you seen those? THE COURT: I have seen their motion. 6 7 not seen your response. MR. LOUGHERY: We filed one a couple days ago. 8 9 May I approach? 10 THE COURT: Yes, you can approach. 11 I didn't get a copy of your response, so I've 12 not read it. I think they're going to fit you with 13 a mike, Mr. Loughery. 14 All right. Here we go. Did you send this to 15 Carolyn? 16 MR. LOUGHERY: I believe so. I didn't 17 personally myself, but it was sent. You know, it 18 could be in Dade City. 19 THE COURT: That's possible, yeah. Because I 20 would have read this. It's only four pages, but I 21 would have read it beforehand. 22 MR. LOUGHERY: Right. I think we filed it 23 Tuesday afternoon. THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, just call in the 24 . 25 future and make sure Carolyn received it so that we

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can get that done.

MR. LOUGHERY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. I've had a chance to review your response.

All right. I guess, let's go next to why do you need -- I'm sorry. Which shoe did you say, the left shoe or the right shoe?

MR. ESCOBAR: The right shoe, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why do you need the right shoe?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, if I could approach the Court and give you a packet.

THE COURT: Sure. I hope you're not going to expect me to read that?

MR. ESCOBAR: No. But I can direct you to certain portions of it. I'm going to make that part of the record, if we can, so that it would be clear as to the reasons.

Your Honor, initially, if you look through that document, you'll see that it starts off with an Orange County Sheriff's Office report. And this Orange County Sheriff's report is going to be for two items: Number one, the actual hard drives that were used in order to generate this examination and this test that was conducted by Orange County; and then obviously it is going to be important as well

concerning the shoe.

If you flip through to Page 2 of that Orange County report, and Page 5 -- and that's where the shoe issue starts -- you'll see that they have captured some pictures that attempt to show some lighting coming from Mr. Reeves's tennis shoes.

They go through Page 5 and through Page 10, and then they start again on the shoes on Page 17, Page 23, which is of great importance there, showing what they opine is a reflection.

Again Page 24, they've labeled that a reflection or reflective area; 25, a reflective area; 26, a reflective area; 27, a reflective area; 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ESCOBAR: On and on. And so if you go further into the reports, it's at the very back of this stack, Your Honor, you'll see that there are a series of pictures of the actual shoe, and it starts with I would say the last 10 pages. And the first page of that exhibit is a bag that contained the shoes.

THE COURT: Ah, right.

MR. ESCOBAR: And then you'll see the next six, seven, eight pages, them being actual very

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thorough pictures of the shoes themselves.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: And then there is an examination that they start doing about three or four pictures in where they're shining a light onto those shoes in an attempt to show a reflection.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: And they adjust the intensity of the lighting in the room in order to try to get different aspects of that particular lighting. And you'll see in one of the last ones, they put that shoe on the floor shining a light on the shoe.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: In an attempt to show a reflection.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: So, likewise, we need one of those shoes in order to test, copy, examine that shoe in order to confront their theory that whatever light was emanating in that video.

The Court remembers the loop video that we presented early on in the bond motion in this case where it actually showed a rectangle light that we are suggesting to the Court and we suggested back then to the Court that it was nothing but

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Mr. Oulson's phone that had been thrown by Mr. Oulson at Mr. Reeves while Mr. Reeves was seated in his chair.

Consequently, Your Honor, which I think corroborates that to a great extent, is the fact that that particular phone, Mr. Oulson's phone immediately after the shooting was found in between Mr. Reeves's two feet as he was seated.

If the Court recalls, Corporal Hamilton quickly came over to Mr. Reeves, saw the phone in between Mr. Reeves's legs; and the Court recalls also the testimony that between the row that Mr. Oulson was seated in and the row that Mr. Reeves was seated in, there's about an eight-inch upstep, which means that if Mr. Oulson by some reason had dropped the phone in his row, there's no way that that phone is going to climb up eight inches and get into Mr. Reeves's row.

So as you can imagine, their theory, at least what they're going to try to report to the jury, is that somehow that reflective light is coming from Mr. Reeves's shoe.

THE COURT: All right. Just to be clear, I've heard everything you're saying. I'm not necessarily saying that I agree with everything

you're saying, but I've heard everything you're saying.

It's only because I'm saying "okay" doesn't mean that I necessarily agree. My recollection of all of that testimony is exactly what you just said, but I understand what your position is.

MR. ESCOBAR: So it's a material issue in this particular case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: And it's relevant to the issues that are going to be presented before the jury, and clearly the Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as our constitution in Florida.

And I disagree with Mr. Loughery. He makes a statement in his memorandum that there is no constitutional right to discovery; he cites a federal case with that.

And there may not be a federal constitutional right to discovery, but I can tell the Court that clearly under the case -- and I'll give this case to you. I cited it in my memo -- State vs.

Gonzalez, it clearly says that there could be a due process violation for the denial of discovery, proper discovery in any criminal case. So that implicates the constitution, certainly the Florida

Constitution.

In looking, Your Honor, at the case law dealing with these particular issues, it's clear the rules say that we have a right to inspect and test evidence in this particular case that's going to be brought forth in a trial.

And I'm going to cite, first of all, Kuntsman, which is at 643 So.2d 1172. Most of these I've cited in my memo, but whatever the Court doesn't have, I'll be able to provide it, because I have the stack here for the State and for the Court.

We have to start off with understanding that Florida has one of the most liberal discovery rules in the entire country. There are four other jurisdictions besides Florida that has as liberal of a discovery rule as we have here.

Only four other states have depositions, five have depositions and liberal discovery rules, the rest are, you know, pretty strict.

THE COURT: All right. You're going to have to tell me what the four other states are or I'm not going to be able to refute it without looking it up.

MR. ESCOBAR: I can tell you Texas is one.
THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ESCOBAR: And I don't have the other ones right with me.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take your word for it. You know I'm going to have to look it up now.

MR. ESCOBAR: So we have to start there and realize that, hey, in Florida the legislature and our Supreme Court has decided that, hey, we're going to have liberal discovery rules in order to facilitate a fair trial.

And when you look at the case law, Your Honor, really fairness is the bottom line. And I'm going to cite *State vs. Coney*, which is located at 272 So.2d, 553. And this is what it says:

"The underlying principles supporting the whole idea of criminal pretrial discovery as gleaned from all the cases and well reasoned commentaries is fairness."

And, you know, at this point the Government has had these shoes. They didn't call me up and say, "Hey, Rick, listen, I've got these shoes, and by the way, we're going to run some tests and I think it's only fair for you to be present when we do these tests because, you know, there may be some tampering or we may lose the shoes." They never

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did that.

And so just like they have the ability to examine that particular shoe at their discretion, we should as well with reference to our experts and our staff.

And so I think that we're being more than fair, I think, by saying, "You keep the left; we take the right." They've documented this shoe considerably. They've taken every photo known to man about this shoe. They've given that shoe, I guess, to two experts.

One set of experts are the ones that took the photos that are at the very back of the packet that I just gave the Court; the other was the Orange County expert that examined that alleged reflection and opined that that was a reflection that needed to be considered in this particular case.

So they've exhausted everything that they can possibly do with this shoe. It's time to turn it over to the Defense now so that we can use that shoe in an effort to make our comparisons, our own tests, and our own theories about whether that shoe is, in fact, relevant in this case.

THE COURT: Well, if your expert examines the shoe, you're going to have to turn those expert

reports over to the State anyway, right?

MR. ESCOBAR: It all depends. And I know there's the Kidder case, Your Honor. I'm familiar with the Kidder case.

THE COURT: Strange you should mention that.

I just read it today. June 12th, out of the Second

DCA, in 2013, I believe.

MR. ESCOBAR: I am familiar with the Kidder case, and I'm prepared at some point in time to argue the issues of the Kidder case.

I think at this point in time, I would disagree. I don't think that every expert that works with me in this particular case and how I test those particular shoes and what I go by, the process I go by in testing those shoes automatically makes an expert that I've employed subject to discovery.

So I respectfully disagree with the Court that Kidder encompasses every particular expert that I may talk to. But, you know, that issue really is not for today because we're at this point in time not in a position to reveal our experts.

At some point in time, I'll be more than glad,
Your Honor, because the one thing that we want to
make sure is that no one violates the discovery

rules here.

So at some point in time if the Court wants to have a Kidder hearing, and we can in camera show you everything that we've done and you can determine whether Kidder applies, I'll be more than willing to do that, because it's not my intent by any stretch of the imagination to hide anything from the Government that I'm not entitled to hide.

But at this point in time we're talking about a shoe, we're talking about a test that they've done on that particular shoe that they're now opining is the reflection that we believe is a cell phone, and for that reason, Your Honor, I think we're entitled to it.

I can tell you I've got great language by many of the cases, some of them that I've cited in my brief, where the court is saying it is the absolute obligation of a lawyer -- it's what makes these trials fair -- it's the absolute obligation of the lawyer to test thoroughly all of the Government's evidence.

And I shouldn't have to give my work product up, my theories, my way of doing an analysis, my way of doing a comparison, we shouldn't have to give my work product up because the Government

somehow says -- it's totally speculative -- that I need to have a chain of custody, a continuous chain of custody.

As the Court well knows, the issues of chain of custody have changed back from when I started practicing law 32 years ago. The issues of chain of custody is very, very difficult in today's day and age to omit a piece of evidence from being introduced, unless I can show not by mere possibility but by probability that, in fact, that particular item has been tampered with.

And then there's another standard for custody, and that is a readily identifiable object. In other words, if you have a gun with a serial number, you don't have to worry about the chain of custody because it's readily identifiable.

And, in fact, if you've got someone that at the scene picked up that gun and saw that serial number as being double AA-123, and at trial you have someone that's introducing that gun double AA-123, that is sufficient chain of custody to introduce that particular gun.

And so I've got some arguments concerning that aspect of chain of custody in reference to the hard drives in this particular case and when it comes --

THE COURT: Let's just go one at a time and stay on the issues.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay.

THE COURT: And I'm familiar with chain of custody. I have a copy of Ehrhardt. It's up here, and I've read Peek vs. State.

All right. Anything else on the shoes before
I give the State the final response? No?

State, final response on the shoes? Why shouldn't he get the shoes?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, because this whole argument is about his ability to test it.

We've never said he can't test it. We just don't want to turn it over unsupervised with no oversight as to what happens to these shoes.

Now, forget the chain of custody aspect for a second. That's very important, but we can't be forced to give up the chain of custody. If one of those shoes comes back altered and tampered with, we have no recourse.

Okay. On an aside, if the Defense lists an item of evidence, I really don't think the Court would say, "State, take it for a week and do what you want with it and then give it back to the Defense." The Defense would say, "Oh, my goodness,

Judge, no, we want to make sure the State doesn't mess that up, we want our expert there while the State looks at this," and you would grant that motion.

I have never, ever seen where our evidence is turned over unsupervised to the Defense to do what they want. Just like in a possession of cocaine case, as a Defense, "We need to test this. Can we have it for a week, please, before we give it back unsupervised?" You never do that.

We're not trying to stomp on their constitutional rights or procedural rights to do discovery. In fact, if you look at the response, we say, "Please come in and do it, but we're not going to give you the stuff that's potentially used in trial so it can potentially be altered or potentially tampered with."

Look, I'm not suggesting they're going to intentionally do that, but I don't have any recourse if that happens. I do have recourse if we're there and see what happens. It's not a work product issue.

We're not asking to stand over their shoulders and watch their reports and see the notes they write down.

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And let me point to this so the record is slightly balanced here. Mr. Escobar talked about this reflection being the cell phone and now we're opining it's the shoe.

Now, you referred to the loop from the other day. Well, that's right, it was a loop. If you look at the whole tape, you will see Mr. Reeves's shoes reflecting as we walked down the aisle. He wasn't stepping on a cell phone.

Okay. And so it's a common sense thing, when you see the whole tape and you say, "Wait a minute. That's not a cell phone, that's his shoes."

So we've done this stuff. If they want to go look at the shoes and photograph the shoes and put them in different lighting, no problem; but we need somebody there to make sure that these things are not altered or tampered with in some fashion or there's some chain of custody issue.

So we're not trying to prevent them from testing them or inspecting them or making photographs of them, we're just saying we don't want you to do that without someone being present.

And I think that's the way it's always been done. I don't think there's any cases out there that I've seen that says a piece of evidence can

just be handed over to the defense to do whatever they want with for a whole week or however long and just bring it back when they want to.

We have the burden of proof; they don't. It's not like it's an equal thing here going on here.

We have a different ethical responsibility than they have.

And it's our evidence, if they want to inspect it and test it, please come and do it, but you have to do it so we can supervise it. That's not an outrageous request.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Escobar, I can tell you have a response.

MR. ESCOBAR: I do, Your Honor. Let's try to analyze this.

THE COURT: That's what we're doing today. Absolutely.

MR. ESCOBAR: They have photographed both shoes.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: They have taken minute detailed information from both shoes.

Mr. Loughery is saying, well, what if he loses the right shoe? If Mr.~Escobar or his team should lose the right shoe, they have all of those photos,

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all of those analyses that were done and preserved to give to the jury. It's not like the shoe is the analysis. The shoe is an item. The right shoe and the left shoe are items.

They can hand that left shoe to the jury and say, look, this is the shoe that Mr. Reeves was wearing, and you see all the stripes here on the side, you see these marks at the back of the heel, you see these marks here, these are reflective areas of the shoe; and, therefore, the jury can actually see the shoe, feel the shoe, touch the shoe, put the shoe in a dark room, shine a light if they want to, do all of those things, and he is not hampered in any way whatsoever.

So at worst case scenario, an absolute worst case scenario, he has the identical piece of evidence that he introduces to the jury that was analyzed by his experts and have opined as to whether or not they were relevant in this particular case.

But guess what? If they come to our facilities where we're going to be doing our thing, everything that I do with that shoe and my placement of the shoe here and there, that's my work product.

If my theory is that this shoe was seated in this position, that is my work product, and he's able to see all of my work product, all of my thoughts, all of my observations of contradiction, he's able to see.

I shouldn't have to give up my work product in order to do a test equally as his experts did in the defense of my client.

He's making the accusations, we should have equal right to make exhaustive tests and experiments with this particular shoe.

And he's not going to be damaged at all, and he can't tell you that he's going to be damaged at all. It's just a nonissue.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's the shoes.

Next item that was on for discussion was the firearm.

You want the firearm and each round of ammunition to be taken away from the evidence locker?

MR. ESCOBAR: I am going to be so reasonable, I'm just going to say the firearm.

THE COURT: Okay. So you just want the firearm?

MR. ESCOBAR: Just the firearm. Give me the

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firearm.

2 THE COURT: All right. Firearm.

So this is the weapon that caused the death of Mr. Oulson, and you want to have exclusive possession of this weapon for five days?

MR. ESCOBAR: For five days.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: If you look halfway through my packet, Your Honor, you will see that there is a ballistics report that was prepared by Jennifer Clark.

THE COURT: Halfway through which packet? The one that you just gave me?

MR. ESCOBAR: The one I just gave you, yes.

THE COURT: Oh, I thought that was just a shoe packet. It looked like you had other packets for other items over there.

MR. ESCOBAR: That is a packet of all of the supporting documents that we are supplying to the Court in this particular case.

And if you look halfway through, you'll see that there's an acknowledgment of additional tangible evidence that was supplied to the Defense on November the 19th of 2014, which was a full lab report concerning the examination and test-firing

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of that particular gun.

THE COURT: I see that.

MR. ESCOBAR: I would ask the Court to go through all those pictures, because they have thoroughly examined and photographed every aspect of that gun, including the barrel, bullets, you know, shell casings.

Everything has been thoroughly documented, thoroughly examined. It's exhaustive that report, which it should be.

And so the only problems with that report is that if you start taking a look at the photos that were provided to the Defense --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- those photos are of very poor quality.

And in speaking with our particular experts, we are in need of doing our own gunpowder test to determine the patterns at different distances.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: We do not believe, Your Honor, that what was provided to us, at least for our purposes, is sufficient in order for my experts to testify before this Court and opine as to the distances of the muzzle of that gun and the various

parties that are alleged as victims in this matter.

They've test-fired the gun. They've used the bullets that were in the gun. And if the Court recalls, the Court was concerned that some of these items may be expended, and this was one of the items.

There was bullets in the gun, and they were going to do this distance testing, and they were probably going to use all of the bullets in the distance testing.

The bullets that you see that were seized from the car are not one and the same bullets that were used in this particular firearm.

THE COURT: A different box of ammunition?

MR. ESCOBAR: A different box of ammunition.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: And so we were concerned.

Everybody was concerned. Mr. Garcia was concerned.

And the Court actually inquired back in one of the hearings as to whether I was okay with them actually doing this test, and I said absolutely so.

THE COURT: I believe that was March of last year. I asked if you were going to have your expert present for them to discharge the firearm so that you could observe it at the same time, and

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since there are a limited number of rounds in the magazine that was taken, that you might want to have your expert present.

Yes, I remember saying something like that.

MR. ESCOBAR: We knew that we had additional bullets of the identical type and so that was not going to be a problem for us.

Expending the bullets that were in that particular gun was not going to be problem for us at all because we have plenty more of that same bullet that came from that same box.

So I'm not concerned about that at all, but the quality of their photographing and the quality actually of their documentation of various aspects of that test I think are of very, very poor quality and hamper the Defense.

THE COURT: All right. Why can't your experts simply go to the FDLE range, though, and conduct that test right there?

Because this is a standard test, it's a test that's been used in ballistics now for going on I'm going to say 30 years, probably longer than that, and there's not that much mystery as to the clothing and apparel that was being worn.

So if you intend to replicate it, again it's

not like the State is not aware of what type of shirt Mr.~Oulson was wearing.

I don't know what the penetration point was, but all of that can be replicated.

And what your expert is going to do is not groundbreaking. He's not treading new ground, unless there's some new test that nobody is aware of yet that he's got.

So why can't you just do it at the FDLE's range?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I can tell you in camera, absolutely.

I've got a good basis because it's my work product. I can tell you in camera as to why we need to do it away from FDLE. Without question, I'll be glad to do it on the record, sealed for the Court's consideration.

THE COURT: Mr. Loughery, do you have any objection to me hearing an in camera explanation as to why the standard gun test that's been used for more than 30 years probably now?

MR. LOUGHERY: I don't, Judge. I really don't, because I can't imagine what it could possibly be.

THE COURT: That's probably why he doesn't

want to tell you, if you can't imagine what it could be.

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, no, no, I understand that.

But, you know, I hate to be paranoid a bit, but I think I had mentioned this before. The way this whole thing seems to be setting up is I just can anticipate some sort of reenactment, "Using the real evidence, ladies and gentlemen, the real gun, the real shoe," and try to recreate this thing and then try to put it into a trial and have an argument in court about whether it's admissible or not.

And so I really think if that's going to be the in camera aspect of it, then I've got a real problem with that, because the whole thing smacks of some sort of recreation where they need the real stuff.

Because, otherwise, they can go and buy another gun, they can go out and buy similar shoes, and do all the tests they want. Okay. I mean this is something that has to have the exact same shoe.

And the cell phone issue we're not talking about today because --

THE COURT: That's okay. Don't skip ahead.

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, Mrs. Oulson filed a response to that.

THE COURT: I read that, but don't spoil the surprise. We still have that to come.

MR. LOUGHERY: Right. And so we've agreed that that's not an issue for you today, maybe on another day.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: But the point is that the request for all that stuff, to have the original stuff and not just buy a replica of the same thing, makes me think they're going to do some sort of stage recreation of which I've yet to see that admissible; but, hey, it's national media, maybe we'll have a big show on that.

THE COURT: I don't know about that.

I do know that depending how long a firearm has been in use, depending on which batch it came out of, and if it's the same generation -- and even if it's the same generation and even if it's the same model of firearm, yes, they're supposed to be interchangeable; yes, all the parts are supposed to work, but as a firearm enthusiast, I can say that there is a difference in discharge.

And I've been to the range enough myself to

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know there is a difference in discharge, even between -- I think Glock is one of the firearms. I've used them for many years, and even if you get the same Gen 3 Glock 22, it's going to discharge slightly different than another Gen 3 Glock 22.

MR. LOUGHERY: I don't necessarily disagree with that. My point is, to answer your question as to why it couldn't be done at the FDLE --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LOUGHERY: -- okay, it makes me believe there's some sort of staging that they want to use it for where they can't do that at the FDLE. And so I'm just guessing what this in camera reason is, why most tests wouldn't be good and why they have to have this secret production done.

It makes me believe that it has to do with some sort of recreation so they can tell the jury this is the exact gun that was used. Okay. So, therefore, asking to test it is not using it as a test, it's using it for some other purpose. You know, it's being used to strengthen this recreation, or whatever they're going to do potentially.

Again, I'm in the dark because I don't even know who his experts are a year later.

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THE COURT: They're going to get to that soon.

MR. LOUGHERY: Yes. Everything has been controlled by these experts for the last year.

And so, again, I don't have a problem. I never object to someone talking to the Court in camera if it's legitimate.

THE COURT: All right. Then I will hear what it is in camera, I guess.

Why don't we do that at the end, though. I mean I can't do it in here. So I'll take you in -- I don't know, we'll go to my chambers and you can give me the in-camera reason on the firearm test.

Are there any other not in-camera reasons, though, so that we can get everything that we can get out to the public?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, again it goes back to the argument he's concerned that somehow this gun is going to disappear, and that because somehow this gun is going to disappear, that he's going to be prejudiced.

We've got to go back on what they did with this gun. They've preserved this gun by photos. They've taken microscopic photos of every aspect of the gun.

THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. You've

already told me the quality of the photos of the gun were terrible.

MR. ESCOBAR: No, no. Those are of the actual distance, the actual gunpowder residue that was left on the screens.

When you look at the rest of the photos, they've done a very good job of -- and if you want to, I can actually point out to the ones that I'm talking about.

They've done a very good job of photographing the gun itself and the internal workings of the gun as well as the bullets.

That is not a problem. The problem is that when they did this distance testing, they didn't do a very good job of capturing the results.

And so I think my argument is very, very clear and that is -- and I'll try to get these for you, Your Honor, so that you can see what I'm talking about.

You can see the pictures of the actual bullets as they were received. They're crystal clear pictures of the bullets. That's not a problem.

You can see the actual contents of the gunpowder that they actually photographed. Not only the gunpowder, but the actual flatten balls

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that were within the actual bullet itself. They've done a great job of photographing that.

They've also photographed the inner chamber of the gun itself, and they've done a great job of outlining all the grooves and all the particularities of that particular gun.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: What they haven't done is they haven't captured the patterns that are so important to us.

And so let's take a look at that. They've documented the gun itself miraculously, every aspect, the front and the back. They've taken great pictures of the gun itself.

So in a jury trial what's the prosecution going to do with that gun? They're not going to let the jury fire that gun. They're not going to let the jury do their test with that gun, their own gun residue test on distances. All they're going to do is see the gun.

The serial number has been documented by photographs and by written memorandum, every aspect of the gun has been preserved, and so at worst case scenario, they can show the jury this is the gun that was used.

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It is not in dispute that Mr. Reeves shot
Mr. Oulson. That is not in dispute. It's never
been in dispute. So how are they going to be
prejudiced by my office and my experts testing that
particular gun in order to get relevant evidence in
order to prove our case in chief? How is it
prejudice?

They're not prejudiced. By any stretch of the imagination they're not prejudiced. They've preserved it enough.

And remember, this is one of those chain of custody items that is easily self-identifiable.

Why? Because guns have serial numbers. And that serial number is clearly photographed. That serial number is well documented.

So it's not like they're going to lose any evidence whatsoever, but they're giving the Defense a chance to use this gun in a proper way.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. The third item that's being discussed today?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I think it was the cell phone of Mr. Oulson.

And what happened there, Your Honor, is that I spoke to Mr. Loughery, I spoke to Mr. Grimaldi.
Mr. Grimaldi could not be here today.

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THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: In an abundance of caution, because of the issue of privacy that was brought up by Mr. Grimaldi, we all agreed, all three of us agreed that probably it was a better time to do it when Mr. Grimaldi was here so that he could speak his voice on behalf of Mrs. Oulson.

And so sometime after today we're going to all join together on a conference call in order to try and get a date with your office that we can all agree on so that we can have the arguments on the cell phone.

I can tell you that probably the arguments on the cell phone are probably going to be a bit more lengthy. Certainly I think we've got, you know, considerable issues and case law that I think I would like the Court to consider, even beyond the case law in my motion, based upon the response that I got from Mr. Grimaldi.

So we are preparing a response or a reply to his response, and I think it will be quite thorough, dealing with the issues of privacy and our procedure that we think we're going to employ to safeguard all of it.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's forget the cell

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phone for today.

All right. Does that work for you also, Mr. Loughery?

MR. LOUGHERY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. So that takes us to I think it was the hard drive for the Cobb Theater Is that something you still want?

MR. ESCOBAR: Yes, Your Honor. If you look at the first page of the Orange County Sheriff's Office report, this is so telling.

Let me read you the first paragraph and put that on the record. It's that important.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: It says that "On 2/12 of 2014, at approximately 12:30 P.M., Investigator Neal Frailey dropped off a DVD disk for me to examine to determine if or what might have been shown at the time of the shooting at the theater." And that DVD is a DVD that I got as well.

It's actually a mirror of the hard drive that Detective Smith initially did when this case first started.

What they did was from the Cobb Theater they mirrored the hard drives not only through DVDs, but through thumb drives and through hard drives

themselves and then they provided the defense, if the Court recalls --

THE COURT: A big Seagate.

MR. ESCOBAR: Exactly. And so we got all of that.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: And so this DVD, which was a mirror of the hard drive, was provided to their experts in Orlando.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ESCOBAR: And this is what he says:

"The DVD contained a processed timeline video from several cameras. The video was not what I needed to fully, to fully examine the incident, so I requested the original videos from the Cobb Theater."

In other words, he requested, their expert requested the original hard drives from the Cobb Theater in order for their expert to do their analysis, and so that's exactly what was provided.

If you look at the paragraph right below, you'll see that Frailey went back and got the case that contained the hard drives and they examined those particular hard drives.

And you'll see that the hard drives -- and

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this is particularly important for the Court I'm sure as well -- each hard drive has a serial number.

Now, one of the things that has not been documented in this Orange County report, not only does it have a serial number, but it has a tag number.

They provided discovery to us that not only has the serial number from each hard drive, but it has a tag number.

So there's two numbers that are peculiar and specific to that particular hard drive that identifies that particular hard drive.

And so as you can see here in this report, for every hard drive there's a serial number that is different from the other, and so what this expert did was he went ahead and examined every one of these particular hard drives.

Of concern to us, to be perfectly honest with you, because we have learned in the discovery process that really and truly these hard drives should not be empty, because what happens is that they tape over and over again, all the cameras tape over and over and over again.

And you'll see that on the original drive

DVR-4, it's listed in his report as being empty; on the original drive DVR-1, it's also listed as empty; on the secondary drive DVR-1, it's listed as empty; on the original drive DVR-5, it's listed as empty; and on the second drive DVR-3, it's listed as empty.

One of the things obviously that we want our experts to do is to really examine those hard drives, mirror those hard drives correctly, and to determine whether or, in fact, there's any more information in any of those hard drives that are going to be probative to our case; and not only any more information, but also give us a clearer picture of what actually happened.

When we received their mirrored hard drive,
Your Honor, we believe that the process, the
software that was used in order to mirror the hard
drive to the Seagate that the Court recalls, we
believe was not the appropriate process.

And so as a result, we don't think we have the clarity on our mirrored hard drive that we should have, which is I am sure, I am sure the reason that their expert said, "You know what? This CD is not working for me. I need the original hard drives for me to be able to get or capture those

particular pictures."

And so, likewise, my expert should have the benefit, as their expert had, of the original hard drives so that number one, we can examine those hard drives; number two, we can mirror those hard drives appropriately so that we can have them at a future time to present to court.

Now, just on that aspect of the case, remember they've mirrored the hard drive, they've exhausted everything that they need to do with those hard drives to preserve them.

So let's assume that every hard drive -- and by the way, the only hard drive that contains the cameras in Theater 10 are the second hard drive DVR-4, it's the very top. And you'll see there it says, Cameras 2, 3, 8, 9, 11 and 12.

If you've ever been to that theater, Camera
11 --

THE COURT: I have. Remember, I went and checked it out?

MR. ESCOBAR: Yes, sir. Camera 11 is the camera that as you're going in is on your right.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ESCOBAR: Camera 12, as you're going, is on your left.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: You will see that there's some problems with what was provided to us we believe both on Camera 11, but even more significant Camera 12. And when you flip through these pictures, you'll see what we're talking about as far as quality.

But let's assume, let's assume that the original hard drives, they belong to the Cobb Theater. I've been talking to Tim Davis. They issued a subpoena to Tim Davis, which I didn't have at that point in time the power to do, but they issued a subpoena after this case to Tim Davis and they went and retrieved those hard drives from out-of-state.

They mirrored them, they preserved them, they've done everything that they needed to do to have allegedly accurately duplicated them. So now it's my turn to be able to get those hard drives in order to download them and see what information we're able to glean from it.

One thing that I'd like the Court to focus on, if you look at Page 21.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: I know you've had a hard day,

1 Your Honor, a long one. 2 THE COURT: That's okay. They aren't 3 numbered. MR. ESCOBAR: Yes. They're on top. MR. MICHAELS: They're on top. MR. ESCOBAR: At the very top. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. LOUGHERY: They're under the Sheriff's 9 Office thing. 10 THE COURT: All right. So it's the big 11 stapled packet, the first one. 12 All right. Page 21. I got it. 13 MR. ESCOBAR: You'll see what it says at the 14 And this is, by the way, Camera 12. 15 says, "This camera does not show each image of the 16 incident. There is a skip in time between 0283 and 17 0286 that prevents seeing more images as normally 18 were recorded on this camera." 19 So of particular importance is for my 20 experts -- and I told you Camera 12 was of even greater importance to me than Camera 11, although 21 both of them I think are of great importance. 22 23 But you can see that there are problems with what this expert may have been seeing and whether 24

this expert himself, in mirroring -- because he had

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to mirror these hard drives, the expert from Orlando -- whether he himself mirrored these hard drives correctly in order to get the proper findings.

Well, they've done what they've done. It's time for us to allow my experts to do that. And I'm bringing my experts from out-of-state to do that.

And I think, again, there's no harm to the Government. Because guess what? They've got mirrored hard drives that they're fully confident with. They've got mirrored hard drives that they are fully confident with.

So give me the original hard drives and let me properly mirror those hard drives. I'll give him back the original hard drives once we're done with them, and, you know, he can do whatever else he wants he wants to do with them.

Mirroring a hard drive is not going to hurt the hard drive, it's not going to damage the hard drive if it's done properly by a professional.

THE COURT: Yes. Now, a question. Why can't you just do it at the FDLE lab or at the evidence locker at the Sheriff's Office? What's the problem with mirroring it right there?

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MR. ESCOBAR: Well, Your Honor -- and I think
Mr. Loughery would agree with me because of
Detective Smith -- it takes an enormous amount of
time to mirror all these hard drives. It's not a
15-minute ordeal. It could be a day's ordeal.

And so in order for my expert to have total custody and control while the mirroring is taking place, he's going to have to have those hard drives, and the process of mirroring it, with him at all times.

I don't want a mirroring process to take place without him totally supervising that process, and so it may take, you know, some time; and I think it took the State some time to mirror these hard drives. So that's one reason.

But you're right, if I could do this in 15 minutes, I would concede with the Court that, hey, listen, I can bring my expert down, we can take a look at the actual hard drives through a computer system, determine what the hard drives look like, and then mirror the hard drives to something that's functional for us.

But it's going to take time. We've got to look at every single hard drive, every single piece of film on those hard drives, to see if there's

anything of value. And then after we look at the hard drives themselves, we've got to then mirror every hard drive. So it's a time-consuming process.

Again, when you balance these things in its -all the case law deals with balance and fairness.

What is unfair about them giving me the hard drives
at this point in time? They've preserved, they
have mirrored, they have preserved the original
hard drives.

Those hard drives really belong to Tim Davis, and he could care less. I asked him, "Could you care less if I get the hard drives? Yeah, I could care less who gets the hard drives." Because they have mirrored it.

So I need those hard drives so that my experts can work with. We can view every single hard drive before we mirror them, mirror them, and then use them extensively in our presentation.

THE COURT: Okay. State, any response?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, again, I don't think that explains it besides going through the same rhetoric about why they need this and why they can't do it at that location.

I just have a hard time taking things into

evidence and giving it to the Defense to do what they want with it.

I don't know if something gets altered, if something gets tampered.

If something like that does happen, I have no recourse. It becomes a credibility issue for the jury. It doesn't need to exist. There's a simple way to deal with it as it's always been dealt with.

You know, I guess he's acting like we're on equal footing here. Well, the State has the burden of proof, number one. They don't have any obligation to give us anything that might damage their client.

So let's say they find that one of these things isn't really empty, okay, and somehow it is bad for their client. They don't have to give that to us and you all know that. They have no reciprocal discovery as far as that goes.

And so, you know, it's kind of like, I guess, they don't trust that the mirroring has been done, so they want to do their own testing to make sure we haven't kept something from them.

Well, do it at the FDLE. Do it where both parties are.

Does their expert want to wear a mask so we

can't tell who he is? I mean is that what it really is, that these people are out there that we might find out who they are?

I mean I don't know; but, again, we're going back to the mystery of these experts that have been controlling this trial for a year that's in play.

So I would just ask that the normal procedures go by that normally happen, there's some supervision to our evidence. That's been my argument on all this stuff.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, somehow Mr. Loughery seems to think that we're not on equal footing, that somehow the State has some special privilege in this case.

MR. LOUGHERY: It's the burden of proof.

MR. ESCOBAR: I would strongly disagree that they do.

Let me read to the Court something that came from the Department of Justice just recently, and it was posted in the Washington Post.

It says, "The Justice Department and the FBI had formally acknowledge that nearly every examiner in the elite FBI forensic unit --"

MR. LOUGHERY: Objection, Judge.

This has nothing to do with this. This is just pandering for the media.

THE COURT: Hold on a second.

MR. ESCOBAR: "-- gave flawed testimony."

THE COURT: Mr. Escobar, why are you reading to me from the Washington Post?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I'm reading that because they had done all these tests and nobody is worried that somehow the Government, just like the FBI did over decades --

MR. LOUGHERY: I've said they can test it.

I'm not stopping them from testing. I'm just
saying it should be supervised. It's that simple.

MR. ESCOBAR: They tested it with no supervision. So he is comparing the State's process, completely different from the State's process, and it should be equal.

The Government shouldn't have any greater right to analyze and test a piece of evidence than the Defense, especially when we know that there was a recent report that says that the FBI for decades has testified falsely concerning hair samples, for decades, wrongfully convicting many individuals.

So they're not bulletproof. They're not perfect. They sit in the same shoes that we do,

and, therefore, we should have an equal right in testing independently every piece of evidence.

That's what due process is in an effort to confront the Government's evidence.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think he was just suggesting that he has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

I understand where you're coming from. It's just 4:53 on a Friday afternoon. I don't need to read the Post. I already read it occasionally.

So do you want to come in the back and tell me your in camera reasoning and we'll go from there.

All right. So for the in camera review, what we'll do is I'll have the court reporter, and Mr.~Escobar and, of course, Mr. Michaels also, if he wants to, come back, come back and tell me.

And I'll order that it will be transcribed, sealed, and placed in the court file?

MR. ESCOBAR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do we agree?

Okay. And then I'll come back in and I'll give you your rulings.

Do we have anything else that we have to handle this afternoon before we pack up and go back there?

MR. LOUGHERY: I don't believe so.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, the only thing that happened, and I think they're going to correct it, but we had depositions today that when we got there, there were again reports missing.

THE COURT: Seriously?

MR. ESCOBAR: Mr. Michaels, he was there.

So, Mr. Michaels, why don't you please at least tell the Court what's happening.

MR. MICHAELS: There were some emergency medical technicians that were listed, members of the firearm department, who responded and treated both Mrs. Oulson and Mr. Oulson.

The State was unaware of any reports that my understanding that were generated by that contact and by that visit.

When we were there to take the depositions, sure enough the EMT had in his hands a couple of reports.

And even though the State tried to elicit them, you know, Ms. Summer asked for them when she sent the subpoena, for some reason didn't get them.

And now we understand that there is an additional witness that they weren't aware of, after talking a little bit to this EMT about

somebody else that was on the scene, and so we had to reset those depositions.

There were also a couple of fire engines that reported to the scene. One of the individuals may have treated Mr. Reeves at the scene for an eye injury. So we don't have that report yet. So there are some reports that are out there that we're still in the process of getting.

So, you know, this isn't a procedure that's being dragged down by mysterious experts, but we're still getting reports, and, you know, we are over a year into it.

MR. ESCOBAR: And, Judge, just to make it clear.

THE COURT: Yeah. But I don't understand how we can be missing EMTs and fire department.

I mean there were like a dozen cameras out in the parking lot of the movie theater, there were helicopters flying overhead taking a video of all these trucks. So we should be able to spot the numbers on the trucks and make sure that everybody that was on the trucks provides their reports.

Can we make sure that we go through it one more time, Mr. Loughery, just so that we don't have anybody else show up with a report that we haven't

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gotten. Just make the phone calls.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, just so the Court knows what I'm going to do. I am going to prepare a complete discovery packet of everything that I've gotten -- and I had spoken to Mr. Garcia about this -- a complete discovery packet of everything that I've received, I'm going to send it over to him so that he can make sure that there is -- that maybe his file may contain more things.

I can tell you both Mr. Garcia and all the prosecutors, Mr. Loughery -- they are all trying to get us whatever they can as quickly as possible.

I think it's the huge volume of this case.

There was literally every Sheriff's officer from
the Pasco County Sheriff's Office, you know, there
at some point in time.

And so I just wanted to bring that to the Court's attention, because the last time, Your Honor, I got the impression that somehow the Court thought that I was dragging my feet, and I think Mr. Loughery will tell you that that's just the opposite.

We are in contact with that office constantly.

Just about every date that they give us, and I mean
just about every date, we take.

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I even had DeeAnn Athan doing depos in this particular case, not only just myself and Mr. Michaels, and it's difficult when she's not heavily involved.

THE COURT: I was going to say.

You say that like DeeAnn isn't one of the best attorneys --

MR. ESCOBAR: DeeAnn is a wonderful lawyer. She's a wonderful lawyer, but she hasn't been entrenched in this case from the very beginning.

So I just wanted to bring that to your attention.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, let's all imagine what this will be like when every deputy that was in that parking lot is wearing a body camera when trying to do discovery on a homicide. Is it going to be possible to get a homicide tried in less than five years under those circumstances?

I can't imagine what's going to happen next, but that's for another -- well, that's for next year to worry about.

All right. Why don't you come back and we'll get this in camera discussion.

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(Thereupon, an in camera hearing was reported in

chambers and is not part of this transcript.)

OPEN COURT:

THE BAILIFF: Court is back in session.

THE COURT: All right. So having concluded the in camera review, one thing is still on my mind, and I want to give the Defense a chance to tell me about it.

Mr. Escobar, can you think of or tell me about any situation where any circuit or county court has given the defense unfettered access to and/or absolute possession of an item of evidence to be introduced in a criminal trial?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I can certainly try to find some.

But I can tell you that there have been cases in the testing of narcotics where as long as you have a lab that is certified to receive narcotics, you can have that narcotic sent to that particular lab without the Government by the way peering over anyone's shoulder, and you can have that tested and analyzed and what have you.

So I know that Mr. Loughery's position is "Well, you know, we don't do it in Pinellas County."

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THE COURT: Well, that's why I'm asking anywhere in the state of Florida.

And I'm familiar with narcotics and DNA under certain circumstances are both sent out, and I've signed DNA orders ordering that they be sent to the lab in Virginia that does the really special testing.

But I'm trying to think of any occasion that I've either participated in, seen, heard of any item like a shoe, a gun, a bullet being given to the Defense in the state of Florida, and I'm not familiar with one.

Do you have anything like that?

MR. LOUGHERY: Your Honor, probably because maybe that hasn't been appealed by the Government as a discovery violation of some sort or a Writ of Prohibition with the circuit court.

I am not aware of a particular case at this point in time. If the Court wants me to do additional research, I'll be more than glad to do so.

But I can tell you in other states I believe that I have seen cases where pieces of items have been turned over to the Government for testing.

In fact, there was a case dealing with a

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firearm, and in the middle of trial the defense counsel was objecting because he had not gotten to do that same ballistics test with the distance test.

And what the court said there -- and I may have given the case here. What the court said here is, "Hey, listen, we're going to give you whatever time you need in the middle of trial to do that test and then you can come back and present your evidence."

And the court reasoned in that particular case that because of the fact that that had been done -- let me see if I can find it quickly for Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. No rush.

MR. ESCOBAR: But I believe that I have that case somewhere.

MR. LOUGHERY: And, Judge, while he's looking for that, in my response there's an improper cite only that it said the Second DCA when, in fact, it's the Third DCA.

THE COURT: Which case?

MR. LOUGHERY: Siegel vs. State, which I have a copy, if you'd like. And I have one for the Defense as well. 68 So.3d, 281.

But just to balance what Mr.~Escobar said, I

would suggest there's no case law because no judge has ever done that, no judge has ever given the Defense evidence to take unsupervised for a whole week, because they are the safeguards we've always used, which is to do it supervised so we won't create problems.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I don't have that case here, but I remember reading a case dealing with that particular issue.

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, no, the issue is not whether they had the right to test it during trial. The issue is whether they have the right to test it without any supervision.

We keep muddling the lines there. He can test these things. He can examine them and copy them.

It's just the unsupervised aspect.

THE COURT: I understand what you two are saying. I promise I'm listening very carefully to what each of you are saying.

MR. LOUGHERY: I know.

THE COURT: And I even listened the second and third time that you repeat what you're saying. So I promise I'm listening.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, even the rule says that the Court has broad discretion; not unbridled

discretion, but broad discretion to fashion certain rules that would make this Court comfortable.

However, the case law and all the case law that I presented to the Court is pretty clear to say that before the Government can really object to a proposal that I am making for testing, copying and obtaining that particular evidence, they've got to show some prejudice. They haven't.

Every piece of evidence they have is either mirrored or perfectly copied. There is no detriment whatsoever in us receiving that piece of evidence and the Government still having a mirrored hard drive, they're having a fully photographed firearm.

They have every single item that we're asking for thoroughly, thoroughly documented and photographed. So there really is no prejudice.

For some reason because of the fact that maybe there's not a case out there that was taken on a Writ of Prohibition by a prosecutor, that somehow that's wrong.

If we read the rule, it is clear that I'm entitled to test it. It doesn't say in the rule the defense can only test it in a government facility.

And when we're reading the plain language of the rule, we can't go elsewhere to try to interpret anything more than what the rule says, and that says that I have the right to test it. It doesn't say I have the right to test it in the presence of this prosecutor.

And so if they want to take a Writ of
Prohibition, if the Court grants my motion, have
them take it. It may be a good case for us to
decide in the Second District Court of Appeal as to
whether this Court has fashioned the appropriate
remedy.

I can tell you that I think I've got a very solid basis in what I've given to the Court in documents.

And I want to make this part of the record, that we are safeguarded by the fact that, hey, they've done everything that they needed to do with these particular items, and they're not going to be damaged. They can't show prejudice.

And when you look at the balancing test, Your Honor --

MR. LOUGHERY: Judge, I'm going to object. We've heard this seven times now. Can we please get to the --

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THE COURT: Overruled. He wants to be comprehensive. He's allowed to be comprehensive. I'm not going to stop him.

MR. ESCOBAR: 3.220(e), Restricting
Disclosures, states that "The court on its own
initiative or on a motion of counsel shall deny or
partially restrict disclosures authorized by this
rule if it finds that there is a substantial risk
to any person of physical harm, intimidation,
bribery, economic reprisals, or unnecessary
annoyance or embarrassment resulting from the
closure, that outweighs, that outweighs any
usefulness of the disclosure to either party."
It's as simple as that.

They have shown no prejudice whatsoever, other than, you know what, we're the State, and because we're the State, we should be present when you're doing your examination.

Your Honor, that is patently unfair. They had their day without us looking over their shoulder. We should have our day.

THE COURT: Okay. State, here we go.

The shoes, is there any reason to believe that the left show is any different from the right shoe or the right shoe is any different from the left

shoe as it relates to anything other than you wear one on your right foot and one on your left foot?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, the only thing I would say, to put this all into context, okay, if the real meat and potatoes of this is the State's argument that the reflection that is seen when the shooting occurs is the defendant's shoe, not the victim's cell phone, okay, that's the bone of contention and what it's going to be.

And when we talk about the cell phone, we can talk about do those cell phones actually light up when they strike a subject or you're stepped on.

That's a whole other issue. Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: So in that regard, that camera that takes that picture, it's probably the right shoe that we're seeing light up.

And I'm sure that's why he asked for the right shoe as opposed to the left shoe, because the reflection shoes argument seems to be off his right shoe.

So that would be the only distinction that I would suggest to the Court is that one camera angle is probably showing the right shoe more often than the left shoe.

And I don't know if the wear patterns on the shoes are such that some reflections are better on one side than the other side. I can't answer the Court about that.

THE COURT: So are you saying you'd rather have me give him the left shoe, if I was going to give him a shoe?

MR. LOUGHERY: To answer that question, yes, but I still think --

THE COURT: You don't want me to give him either shoe.

But if you have to give up a shoe, it would be the left shoe?

MR. LOUGHERY: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there any reason he shouldn't have the left shoe rather than the right shoe, Mr. Escobar?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, because we believe that the right shoe may -- it is what it is. Your Honor, I think I've exhausted my point in this matter.

THE COURT: I understand.

I'm just trying to figure out whether you'd be satisfied with the left shoe or you really want the right shoe and that's the only one you want?

MR. ESCOBAR: I really want the right shoe.

If the Court is not going to give me any shoe,
I'd rather take the left shoe. But I think I'm
entitled to the right shoe, and that's what I'm
asking for.

MR. LOUGHERY: Judge, if I might. And this is something I suggested to Mr. Escobar when were talking about this this week.

I mean because of the nature of what we're doing here, this is in evidence and they want it unsupervised that we talked about, which is, in my opinion, highly unusual -- there's not been a case on that -- is what prevents the Defense from getting a similar pair of shoes and doing their testing with dozens of pairs of those shoes -- the left shoe, the right shoe, whatever?

And then once they've done their top secret testing, and if they just determine there's some reason why they now have to look at the actual shoes in evidence, okay, that they come back to the Court and then at that moment we decide whether or not we're going to take the move of giving them the actual evidence to look at, and then does it have to be unsupervised at that point.

It just seems to me that this is just folly to

be giving evidence up when there's alternative safeguards that can be established.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, Mr.~Escobar?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, is Mr. Loughery saying that if we go out in the market and get --

THE COURT: Another pair of Salomans?

MR. ESCOBAR: -- another pair of shoes, that he is not going to object when my expert testifies concerning the reflection of that shoe?

THE COURT: No. I think what he's saying is that he wants you to go look at a similar portion of those shoes and do your super secret test first, and then if it's insufficient, then he wants you to use the actual shoes.

I don't know why he'd want you to repeat the step, but that's what he's saying.

MR. ESCOBAR: This is the problem. Mr. Reeves is not a millionaire. Every time that I bring my experts to do something, it is an incredible expense on Mr. Reeves.

I can't be bringing experts just to bring them over to do three steps before the step that needs to be taken just because Mr. Loughery thinks that somehow someone is going to steal his shoe or damage his shoe. We're going to do neither of

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them.

And as I've been telling the Court right now, you can impose any order, any sanction on me and Mr. Michaels to preserve the shoe, the DVR, the gun, everything.

If you want me the hold it 24 hours a day during the period that I have it, that's exactly what I'll do. If you want my investigator to hold it 24 hours a day during that period, we will. And we will be subject to sanctions by this Court if we fail to follow those rules.

I have no problems with that. It's that important to our case.

THE COURT: All right. Maybe I should go the other way.

We'll start with the hard drive. As it relates to the hard drive, Mr. Escobar, I'm going to deny your motion for unfettered access without the supervision of the State.

Where is it being held?

MR. LOUGHERY: I think we have it in Pasco.

THE COURT: It's the big fingerprint out there by the jail, the big fingerprint building?

MR. LOUGHERY: I believe so, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. You're not a hundred

percent positive it's not at FDLE?

MR. LOUGHERY: I'm not. Yes, I'm pretty sure that FDLE doesn't have it. But where in Pasco it is, I can find that out.

Again, this motion being filed when it was and no notice to the Sheriff's Office, I didn't bother to go and do those things, not knowing what the Court's ruling would be.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I'll rule.
MR. LOUGHERY: Okay.

THE COURT: I'll rule that Mr. Escobar's expert is to have uninterrupted access that is supervised in an environment conducive to doing the computer testing that he wants to do.

And if they need to run a simulation or a mirroring program that takes overnight, put it in a secure room, run your mirroring program overnight, and then you'll walk away with everything that's in the hard drive.

And I'm sure your expert will take down the number on the hard drive so that he can get the factory specs on it and be able to do everything that he needs to do without actually taking the hard drive off the site.

If for some reason, and if your expert does

that, you come to me and say there is something that he couldn't do in the 24 hours or 36 hours or however much time he had with it over at the big fingerprint building, or the environment was too hot or the environment was too cool, if he had something like that, and you can show me some actual prejudice to you, then I'll reconsider the motion.

But for right now he can mirror the hard drive at the big fingerprint or at the FDLE, if they're holding it at FDLE; but you have to follow the procedures that are already in place for testing at those facilities.

They'll make space available for you. If for some reason they say they won't make space available so that he can set up his computers to do his tests and run his mirror program, that's a whole different story.

But I want you to at least give them the chance to accommodate you on the site, because there's no reason for me to allow the chain of custody tampered with on the hard drives.

The next item up, the firearm. Considering the argument made in court, as well as considering the argument made in camera, I will allow testing

of the firearm only at the FDLE lab or only at the Sheriff's Office with a caveat that -- I'm trying to figure out how to phrase it without revealing what was relayed to me in camera.

I'll make accommodations for redeposition, if necessary, before and after, so that you can schedule the testing of the firearm at a point before and after any deposition and then do a redeposition on that particular issue.

I know that sounds like I'm talking in code, but does that make sense to you, Mr.~Escobar, what I've explained?

MR. ESCOBAR: It does.

THE COURT: Okay. So that way it will preserve what you wanted to protect, at the same time it will give the State an opportunity to maintain control over arguably what is a key piece of evidence in the case.

Finally, the shoe. I don't understand why you can't do the testing on the shoe at the facility, Mr.~Escobar.

If you need to take the shoe out of the facility and take it someplace else in order to do the testing, I'm just going to order that you follow the rules that the facility already has in

place for taking a piece of evidence out of the facility for testing.

So if you want to check a piece of evidence out and you want to take it to a different lighting situation to take photos, or if you have to take it to -- I don't know where you're going to have to take it to do a different type of a photo shoot with it.

But if you want to take it someplace, they're just going to have a detective go with you to wherever you want to take it, whether you're going to take it in a theater or you want take it on a stage. Wherever you want to take it, you can take it there to have it photographed.

I'd be inclined, and I was ready to say, you can take the left shoe and they'll hold the right shoe, because they're the same shoes from the same batch of shoes, made in the same factory -- probably in China. I don't know where Salomon makes their shoes -- so it has all the same qualities, but now I understand that there is a distinction specific to the right shoe.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I'll take the left shoe, because what I can possibly do -- and I don't know if this is going to work or not -- but I can

possibly get another shoe of the same make and model and year and compare it, have my experts compare it to the light reflection on the left shoe.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: And so if I can have the left shoe, I'll take the left shoe.

THE COURT: That's fine. Over the State's objection, then, I'm going to give you the left shoe.

And my reasoning of this, Mr. Loughery -- and I'm not trying to open a can of worms here where I'm giving away evidence to the Defense unsupervised, but it's akin to sending DNA to a lab for testing. You still have some of the DNA, so you send a small portion of it.

You still have the right shoe that you told me is the primary shoe of importance, so you still have that shoe. So I'm not taking your primary piece of evidence away from you.

If there was, you know, a kilo of cocaine that was going to be tested and they said, "We want an ounce of cocaine from that kilo," I would give them an ounce of cocaine from that kilo to send to their lab unsupervised.

I'm giving them an ounce of a left shoe to go and test wherever you want it. That shoe still has to be brought back, and it can't be -- no cutting it in half, no rubbing oils on it, no -- I'm trying to think what else an expert might do.

MR. ESCOBAR: We're not going to alter the shoe, Judge.

THE COURT: You're not going to alter the shoe. So no rubbing oils on it, no cutting it in half, or letting dogs bite it, no anything like.

Let's just keep it the same shoe that you take away as the same shoe you bring back.

How many days do you want the shoe for?

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, if I could have it Monday through Friday.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. ESCOBAR: And I'll have my investigator be able to pick it up.

THE COURT: All right. Which Monday through which Friday? This Monday through this Friday?

MR. ESCOBAR: No, Your Honor. I'm going to have to contact my experts now and see where we're going to be able to --

THE COURT: Then I want a very specific order releasing the very specific shoe by identification.

And I want you to run that order past

Mr. Loughery before you submit it to me to sign to

make sure that it both comports with my oral

pronouncement and whatever the rules are over at

PCSO evidence if somebody is going to pick

something up, and then also give Mr. Loughery a

chance to object to the language if the language

for some reason is out of bounds from what I just

ruled.

I'll give it to you from Monday through Friday unsupervised, the left shoe only. No damaging it. Okay?

MR. ESCOBAR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So we still have the cell phone to talk about, but that will be for another day. And I think we've covered everything we can cover.

We won't be back to see each other until

June 30th, is my recollection, at 4:00 o'clock.

It's going to be over in Dade City next time,

unless somebody set something between now and then.

Yes, Mr. Loughery.

MR. LOUGHERY: Judge, the only thing -- I understand the shoe issue -- the timeframe as far as the DVR and the firearm, it's not going to be

next week? Is that right, Mr.Escobar?

THE COURT: Yes. He said it's not going to be next week.

MR. LOUGHERY: So you'll get with me and we'll figure out when that's going to be so I can get those guys?

THE COURT: So they can realize that somebody's coming to get the shoe.

MR. LOUGHERY: Yes. Okay. I was wondering where we were at with that.

THE COURT: Take the shoe out for five days of unsupervised visitation.

MR. LOUGHERY: Right. No running with the shoe.

THE COURT: Okay. So the one thing that I had on my agenda that was not calendared by either side that I figured I'd explain and let you know is over the weekend I'm going to start to write my pretrial order for June 30th. I have to say I've written more pretrial orders in this case than every other case combined.

But in the pretrial order, I'm going to be pointing out that a trial has been set in this case, and that the only way that that trial is going to be moved is if somebody files a written

motion to continue outlining the reasons why I cannot get my trial done, because I consider this my trial, since I brought it with me from Dade City, and I've got to get this case tried.

And I wanted it tried in August. I felt like we all talked about it and came up with a game plan. I understand that people believe it's not going to work. But if somebody wants to continue it, it needs to be a written motion to continue, and I'm going to outline that in my pretrial order.

I don't want to just spring it on you and you think, well, Judge never said anything about this and now he's coming at us with you've got to file a written motion to continue.

Right now this case is set for trial

August 24th. Unless somebody files a written

motion to continue laying out a good reason why it

needs to be changed and when they believe it can be

tried.

Because I have already promised Judge Babb
that I will not mess up the Dade City courthouse in
the month of October, because she has a giant med
mal with five attorneys on every side, and the
courthouse is already going to be swamped, and it
isn't a big courthouse.

So that means if I'm getting this tried this year, you all have to clear your experts for either November, or if you want to really try to do this in December, December of this year.

And obviously December is a terrible idea, because you're looking at putting jurors in the box for three weeks, at least.

So that means you've got November, if it's going to be tried in 2015. Otherwise, we're going to January.

Actually, you're going to miss it, aren't you? You're not even going to be here. Are you going to be here?

MR. LOUGHERY: I don't think so, Judge.

THE COURT: No.

MR. LOUGHERY: I haven't officially said anything.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. LOUGHERY: Yes. I think it's fair to say that I probably will not be here.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, I can tell you we're going to be filing a motion.

Would you like us to file it sooner rather than later?

THE COURT: No, no. I mean let's just get it

filed well in advance of the June 30th pretrial.

Now, I haven't written my order. I looked at it this week and thought I need to start writing that pretrial order.

And then I thought I need to spend three hours this week reading and rereading and rereading the rules of discovery again so that I can be ready for this motion.

So I just never got around to writing it because I thought I'd spring it on you here, but it just didn't come together in my mind last night as I was reading.

MR. ESCOBAR: Would you like it set on the 30th or set before the 30th?

THE COURT: No. Let's set it on the 30th.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay.

THE COURT: If you want to move to continue, since we already have it cleared with everybody's calendar and we'll all be here, let's do that on that day, if, in fact, that's what you want to do.

But remember, I want you all to get together and talk about realistic opportunities for another time. Because if you're proposing for me to move this, I took the time in January to go through a timeline with you, and I broke out three weeks of

my calendar; and I broke out three days for a stand-your-ground motion, if that were to come to fruition.

So now, you know, as I look at my calendar,
November is the only place I see it could happen.
When you look at November, of course, Thanksgiving
is in there.

So if we didn't start in the first week of November on the 2nd, I'm not sure how it is possible that we could assure those people that they would be out by Thanksgiving.

I'm not baking a turkey dinner for jurors.

That's not going to happen.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, one of the things, and I think Mr. Loughery will agree with this and Mr. Garcia as well, the real problem here is getting enough dates.

Mr. Garcia is in a two-week murder trial in July.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. ESCOBAR: He couldn't give me any dates in July at all for depos, and so Mr. Loughery has given us some dates in July.

In May I have got very few dates, because it's no fault of them. They have other cases, other

trials, other depositions.

So I want the Court to know that we are, our firm is taking every available date that they give us.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay. I just don't want you to think we're dragging our feet.

THE COURT: I understand.

But you also see where I'm sitting on a case that came in January 13th of 2014, and the way that I'm starting to look at my calendar, I'm starting to get concerned that if there was a motion to continue, that I wouldn't be able to accomplish the task of trying this case in 2015.

That doesn't sit well with me. I think that with the quality of representation on both sides, we should be able to get a homicide tried in 20 months.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, we will do everything we can.

You know, one of the things that's concerning to me in this push to try to get it done in August, for example, is that this is a complicated case, it has a lot of very unique factors. I can't tell you how many witnesses we've deposed that have given a

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variety of issues for us to consider.

And it's not as simple as just taking a deposition. You've got to prepare for the deposition, then you've got to take the deposition, then you've got to summarize the deposition, then you've got to prepare that deposition for trial.

It is a monumental event. I can tell you that Dino and I, for every weekend, we're doing summaries after summaries of all the depos that we receive.

So it's a big monster. It's not easy. It's not like taking a depo and saying, well, I'm not going to worry about reading and summarizing, when the witness gets up there, I hope that I can remember what I asked him.

THE COURT: I was a lawyer. I remember what it is to do this stuff. So that's why I try to provide as hospitable an environment for you all to try your cases and do your bond hearings and everything else you need to do, but I'm also now not a lawyer but a judge responsible and tasked with moving the cases along.

I don't want to prejudice anybody's rights or rush anybody in to making mistakes, but at the same time I've got to put a reasonable timeframe on this

stuff.

(HEARING CONCLUDED.)

So that's why I'm going to have to be a stickler about a written motion to continue that includes within that motion to continue a plan for us to get to the goal, which is a fair trial for your client and a fair trial for the People of the State of Florida.

So let's make sure that plan includes how we're going to accomplish this in 2015, if that's what going to happen. Okay?

All right. Great. Everybody, good luck. Have a good weekend.

MR. LOUGHERY: Thank you, Judge. You too. THE BAILIFF: Court stands in recess.

CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

STATE (OF I	LORIDA)
)
COUNTY	OF	PASCO)

I, MARIA FORTNER, Registered Professional
Reporter for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, do hereby
certify that I was authorized to and did
stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and
that the transcript is a true and correct record.

DATED this 5th day of June, 2015.

